



Daily Report

East Europe

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NOTICE: This volume contains a representative selection of material previously disseminated in softcopy format.

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NATO Ambassadors To Discuss Peace Force 11 Oct
AU1010162995 Paris AFP in English
1551 GMT 10 Oct 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Brussels, Oct 10 (AFP)—NATO ambassadors will meet here Wednesday to discuss setting up a force aimed at enforcing future peace accords in Bosnia, diplomatic sources said.

The supreme allied commander in Europe, American General George Joulwan, will seek approval during the meeting for a "general global concept" tied to such a force, one diplomat said.

Joulwan is expected to discuss during the meeting specifics of the plan, including the size of the force and its military potential, the diplomat said.

He added that the plan has been under study for several days by military officials within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

Other sources said that implementing such an idea is dependent on the implementation of the latest U.S.-brokered cease-fire in Bosnia and UN approval.

One outstanding issue is Russia's participation in such a multi-national peacekeeping force provided by NATO, one expert said.

Moscow is hesitant about its former Cold War enemies taking the lead in Bosnia and favors the idea of an "international coalition" that would be under the command of the United Nations, he added.

UNHCR's Ogata Urges Refugee Repatriation Plan
AU1010170495 Paris AFP in English
1449 GMT 10 Oct 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Geneva, Oct 10 (AFP)—United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees Sadako Ogata Tuesday [10 October] expressed her desire to see a three-stage repatriation process as part of the peace process in the former Yugoslavia.

"The first should be the return of displaced persons within Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia," she told the Humanitarian Issues Working Group of the International Conference on former Yugoslavia.

This first phase would also include "a return-of-professionals programme" from third countries.

"The second phase would involve repatriation from other republics within the former Yugoslavia and the third return from countries which have granted temporary protection or resettlement," she continued.

Sadako stressed the importance of "the early establishment of an adequate monitoring presence to ensure the parties abide by their commitments."

She further stated that the return of displaced persons and refugees "must take place in parallel with rehabilitation and reconstruction work."

Parliament Makes Koruna Freely Convertible

AU1010154695 Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech
27 Sep 95 p 1

[Article by Martin Manak: "Into the Wide World With the Czech Koruna in Pocket"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The free convertibility of the koruna and the possibility for our citizens to purchase real estate abroad are among the most important items in the new foreign currency law that was passed by the Czech parliament's Chamber of Deputies yesterday.

There were 130 deputies in favor of passing the law and none against. The new foreign currency law means for the citizens the removal of the previous limit of 100,000 [korunas] for the purchase of foreign currency from domestic financial institutions and free access to any amount of foreign currency. Moreover, the law enables citizens to export an unlimited amount of Czech korunas and to change them for local currency. The possibility of changing korunas abroad is not automatically implemented but is to be a gradual process depending on specific operations by foreign banks.

The law permits direct investment abroad by Czech residents, the acceptance of financial credits from foreign entities, and the free opening of foreign currency accounts with domestic banks for legal persons. Furthermore, the so-called first refusal obligation, when residents had to offer foreign currency for purchase to the banking institutions is abolished. Opening a foreign currency account abroad remains subject to a regime of foreign-currency permits.

The law also facilitates the purchase of real estate abroad to both Czech legal and natural persons. The previous regulations on the acquisition of real estate in the Czech Republic by foreigners, however, remains in effect. Nevertheless, there is a significant change in the law allowing Czech citizens without permanent residence in the Republic to acquire real estate here. A foreigner who is not a Czech citizen can assume ownership of real estate through inheritance or for a diplomatic mission. The access of foreigners to domestic real estate is not at all limited within the framework of their business activities.

In the event of unfavorable developments in the balance of payments, which "seriously jeopardize" the country's solvency abroad, the foreign currency law enables the Czech Government to declare a so-called state of emergency in foreign currency management for up to a maximum of three months. If the government does so, it will be forbidden, among other things, to obtain foreign currency in exchange for Czech korunas, to transfer

payments abroad, to send funds to accounts abroad, or to accept financial credit from foreigners.

As Finance Minister Ivan Kocarnik emphasized in justifying the bill, the introduction of the external convertibility of the Czech currency is a necessary condition for us to join the OECD, an organization that brings together the most advanced countries of the world. "After almost 60 years, the Czech currency will be recognized and accepted abroad," he stated.

Czech National Bank Governor Josef Tosovsky pointed out that the law will impose greater demands on the government's economic policy and the central bank's monetary policy. He observed that the foreign currency law does not have any direct effect on the exchange rate of the Czech koruna.

The government proposal for an amendment to the foreign currency law was passed by 130 votes of the 146 deputies present. A total of 12 deputies abstained and four did not vote. The new law was not supported by nine Czech Social Democratic Party deputies, two Bohemian and Moravian Center Union deputies, the three Association for the Republic-Republican Party of Czechoslovakia deputies present, and two independent deputies. None of the 10 deputies of the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia were present when the vote was taken.

The law goes in effect on 1 October 1996.

Remaining restrictions:

—Indirect portfolio investments abroad will be possible only with a permit from the central bank.

—A Czech National Bank permit will also be necessary for opening an account abroad (koruna or foreign currency).

—The Czech National Bank will also have to approve financial credit for foreign entities.

—The purchase of real estate and land in the Czech Republic will continue to be limited to Czech citizens or permanent residents.

Commentary: Problems of Updating Army, Integrating

AU0810212195 Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech
27 Sep 95 p 1

[Commentary by Marek Stonis: "NATO and Us"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Only the people who see the guarantee of the security of our democracy in the East doubt the absolute necessity from the security vantage point of the entry of our state into the North Atlantic

alliance. The doubts can be legitimate, however, regarding the manner of preparation for this step on the part of the Czech Republic.

To transform an army that still recently was a part of the Warsaw Pact and slavishly followed orders from the Moscow generals into a modern combat-ready body certainly is not a simple task. Even to be able to contemplate integration into NATO we must rebuild our Army as soon as possible. This means from both materiel and personnel aspects. If we realize, however, how arduous are the discussions, for instance, on the modernization contracts for individual weapons, we can consider ourselves fortunate that we have not inherited from the time of communism a seagoing fleet of combat vessels. When the chaotic Minister Baudys was replaced last year by his People's Party fellow Vilem Holan, it seemed that a man was finally coming who would be able to resist the pressure of various military lobbies championing their interests in the placement of lucrative state orders. Moreover, Minister Holan came to his new department from Foreign Minister Zieleniec's office, so there was a realistic chance that the Army under his political command would approach the Western military structures much faster. The latest developments in the department of defense testify, however, to the hopes placed on Holan being rather exaggerated after all. Minister Holan himself seems lately to be rather disoriented. How else could one explain the fact that at first he advocated modernization of Russian fighters and now has suddenly switched to the purchase of U.S. F-16's? How can one explain the turmoil accompanying the contract for the modernization of the T-72 tank? Why did the Belehradsk's antimonopoly office cancel the tender for night sights? There are too many questions. The ministers responsible apparently realized this when they decided on 25 September that the government, rather than the Army alone, would decide on all strategic steps en route to reequipping our Army.

Namely, it would be the greatest misfortune to depend on the mollifying words of the U.S. generals stating that we have the best prerequisites for joining NATO or on the deceptive results of a public opinion survey regarding the trust of our citizens in the Army. Neither of these, as opposed to a consistent transformation of the Army, will bring us closer to NATO. After all, it still is true that we need the alliance more than it needs us.

New Deputy Defense Minister Outlines Priorities

*AU1010183695 Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech
27 Sep 95 p 3*

[Article by Michal Hackl: "According to Necas, Military Service Could Be Reduced"]

[FBIS Translated Text] New First Deputy Defense Minister Petr Necas (Civic Democratic Party [ODS]), in an interview for LIDOVE NOVINY, has described as his priorities assigning public tenders to Czech firms, speeding up the process of incorporation into NATO, and creating a compact army with stabilized occupancy of the lower command posts.

"The Defense Ministry is not an Army ministry," said new Deputy Defense Minister Petr Necas after the 25 September ministerial consultative meeting, which dealt with the possibility of partly separating the financing of some Army projects from the Defense Ministry's budget. According to Necas, in no way was this an expression of no confidence in the defense department. "It is rather that departments other than the Defense Ministry are also responsible for the country's defense capability," he said. This was also confirmed by Economy Committee Chairman Vladimir Budinsky [ODS]. According to him, the Army alone cannot make decisions on investments worth tens of billions in the years to come.

Necas rejected the speculation that the immediate reason for his predecessor's dismissal was the badly conducted selection procedure for modernizing the T-72 tank. "Selection procedures come under the jurisdiction of another deputy; neither former Deputy Minister Pospisil nor I have anything to do with them," he said. In the opinion of Necas, it is necessary to create "a relatively small but highly mobile Army. Sixty thousand soldiers is the optimum number." In the event of mobilization during a military conflict, the number of soldiers would increase threefold to fourfold. The Army's command system should also be changed. There should be a high percentage of more junior officers in the Army—career soldiers and longer serving noncommissioned officers. "We need to create an atmosphere in which career soldiers will see good prospects in Army service," said Necas. Soldiers in basic service would then only fulfill the function of rank-and-file soldiers, "infantrymen," and would not operate complex weapon systems. "Because the training of a rank-and-file soldier is not as demanding as that of a specialist, basic military service could be reduced even further in the future," said Deputy Minister Petr Necas. "The Army should acquire a 'home defense character'—soldiers would train close to their place of residence and, in the event of a threat,

would then defend their homes and towns in the terrain they know."

"We decided on the necessity of replacing the deputy defense minister in May. I would say that our selection of a suitable successor had lasted too long," said Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus to journalists yesterday. He said that he had discussed the issue with Necas, Pospisil, Josef Lux, chairman of the Christian Democratic Union-Czechoslovak People's Party, and Defense Minister Vilem Holan on 13 September and that the matter was settled then.

First Army Course for Westerners Concludes in Brno

AU1110082095 Prague PRAVO in Czech 29 Sep 95 p 3

[Report by "(ke)": "The First Army Course for Western Officers Has Come to an End"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Brno—Nineteen military chemists from 17 European countries and the United States completed the first Czech Army specialist course for Western officers at the Military Academy in Brno on 28 September.

In various Czech units over a period of three weeks, they were acquainted with antichemical defense devices and worked with Czech instruments for chemical and radiation inspection. "We are pleasantly surprised by the standard of technology and officers," said Captain John Kulifay of the United States to reporters after completing the course.

Prime Minister Klaus Answers Interpellations

AU1110081995 Prague HOSPODARSKE NOVINY in Czech 29 Sep 95 p 3

[Article by "pra": "Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus Defended His Recent Meeting With the Bavarian Minister-President"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Prague—In the Chamber of Deputies yesterday, Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus sharply rejected the view held by Deputy Jiri Vyvadil (Czech Social Democratic Party) that he, Klaus, might be denigrating the Czech Republic by his foreign political activities in general and by the talks with Bavarian politicians in particular. Deputy Jiri Vyvadil declared, among other things, that a significant failure by the Czech prime minister was his recent talks on Czech-German relations with Bavarian Minister President Edmund Stoiber. The Chamber's Foreign Committee chairman, Jiri Payne (Civic Democratic Party), pointed out that official contacts between the Czech Republic

and four federal laender, including Bavaria, date back to the time of the [Czech] federation.

In a written answer to an older interpellation by Vyvadil, Prime Minister Klaus said that the government considers the 1945 decrees by the president of the Republic a part of the Czech legal code and that, at the time of their origin, these legislative acts fully complied with the sentiments of Czech citizens. The Cabinet considers the terms "transfer" or "evacuation" appropriate, but never the "expulsion." The prime minister in his response also observed that the government disagrees with any contemplations on the symmetric nature of responsibility on the part of the Czech and German peoples and is fully aware of the importance of the historical sequence because there would be no transfer of Germans without German Nazism. Furthermore, he stated that the Cabinet does not intend to amend the law on acquiring citizenship so as to "provide the Sudeten Germans with an exception from the generally valid legal framework."

Civic Democratic Alliance Deputy Cestmir Hofhanzl again criticized the government approach to the continuing privatization of forest management and refused to accept the prime minister's answer to his interpellation. Vaclav Klaus in his answer said, among other things, that the transformation of forest management is based on generally valid reform principles and that, for economic reasons, it is not possible to break up former forestry enterprises. The existence of prospering expert firms capable both technically and professionally of providing service work for the forest owners is completely based on the principles of the market economy and proved in European application. According to Deputy Hofhanzl, the practice of the forest stockholding companies and their allegedly monopoly type of behavior in relation to the forest owners is the main reason for the continuing devastation of forest growth.

[Prague PRAVO in Czech on 29 September on page 1 adds some details to the clash between Klaus and Vyvadil: "Klaus said that he will not listen to the 'absurd, deceitful, and false reproaches.' The deputy pointed out to the prime minister that he is not protected by immunity and added: 'It is completely irrelevant what you want or do not want to do, because the relationship between the executive power and parliament is such that, regardless of your subjective sentiments, you simply will have to listen!'" PRAVO also reports that, according to Vyvadil, "the prime minister made a mistake when he dissociated himself from the recent statement by Interior Minister Jan Ruml (Civic Democratic Party) regarding democracy in Slovakia. According to Vyvadil, Ruml said what 95 percent of the Czech political scene believes."]

Ministries Not To React to Slota Remarks on NATO*AU1110082195 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak
5 Oct 95 p 2*

[Report by "ad, lm": "They Will Not React to Slota's Statements"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratislava—According to Defense Ministry Spokesman Frantisek Kasicky, the Ministry of Defense will not comment and assume a stand on Slovak National Party [SNS] Chairman Jan Slota's statements on Slovakia's neutrality and his negative attitude toward NATO. Asked by PRAVDA about the ministry's attitude toward the Slovak Republic's possible neutrality and whether this would be in harmony with the ministry's and the government's philosophy, he told us: "Historically, Slovakia has no experience with neutrality, and, in its policy statement, the government clearly declared its endeavor to gain NATO membership." According to his words, the government regards the North Atlantic alliance as the most effective existing security organization and membership thereof as an opportunity to gain effective security guarantees. According to Frantisek Kasicky, it cannot be ruled out that Slovakia's individual entry into NATO will be preceded by a referendum.

Slovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs Spokesman Juraj Matejovsky, too, said that the ministry would not react to Jan Slota's statements because the Slovak Republic's foreign policy orientation toward NATO membership is unchangeable. This is a priority of the Slovak Republic's foreign policy that cannot be questioned. This transpires from the government's policy statement, which is binding for all coalition partners.

Reportage on Michal Kovac Jr Kidnapping Case**'Game' To Thwart Inquiry***AU1110083095 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak
5 Oct 95 pp 1, 3*

[Article by "PA": "There Exists Also a Second Letter From an Alleged Slovak Information Service Employee"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Some Slovak dailies yesterday published reports on a letter written by a person who claims to have worked in the Slovak Information Service [SIS], in the "shadowing section."

In the handwritten letter, which has been made available also to our editorial office, the writer states that he had testified before Major Peter Vacok, the investigator in the case of Michal Kovac Jr.'s kidnapping, and that he had also sent a similar letter to him. Major Peter Vacok

has confirmed to journalists the receipt of a "similar" letter. [passage omitted]

Our editorial office avails itself also of a second letter whose author identifies himself as an SIS employee. This second letter, dated 27 September 1995, is type-written, and its essence is expressed in the following passage: "I know that an operation—an intelligence game—has been prepared for at least three weeks and is now being implemented, the aim of which is to bring to a halt, vigorously and on a broad scale, the effort of the investigators of the assault on and the kidnapping of the president's son, Kovac Jr., and to intimidate all possible future investigators." The author claims, furthermore, that people who are already known to the public—that is, an SIS "member" who was seen at the Berg border crossing on the day of the kidnapping, his direct SIS superior, and three other persons—are involved in the operation. Details follow about the "game," within the framework of which some employees of the Regional Office of Investigations (KUV) in Bratislava are to be compromised and, subsequently, arrested, with assistance from a certain KUV investigator who has simultaneously been recruited as an SIS member. The intended outcome of this "game," according to the writer, is withdrawing the file from KUV Bratislava and assigning it to another office of investigations and another investigator, which have been selected in advance and which "will not succeed in clearing up anything."

Major Peter Vacok confirmed to us yesterday that he also knows the text of this second letter (both letters are at the KUV). As transpired from his words, he is paying due attention to both letters. As he went on to say, he is "working on it personally, and the criminal police are also working on it." Asked about his view about the facts contained in the letters, he said: "It is now premature to comment on this. Once everything surrounding the matter has been documented, it will be possible to assume a stand."

Of course, the possibility that both letters are forged cannot be ruled out, either. Most probably, light on their credibility will be thrown only by the stand that Major Peter Vacok was referring to.

Letter Names SIS Members Involved*AU1110083195 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA
in Slovak 6 Oct 95 pp 1-2*

[Article by Jan Fule and Ivan Sedlar: "Will Anonymous Letters Clarify Michal Kovac Jr.'s Kidnapping?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratislava—The day before yesterday we published an anonymous letter, in which an alleged Slovak Information Service [SIS] member

let us know that, albeit unwittingly, he participated, as a member of the SIS shadowing section [sledovacka], in the abduction of Michal Kovac Jr. to Austria. In the letter, he provided the initials of four alleged SIS members who supposedly also took part in the operation—Igor M., Dusan R., Jiri N., and Peter S. Major Vacok, investigator in the case, on 2 October received a similar letter, probably from the same author. Yesterday we managed to find out (and verify from several sources) that the initials are identical with those of four former members of the Police Corps shadowing section.

The persons in question could be Captain Igor Majtan, Captain Dusan Rakus, Major Jiri Novotny, and Captain Peter Skrutek. Of course, the fact that these names and surnames correspond with the aforementioned initials does not necessarily prove that these men had anything to do with Kovac Jr.'s abduction. The daily SME and NOVA TV avail themselves of similar information.

According to accessible information, it can be assumed that the whole operation was overseen by a group of experts from the secret service section for special assignments. Julius I., another former police member, who used to specialize in the clarification of particularly grievous, organized, and violent forms of criminal activity and who is therefore known also in journalistic circles, may have also participated in preparing the operation. This is most probably the same Julius I. who has repeatedly been seen in the company of Jaroslav S., one of the key SIS men, for example, in the Black Raven cafe in Bratislava. It is also interesting that Julius I. left the police service at about the same time Jaroslav S. took up his post in SIS.

Yesterday we received another anonymous letter. Because we have already managed to verify some of the information mentioned in it and because this information appears to be accurate, we publish also this letter in a slightly abridged form, without giving the SIS members' code names but, instead, the initials of their actual names:

"Esteemed Sirs, it has become increasingly obvious recently that the circumstances of citizen Michal Kovac Jr.'s abduction abroad are getting shrouded in mist. For the case to be cleared up, we are offering to you the following facts, which are identical and confirmed from circles close to higher-ranking SIS functionaries [sentence as published]. Until the time of M. Kovac Jr.'s kidnapping, Jozef V., a member of the second SIS section, along with Ludmila A. from the same section, had been actively collecting information regarding the family of President Michal Kovac and his close relatives. Frantisek F., registered with the same section, who was

often to be seen last week with people who carried out the kidnapping, has been bragging, when intoxicated, that the kidnapping was carried out by members of one department of the second SIS section headed by Jula [familiar form of Julius] I., former member of the Bratislava Police Corps Municipal Office of Investigations, who, too, is currently registered with the same SIS section. Jaroslav S. of the second SIS section is directly involved in the whole operation and directly supervised the action group and the deployment of motor vehicles— V.'s vehicle [Skoda-] Favorit BBH 96- and F.'s vehicle Opel Astra BLE 81- ."

So much for the anonymous letter, which the writer also sent to the Police Corps Regional Office of Investigations in Bratislava.

Hence, the case continues.

Lawyer Visits U.S. Embassy

AU1010184995 Bratislava SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA
in Slovak 7 Oct 95 pp 1-2

[Report by "mis": "Chairman of Agricultural Cooperative Claims That, to This Day, the Father Has Not Paid the Son's Debts"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Bratislava—[Passage omitted]

Unconfirmed Information

In connection with the abduction of Michal K. Jr. abroad, a great number of reports "from well-informed sources" who do not wish to be named under any circumstances appear every day. Not even anonymous letters containing information concerning secret facts are rare. In similar fashion, the rumor has reached our editorial office that Michal K. Jr.'s Slovak lawyer visited the U.S. Embassy in Bratislava. Because we do not have the possibility of verifying this information, we have to say it is a rumor, the veracity of which we do not guarantee. If the information is true, however, we would like to know what was discussed there.

Report of President's Alleged Foreign Account

AU1010182895

[FBIS Editorial Report] Bratislava SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA in Slovak from 3 to 7 October publishes a number of items alleging that President Michal Kovac holds a multimillion-schilling account with the Austrian Reiffeisen Bank. On 9 October, the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS) daily publishes the president's response to its allegations.

SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA on 3 October on page 1 carries a 100-word report announcing that "SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA has obtained a document from foreign sources revealing the size of the foreign account of a prominent Slovak" and that, in its subsequent issues, it will publish further details from the document. On 4 October the daily reveals the name of the bank (Reiffeisen Bank), on 5 October the amount of money deposited in the account on 25 May 1995 (23,258,688 Austrian schillings and 80 groschen), on 6 October the account number (328-436/588), and on 7 October, finally, the owner of the account. On 7 October on page 1, under the banner headline "Owner of the Foreign Account in Austria With More Than 23 Million Schillings Is Engineer Michal Kovac, Candidate of Sciences, From Bratislava," SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA publishes the copy of a bank statement, dated 25 May 1995, which, as SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA notes, "contains some data that bear conspicuous similarity to the data of one constitutional official." In addition to Michal Kovac's name and the amount of money deposited in the account, the copy of the statement includes Kovac's academic title, his date of birth (5 August 1930), and his address (43 Placheho Street, 841 01 Bratislava).

On the same day, in the "A Matter of Public Concern" column on page 1, SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA carries the following commentary by its chief editor, Jan Smolec: "Quite recently, the president asked me to find out about the foreign accounts of Meciar's ministers. In pursuit of this task from the president, I got hold not of an anonymous letter, as other chief editors did, but of the facsimile of a specific foreign bank account containing over 23 million Austrian schillings (some 70 million korunas, according to the exchange rate valid today!). I was shocked, above all, by the enormous sum of money and then by the name of the account holder. According to the facsimile, the owner of this treasure is Michal Kovac from Bratislava. While there are 10 Michal Kovacs in the telephone directory for the Slovak capital, only one of them lives on Placheho Street, which is the home of the Slovak president.

"And so I ask you, Mr. President: 'Does this money belong to you? If it does, would you please explain how you obtained it? You have been portraying yourself as a person who was discriminated against by the communist regime. Can one earn such a sum in schillings by honest work?' Moreover, this gives rise to other questions: 'Why did you deposit the money abroad? Are these millions of schillings clean in terms of taxes?'"

"Nowadays, every small businessman must furnish proof of his clean record. However, the sum deposited in the account seriously challenges the clean record of the highest constitutional official."

On 9 October, on page 2, SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA publishes the following "Statement by the President of the Slovak Republic," issued in "Bratislava on 6 October 1995": "On 7 October 1995, the daily SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA published, under a bombastic headline, the information that I have exactly 23,258,688 schillings and 80 groschen in a Reiffeisen Bank account. If I am to be honest, I first rejoiced upon reading the news, then laughed, and, finally, grew sad. The news first cheered me because I have never owned such a sum of money and, apparently, an as-yet-unknown 'donor' deposited this sum in an account I never opened. It made me laugh because, in their scenario for discrediting the head of state, its authors resort to even such naive methods. On 9 October I will drive to the bank in question and, if the money is really there, will withdraw it and distribute it down to the last schilling to orphanages all across Slovakia. I will keep only the 80 groschen as a souvenir.

"If the money is not there, it will be easy to find out in the bank the truth about the authenticity of the account, the contract on it, and the genuineness of the statement, which is marked by a few peculiarities.

"What filled me with sadness was that, before the meeting of parliament, the progovernment daily is again resorting to such perfidious methods of political struggle against my person, and, above all, how deep we have sunk that some people do not shy away from using such dirty methods. This is very dangerous for our state—domestically as well as internationally.

"I am filing suit for defamation and criminal charges against the publisher and chief editor of SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA. I am doing so without delay."

On the same day, on pages 1 and 2, under the headline "Will the SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA Chief Editor Become the President's First Prisoner?," SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA carries a 600-word statement by Jan Smolec in response to President Kovac's statement. In the statement, Smolec justifies the publication of the facsimile of the bank statement in his daily's 7 October issue, claiming that the aim was to "arrive at the truth." Smolec says that the president of any country has the duty to know which is the duty of the president, and that the facsimile of the statement of the account "exists," although he admits that the account "has meanwhile been liquidated." He says to Smolec, SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA is "not bear responsibility for the publication of the president's personal data," and he himself will feel "honored" to be involved in a lawsuit with the president. "And I will even accept the possible fate of being the president's prisoner," the chief editor says in conclusion.

Carnogursky: Civil Servants Boycotting President

AU1010143195 Vienna KURIER in German
10 Oct 95 p 5

[Interview with Jan Carnogursky, chairman of the Slovak Christian Democratic Movement, by Jana Patsch; place and date not given: "Carnogursky: 'The President Simply Must Not Give Up'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Jan Carnogursky, chairman of the Slovak Christian Democratic Movement, has requested a special parliamentary session. KURIER talked to him about the following subjects:

Agenda of the Special Session

"If the coalition does not agree to our agenda, which is very likely, we will convene a joint session of all parliamentary groups on the role of the secret service in the case of Kovac's [son of President Kovac] abduction half an hour later. Secret Service Chief Lexa and Interior Minister Hudek will be invited. Resolutions cannot be adopted there, but there will be a political debate."

President Kovac's Removal From Office

"Despite all affirmations to the contrary, the coalition cannot achieve the necessary 90 votes in parliament. We await a possible referendum with equanimity."

Civil Servants Ignoring President

"When President Kovac travels to the country today, his activity is very much restricted. The civil servants are boycotting him. He really only has the rights that the Constitution explicitly guarantees him. Prime Minister Meciar is politically fully responsible for all of these obstructions to the head of state."

Stalemate in Slovakia

"If Prime Minister Meciar does not give up his destructive intentions, Slovakia will remain paralyzed for some time. The president must not give in. At any rate, we are continuing our struggle."

Commentary Blames President for Recent Fall in Support

AU0710151895 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES
in Czech 26 Sep 95 p 13

[Commentary by Karol Wolf: "The Slovaks Do Not Feel Sorry for Their President"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Another, to date, more or less sacred taboo has been toppled on the Slovak political scene, which has a consistent capacity for creating unexpected precedents. In short, it is possible to

characterize it as the electorate's tendency to feel sorry for the weaker, the persecuted, or the unappreciated.

In the past, this attribute of the Slovak voter—which several institutions dealing in public opinion polls have identified as relatively permanent—has been exploited with great success by, for example, Prime Minister Meciar, who has become renowned for his tales of how the former federal secret police or agents of foreign powers are hounding him. However, former Prime Minister Moravcik also had a similar experience. After the last parliamentary elections, his Democratic Union plainly benefited, and is benefiting, from the attacks that Meciar himself unleashed against it in an attempt to prove it committed electoral fraud.

The Slovak electorate's capacity for sympathy and pity, however, collapsed completely in the case of the kidnapping of Michal Kovac Jr.

The grieving president, who has almost broken down in public several times since the day his son was kidnapped, recorded a more than 10-percent decline in support in the poll that maps out the period immediately after the terrorist act. His main rival, Prime Minister Meciar, has, on the other hand, improved by almost 15 percent, despite the fact that the course of the investigation into the kidnapping is relatively dramatic and that people in Slovakia are publicly voicing the suspicion that the Slovak secret service is directly behind the entire affair.

There are only two ways of explaining this unexpected "cruelty" by the Slovak voter, which has surprised all of the public opinion experts. First, it is necessary to emphasize that President Kovac, in the first few days after the kidnapping, did not behave like a president and succumbed to family feeling. He turned to Austrian President Klestil to no avail and tried persistently to get his son out of his Viennese prison. He also directed some inappropriate remarks at the government that he was later unable to confirm and, thus, merely bolstered the suspicion that his son is not exactly unblemished. In other words, he touched a sensitive chord among the public and gave the impression that a different method applies for his son, as the son of the head of state, than for the ordinary citizen. Instead of declaring that he had nothing against Kovac Jr.'s being questioned normally by the German authorities, he tried to help him from his official position.

Indisputably, the Slovak media also had a hand in the poll's results. That is, the pro-government and, therefore, antipresidential tendentiousness of state television and radio is far from being compensated for by the efforts of the independent media. Not one Slovak newspaper has been able to put together a team that could devote itself

unceasingly to the kidnapping, and the private VTV television has conducted itself similarly. An incident of the nature of the kidnapping of the president's son, which all of the journalists in the world dream about, has not stimulated anyone, with the exception of a few independent reporters and writers.

As a rule, not the Slovak media but their colleagues from the Czech Republic, Austria, and Germany came up with the new facts.

A quotation from a Slovak Television presenter, Igor Kubis, will serve very well to complete the picture of the state of Slovak journalism. During Slovak Television's main news program, he explained public-legal television's lack of interest in the entire case as follows: "In my opinion, far too much scope is being given to the alleged kidnapping of Michal Kovac Jr."

Deputy Prime Minister Supports TU Demands

AU0710152495 Bratislava SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA in Slovak 5 Oct 95 p 5

[Article by TASR: "From Slovak Deputy Prime Minister Jozef Kalman's Statement on the Trade Unionists' Demands"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratislava—As Slovak deputy prime minister and chairman of the Slovak Republic Council of Economic and Social Accord (RHSD), I fully support the demands of the participants in the protest rally organized by the Confederation of Trade Unions (KOZ) of the Slovak Republic in Bratislava on 23 September. I have also called on all other members of the government to seek, within the framework of their departments, ways of raising the cost of labor as early as in 1996. I will continue to support and carefully monitor the solution to this important issue, which is being enforced also by the Association of Workers of Slovakia. This is reported in a statement issued by Deputy Prime Minister Jozef Kalman yesterday.

As the deputy prime minister goes on to say, the appeal adopted by the participants in the KOZ rally was dealt with by the RHSD at its meeting on 27 September, at which the social partners agreed that, "in spite of the positive macroeconomic development, the socioeconomic situation of citizens remains very difficult." The tripartite body adopted conclusions in which it recommended to the Slovak Republic Government to solve, in cooperation with the social partners, compensation for the increased [railroad and bus] fares and for the abolition of social discounts by 15 October. At the same time, the RHSD established a tripartite commission, which is to submit to the government proposals for compensation by 15 October. The Slovak Republic Government

will deliver its definitive opinion on these proposals at its meeting on 17 October.

Jozef Kalman also specified that, at its meeting on 3 October, the Cabinet endorsed the above conclusions. It also agreed with the trade unionists' demand that the citizens' standard of living and the price of labor be dealt with. The government sees realistic solutions, above all, in the preparation of the state budget, General Agreement [between the trade unions, employers, and the government], and collective bargaining for next year. As Jozef Kalman notes in his statement, at a meeting between government representatives and employers on 3 October, Cabinet members called on representatives of the Association of Employers' Unions of Slovakia to cooperate more closely with trade unionists in seeking possibilities to raise the price of labor, which can be described as another accommodating move on the part of the Cabinet.

Meciar on Prospects for Trade With Former CEMA

LD1010143595 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1100 GMT 10 Oct 95

[FBIS Translated Text] An international economic conference entitled Slovakia in the Lines of Force [v silniciach] of Europe and the World on the Threshold of the Third Millennium opened in Bratislava today. The three-day event has been organized by the Independent Association of Economists of Slovakia [Nezavisle zdruzenie ekonomov Slovenska] in conjunction with the Permanent Conference of the Slovak Intelligentsia-Slovakia Plus [Stala konferencia slovenskej inteligencie-Slovakia Plus]. The conference is being held under the patronage of Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar, who is interviewed by Michal Dzurianin.

[Begin recording] [Dzurianin] Prime Minister, how do you see relations between Slovakia and the countries of the former CEMA?

[Meciar] Since 1990, there have been a collapse in economic cooperation and a big drop in the exchange of goods, and production cooperation has come to a complete standstill. We are trying to revive the exchange of goods by reducing customs duties within the framework of the Central European Free Trade Association. We are also working out a blueprint for the development of the movement of capital and services by the year 1996.

From the point of view of our interests, it is in Slovakia's interest to place goods and services in these markets, and this constitutes an extremely promising and dynamic source of future development.

[Dzurianin] Will this development not be affected by the process of Slovakia's integration into the European Union?

[Meciar] On the contrary, it will support this development because many Central European countries have plans similar to our own. Five countries are asso-

ciate members of the European Union, while others are preparing themselves for integration. The growth in economic structures and broader cooperation is, after all, the goal of the European Union as well as our own.
[end recording]

Major General on Preparation for NATO Exercise
AU1010114595 Budapest MAGYAR NEMZET
in Hungarian 6 Oct 95 p 8

[Interview with Major General Lajos Urban, deputy commander of the Hungarian Army's land forces, by Frigyes Varju; place and date not given: "The Hungarian Army Is Facing a Decisive Year—Lajos Urban on the Army's National Roots and the Problems of NATO Admission"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The Partnership for Peace military exercise to be held in mid-October in Hungary will be a milestone for Hungarian officers from the point of view that this will be the first time Hungarian soldiers are able to participate in the planning work of a NATO exercise. At the same time, Major General Lajos Urban, deputy commander of the Hungarian Army's land forces and the Hungarian leader of the military action code named "Cooperative Light," does not hide his opinion that the preparation of the Hungarian staff of commanders for joining NATO is not progressing with the necessary speed. [passage omitted]

[Varju] NATO is preparing for a multinational Peace Partnership military exercise within a few days, which will be the most significant one so far. It will be organized on Hungary's territory and you will be the head of the Hungarian coleader. In your view, what will be more difficult for us before the expected NATO admission: modernizing the Hungarian Army's weapons or changing the commanders' way of thinking?

[Urban] I can say with certainty that establishing intellectual compatibility will be the most difficult and longest process. Modernizing the weaponry is very simple, it is only a question of money. As a matter of fact, we already have a unit, namely the 25th tank brigade, which will soon be able to perform joint tasks with NATO.

[Varju] According to military analysts, the current Hungarian-German-British designed command staff control exercise is a milestone in the life of NATO and the East Central European countries cooperating with it. In what does this exercise coincide and in what does it differ from the former Warsaw Pact exercises?

[Urban] As this cooperation is multinational, all aspects of it are completely different from what we were used to in the Warsaw Pact. In the Warsaw Pact, the appointed leadership independently planned the tasks and, at the most, the mediators of the member states could participate in this. However, this time, all participating countries will be part of planning and implementation, of the three separate phases of the military exercise. At the so-called initial planning conference, the sides

will first define the basic documents and the direction of planning, and then they will set up a central planning team of practical experts. Rather than generals, these will be majors and captains at the most, people who are able to work out the details of the basic documents between the initial and the main conference, which will then be finalized by the main planning conference's high-ranking leaders.

[Varju] I must admit that this seems too complicated to me. Are you sure that the plans for military actions need to mature for a long time?

[Urban] No, in fact, it is very important to be able to plan and organize the tasks as fast as possible. However, let us not forget that this is a NATO exercise, soldiers of various nationalities of this region will for the first time be involved in the planning, therefore, the peace partnership process is basically educational and methodological to help establish intellectual compatibility among the commanders. This type of exercise has only been held once, in the Czech Republic in recent days, and now Hungary is next. The size of the cooperation is similar in both places, but the exercise will be held in more realistic circumstances in Hungary compared to the Czech Republic. This test of strength is equally important for NATO and Hungary, and it is an important step forward compared to past cooperations.

[Varju] Is it possible that further training of the Hungarian commanders will be accelerated after the October exercise?

[Urban] Rather than acceleration, we would need training in the right direction. As far as I know, some 1,500 Hungarian field officers have studied at western military schools, but we must change the attitude that the knowledge of one language can be enough for our approach to NATO. Suitable experts have to be trained for the various tasks and this will take at least two to three years. In recent times, it has been a problem for us that we did not set up a unified system for training the officers and field officers; we accepted everything the partners offered to us and we often trained people for areas which we did not need. In view of our experience so far I can say that the commanders of the Hungarian Army are looking forward to the coming months with great expectations. This and the next year will be decisive from the viewpoint whether we will be able to lay the foundations for the kind of Army everyone is talking about but for which we have done very little. This means that the Army should be smaller but more efficient. Everyone wants it to be smaller but we are not doing much for modernizing it. However, we should not put the commanders, who form the Army's backbone, into a situation where they lose their faith in the fu-

ture, because it was they who persevered all along in the political storm of the change of the regime! They need to be shown the way and the direction, they must be kept by all means so that we can prepare for fully implementing the tasks in NATO. From this point of view, it is positive that the commander of the Army has set up a team to prepare NATO membership within the leadership, although we were at least four years late in doing this. In addition to this, a number of such organizations would be needed, operating parallel, to prepare our catching up with NATO from various directions.

[Varju] How much time would be needed to make the whole staff of commanders NATO compatible?

[Urban] We needed six months to prepare the staff for this current exercise, which is a very short time. If the organizations preparing our membership and the commanders clearly received their tasks and if they spent all their energy doing this job then we would not need much time to achieve our goals.

[Varju] Do you think the current efforts are sufficient?

[Urban] No, they are not. The process of joining up has to be strengthened and broadened.

Editorial Views Possible Timing of NATO Entry

AU0610184895 Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP
in Hungarian 6 Oct 95 p 7

[Editorial by Janos T. Barabas: "One Year of Loneliness"]

[FBIS Translated Text] According to the news, NATO will only decide on admitting new members after the Russian and the U.S. presidential elections. Although they have already indicated this possibility before—and its reasonableness cannot be doubted—it is still an important new piece of information. This is the first time we were given an exact date. Since the NATO study was handed over, the conditions of our hoped-for membership have become—vaguely—clearer, but NATO has not yet been willing to give information on the timing. Although we still do not know when we will be given the chance to gain membership, we now know until when we definitely will not. We have one year to make some careful progress, thus giving more time to Moscow and to our future allies to assess their relationship with each other—because the final decision on our fate mainly depends on this.

Moscow is obviously mainly irritated by the possible NATO membership of the former Soviet republics. It is no accident that, for this scenario, even the thought of occupying the Baltics has emerged—although they quickly denied this officially. Poland is the next level of the Russian worries with its nearly 40 million strong

population and its potential as a medium-sized power. Russia might find Hungary's, the Czech Republic's, and Slovakia's NATO membership somewhat less worrying.

The voices that angrily condemn the West for giving in to Moscow's blackmail will now probably become louder again. Naturally, it is unpleasant when, due to weather conditions, the airplane preparing for landing is told to circle above town for a while until it can land safely, but it would be stupid to take this as an offense. It may be true that only one superpower is left after the collapse of the Soviet Union but, together with the ruins of the empire, Moscow inherited a largely untouched arsenal that cannot be ignored. The real problem is that these basics of the world political situation and the fundamental interests of the United States and Russia will not have changed by the end of next year, either, therefore, we will not be any closer to solving this stalemate situation after the presidential elections, either.

Extra Border Guard Units Leave Southern Border

LD0810122895 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network
in Hungarian 1100 GMT 8 Oct 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Hungarian border guard units will be withdrawn from the southern stretch of the border. Laszlo Gungl reports:

[Gungl] Some of the border guards are on their way home. Those who stay here will be replaced by fresh forces who have already arrived at their stations. The departing units were seen off with ceremony in Siklos and thanked for the disciplined work they carried out in the past three weeks. In the future, five action companies will be on duty in the district. According to experts, a force of this size will be sufficient for effective defense of the border. Colonel Jozsef Bendek, deputy head of the Siklos headquarters, told the "Chronicle" newscast. He said that although there has recently been some shooting in the occupied Croatian territories and a number of mines have exploded in the vicinity of the Hungarian state border, the region is basically calm.

Government Backs Autonomy for Vojvodina Hungarians

LD0810125095 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network
in Hungarian 1000 GMT 8 Oct 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The Hungarian Government is of the view that the autonomy plan of the Vojvodina minority organizations should stress that the Hungarian community regards coexistence as a value and it does not strive for secession.

Erika Toerzsoek, deputy chairman of the Office of Hungarians Beyond the Border, said in an interview with the

news agency [MTI] that at the Budapest meeting of representatives of the government, the Vojvodina Hungarian organizations, and intellectuals, an agreement had been made on the principles of the desired autonomy. They had also agreed to give up rivalry.

Andras Agoston, one of the leaders of the Vojvodina Hungarians [chairman of the Democratic Community of Vojvodina Hungarians—DZVM], is of the view that the settlement of the minority issues in the successor states of the former Yugoslavia has been put on the agenda. Agoston expects international agreements to be made. He hopes for success following an undertaking by [Prime Minister] Gyula Horn to represent their autonomy endeavors.

The Association of Vojvodina Hungarians also welcomes the Hungarian Government's espousal. It offers to cooperate with the DZVM in the interests of the autonomy.

Provisions, Effect of Police Secrecy Rules

AU0710151995 Budapest MAGYAR NEMZET
in Hungarian 6 Oct 95 pp 1, 4

[Article by "Bodnar": "Interior Affairs Secrecy Protection—Even the Phone Book Is Strictly Guarded...."]

[FBIS Translated Text] The law that was passed this year on state and official secrets activated the imagination of lawmakers both in the area of central administration and in the police. The list of the range of secrets recently approved by the national police chief reveals that even the telephone book is protected. It is true though that the list of secrets is now an open secret—and not only for the police.

When the police organization of another state or an international institution provides the Hungarian police with data or information and requests it to be treated as official secret, then this has to be complied with. Defining the period of protection is up to the owner of the secret, otherwise it can be a maximum of 20 years. For a maximum of five years, the security plan for foreign state and government heads and protected Hungarian state leaders is also part of the recently outlined range of official secrets, unless it has to be treated as state secret. Naturally, the secret code of police broadcasting, the instruction that ensures secrecy, and the documentation of code names and code numbers also receive legal protection for three years after their withdrawal from the system. The longest period of protection is 20 years in this case, too.

The police's combined frequency records are to be treated as official secret for 10 years. The guarding plan

of police buildings and cells and documentation on the guard and its personnel are under police protection for 12 months after ending their use but this period can be extended even up to 20 years if necessary. Data on the police's cooperation agreements in connection with preparedness and mobilization also receive 20 years of protection. The route plan of guard duty instructions can come under official secrets for up to 20 years if they are in connection with the state of emergency or the defense of buildings used by diplomatic organizations. The plan to secure the transport of military type cargo, or cargo containing especially high value or drugs, can be treated as official secret for one year after the event. Data on the size, assignment, armament, and military value of the police staff and the deployment plans are to be treated as secret for five, maximum 20 years after their expiry. Similar protection time is prescribed for data on the state courier service.

The police's punitive disciplinary and minor offense documents which are created in connection with violating official secrets also receive protection for 20 years. Procedures, tactical plans, and reports, descriptions, and video and voice recordings showing in detail the application of armament technological equipment at the police's special service and at the implementation of special police tasks are also to be treated as official secrets and the protection time can be as long as 20 years.

Reports on the situation of terrorist threat in the country, instructions, and video and voice recordings in connection with preventing terrorist activities are treated as official secrets until they are legally published or for five years after their expiry. In connection with constitutional requirements, the maximum protection period can be 20 years in this case, too.

The information interests of the protection of secrets and of the citizen-friendly state can also clash in other areas. It might not need special justification that analyses and reports in connection with airplane catastrophes and accidents also need to be protected by secrecy for a certain period. The national police chief also prescribed one year protection for bids submitted to the police, but the time of the assessment can of course mean the loss of this right. The plans of criminal, public order raids, and those dealing with foreigners get a minimum period of strict protection of official secrecy until the day after their implementation. The day after carrying out investigative activities is also the turning point as regards secrecy if making these public before time could endanger the success of the investigation or surveillance.

Finally, it has to be mentioned here that, according to the judgment of the national police chief, even the telephone book containing data on state leaders is to be

treated as official secret if the publication of any piece of information in it would endanger the undisturbed work of those receiving increased protection. The maximum period of 20 years seems a little exaggerated. The detailed elaboration of the interior affairs official secrets list will probably end the legal uncertainty that has characterized this delicate area up to now. The classification of the listed data is questionable in places, but the practical implementation—and perhaps the sentencing practice of courts—will, in accordance with the constitutional state's requirements, contribute to preventing the authorities from using these "top secrets" for giving "ideological" support to an increased state isolation from the public.

Labor Minister Assesses Social Bargaining

AU1010121295 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG
in Hungarian 7 Oct 95 pp 1, 10

[Interview with Labor Affairs Minister Magda Kovacs Kosa by Szilvia Hamor; place and date not given: "Mrs. Kosa: We Must Come to an Agreement With the Social Partners"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Labor Affairs Minister Magda Kovacs Kosa gave an interview to NEPSZABADSAG before her resignation. In this, she outlined the issue on which, in her view, agreement has to be reached with the social partners in order to preserve social peace. The conflicts within the government, which since then have led to her resignation, were also part of the interview. Mrs. Kosa did not yet wish to comment on her decision, as she wanted more time to assess the events. However, she agreed to the publishing of this interview.

[Hamor] Do you not find it an unusual contradiction that interest coordination has come to a crisis precisely during a professedly social-liberal government?

[Kosa] In my view, it is our usual understanding of interest coordination that has come to a crisis point. I recently participated in a conference of the ILO [International Labor Organization] at which the dilemmas of social partnership were discussed. All countries are dealing with similar problems to us. In places that do not have a corporative model, the possibility of making agreements on a macroeconomic level is questionable. Agreements that can be adhered to are made between employees and employers at work places and at the industrial level through bargaining. Macroeconomic interest coordination is increasingly moving toward consultations in which the social partners reveal the areas where cooperation is possible and make it clear where the breaking points and tensions threatening social peace lie.

[Hamor] However, the role of the state is still much greater in the Hungarian economy than in traditional market economies.

[Kosa] The state has a decreasing influence on the competitive sphere. The same also applies even to the sphere of state ownership. The government can make decisions but it has few means to enforce them.

[Hamor] Under these circumstances, is there a chance for a price and wage agreement that can be adhered to?

[Kosa] Consultation does not mean that no agreements can be made on concrete issues. The possibility of a price-wage agreement reflects precisely the belief that there is a chance for a national agreement. An agreement from which the government, the trade unions, and the employers can all expect tangible benefits. This is supported by the fact that the initiative comes from the employees' interest representation groups.

[Hamor] What can be expected from this agreement?

[Kosa] We can expect that we can start the next year with a lower nominal wage level and lower inflation rate, which would help stabilization and the balancing goals while demanding fewer sacrifices from society. I think that next year a third element could be attached to the agreement, namely the level of employment. The situation of the labor market is inseparable from the movement of wages and prices. The cost of labor rather than the number of employees has primary significance in the economy. In this sense, a sensible self-moderation decided in the case of wages can have a positive effect on the employment level. It is a basic goal of the government's employment policy to reduce or stop the decrease of the level of employment. A moderately self-restricting price and wage agreement is a necessary precondition for this.

[Hamor] What is the government's role and responsibility in the shape of the 1996 wage situation?

[Kosa] We can already see that the government's stance cannot be seen as final on the 1996 wages of public employees and civil servants. The gap between the competitive sphere and the public sector has continued to widen and well-qualified people are leaving public administration en masse. The reason, in addition to pay levels, is the salary systems and the financing systems. The outdated salary scales themselves generate tensions, especially in the case of public employees. A thorough change of the salary scales would mean a fundamental solution. I agree with the trade unions that the budget has to give some money for this.

[Hamor] How much would be needed for an agreement?

[Kosa] I do not know but the most burning issues could be remedied with a net single-digit billion forints. Taking the former employment into account is another tense point. This issue has been waiting for a solution for years and I find it constitutionally risky that the 1996 budget also "postpones" dealing with it. It would be good for the Constitutional Court to take a stance on this issue before the end of the budget debate.

[Hamor] Employers and employees find it worrying, to put it mildly, that the funds targeting employment will be merged and have a tax type character.

[Kosa] You have raised two issues. One is the merger of the funds, which fits in with the new financial scheme accepted by the government and I also support this. Nothing justifies the existence of so many designated funds. I do not agree that the labor market fund's money should be treated as a ceded tax. The functioning of the fund has to be regulated in such a way that it meets the requirements of the law on state administration, and it also takes it into account that a large amount of the money is provided by the social partners. Therefore, the method of operation has to be worked out jointly.

[Hamor] The solidarity fund already has a big surplus, which would make it possible to set up a system operating purely on an insurance basis and independently of the state.

[Kosa] Providing for the unemployed and operating the employment system is the state's responsibility throughout the world, although payments by employees and employers provide the source for it. This has not been put on a purely insurance basis anywhere. In an eastern market economy like ours, which is struggling with tough and deep crises, it would hardly function if the employers and employees had to supply the costs of unemployment provision on a voluntary basis. However, I think it is reasonable to assess what kind of payments the current labor market situation and the long-term tasks which will have to be paid for from this fund justify.

[Hamor] It seems inexplicable that while the solidarity fund has a surplus, the government intends to reduce the length of unemployment provision and the amount of the benefit. What is the reason for this in your view?

[Kosa] Nothing. This is something included in a draft of the Finance Ministry, and it is not a governmental plan. In my view, the contributions paid by the employers have to be treated in one unit and the size of the payments has to be defined accordingly. It is undeniable that the wage-related costs are very high. At the same time, it is hard to understand why it is planned to reduce the size of the social insurance contributions

when this fund has a deficit. However, in the case of the solidarity fund [for unemployment benefits], a 2-percent reduction could be permitted while maintaining the same level of provision. This would not endanger the balance of state administration or social insurance, would not put additional burdens on the employees, but it would reduce the employers' payments obligations in the meantime. I would welcome if the final government decision was made after assessing many possible versions at the forthcoming interest coordination talks.

Horn Rejects Labor Minister's Offer To Resign

LD0610205795 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1800 GMT 6 Oct 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Prime Minister Gyula Horn does not accept the resignation of Labor Minister Mrs. Magda Kosa, nee Kovacs, and he told her this last night. Gyula Horn, who is attending the CEI prime ministers' summit in Warsaw, informed the MTI correspondent in Warsaw. Gyula Horn said he agreed with Mrs. Kosa that they would try to sort out the affair. The government wants to implement the stabilization program consistently, but it requires very serious reforms. A compromise solution must be found regarding the method of financing sick leaves, which triggered her resignation, Gyula Horn said.

MSZP Ministers on Resignation

AU1010074095 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 7 Oct 95 p 4

[Unattributed report: "Vastagh and Suchman Support the Resigned Labor Minister"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Justice Minister Pal Vastagh and Tamas Suchman, minister without portfolio in charge of privatization, two Socialist members of the government, expressed their concern about the resignation of Mrs. Magda Kovacs Kosa in an interview with NEPSZABADSAG.

According to Vastagh, considering the average 32 to 33 days [of sick leave], it would be in accordance with the Constitutional Court's decision if only the first 15, rather than 25 days, of sick leave were financed by the employer. My opinion in this issue coincides with what the labor minister said at the government session. I fully share Mrs. Kosa's views. I am convinced that this legal solution meets the requirements of constitutionality, Vastagh emphasized, talking to NEPSZABADSAG before his 10-day visit to China.

Asked what he would do if the government decided on the 25-day rather than the 15-day version, he said: In

that case, I would have no other choice but to resign. I would like to emphasize that the government has not yet decided this, as it will first be taking this issue to a session of the Interest Coordination Council, where the government actually represents the Finance Ministry's stance, and it will only make a decision after this. I trust that a solution that also meets the constitutionality requirement will be found.

He said that it could be concluded from the Constitutional Court's decision that when an average of 32 to 33 days of sick pay is received by workers, it is unacceptable from the point of view of constitutionality to make the employer pay for 25 of these days. This means that the Social Insurance Board would stop paying for 75 percent of the period when someone is unable to work because of sickness. The Constitutional Court stated that, bearing in mind the "violation reaching more than 50 percent" known from Roman law, the introduction of the 25 days would mean an disproportionate change in the balance of the legal status of insurance.

Asked to what he attributes the labor minister's resignation, Suchman said that, since 1 March, the Hungarian Socialist Party [MSZP] had lost four ministers from the government, who had contributed the lion's share to establishing the bases for the 1994 election results. In my view, this is very harmful for the governmental work and causes extreme damage to the parliamentary group's and the party's image, [he said]. It would be good for this series to end. Mrs. Kosa is one of those Socialist politicians who represent a clear and unequivocal line in their professional field. As she found her own belief and professional understanding, which are in accordance with constitutionality, irreconcilable with the views of others, she drew the conclusion normally drawn by correct politicians in such situations. Others may also think about this. After the Constitutional Court's decision, the government will find itself in a really unfavorable situation if it tries to struggle free from the trap of constitutionality instead of carefully setting up a new concept. This does not fit in with the practice and principles of a Socialist-dominated government. We must not forget that we attributed extreme importance to the Constitutional Court when we were in opposition; so the MSZP's views on the role and place of this court cannot change now.

Asked whether he considered Mrs. Kosa's departure an ill omen for himself, Suchman said: I am convinced that I could also get into a similar situation, but after what has happened, my only possibility is to remain where I am as the Last of the Mohicans. It is a different matter that it is not good for the government members to have misgivings about who the next person might be. I believe that the prime minister has to draw far-reaching

conclusions from this case. His government must not get into a situation where the socialist dominance is weakened or ended through continuous replacements.

SZDSZ Official Views Coalition, Legislation

*AU1110105595 Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP
in Hungarian 7 Oct 95 p 8*

[Interview with SZDSZ Executive Tamas Bauer by Dezso Pinter; place and date not given: "The Coalition Is in Its Most Solid State"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Passage omitted] [Pinter] Is it true that the Alliance of Free Democrats [SZDSZ] was embarrassed by the Hungarian Socialist Party's [MSZP] statement—namely, by the prime minister's attitude that had closed the coalition dispute?

[Bauer] On the contrary, their statement reassured us because it confirmed the validity of the coalition agreement: The prime minister wishes to use his constitutional powers—on organizational and personnel issues—in agreement with the coalition deputy prime minister.

[Pinter] Can you see any guarantee that this agreement with the coalition partner will prove to be more viable than the previous one?

[Bauer] The two parties made the coalition for four years. The past and the image of the SZDSZ and the MSZP are different in many areas, but 15 months ago we agreed on what needed to be done in Hungary in the coming four years. This agreement was based on the two parties' separately prepared election programs: It was proved that neither party could find a more suitable partner than the current one. For the foreign policy line, which is also very important for the prime minister, the current parliament has no other partner but the SZDSZ. We also have similar views on economic stabilization, on the withdrawal of the state, continuing privatization, and on preparing Euroatlantic integration. All these provide a solid basis for the coalition. The recent crisis was deeper than ever. Both sides seriously assessed what it would mean the end the coalition. The result of the assessments is known. I would like to start from the premise that the coalition, having come out of the crisis, is now more solid than ever. We do not like each other any more than before but both parties can now see it more clearly that they need to rely on each other. [passage omitted]

[Pinter] What are your views on the mainly opposition claim that the government is now controlled from the SZDSZ headquarters on Merleg Street?

[Bauer] I find this statement ridiculous, and its objective obviously is to drive in a wedge between the two

coalition parties. According to public opinion polls, the voters fortunately do not give any credit to this claim and—even voters of the opposition—can see that mostly the MSZP's will prevails in the government decisions. If, as the opposition assumes, we controlled the government's economic policy, then we would have started to implement the stabilization program much earlier and not eight months after the government was set up. We would have submitted the privatization bill much earlier and this year's privatization income would not stand at 10 billion forints in September 1995. It would not have been possible to reduce the proportion of the personal income tax which is to be kept by the local authorities, either, and we would have chosen a different way to reduce family support. We do not dictate even in those areas where the minister comes from the SZDSZ. For example, the minister for education and culture has to hold tough debates with the Socialists in order to carry out the education concept in accordance with the coalition agreement. Shall I continue? Let us look at the coalition proportions! The MSZP has 54, the SZDSZ 18 percent of the mandates. These figures would require the two parties to share the governmental positions in a proportion of three to one. When the government was formed, the Socialists appointed nine and the Free Democrats three ministers. We have to add to this the Socialist prime minister, the Socialist minister without portfolio Istvan Nikolits, and the Socialist political state secretary of the Prime Minister's Office, Csaba Tabajdi. Later, the Socialists brought in the minister without portfolio responsible for privatization, and they also nominated another political state secretary. It is completely out of the question that the SZDSZ carry more weight in the coalition than its numeric proportion. [passage omitted]

[Pinter] The opposition has announced a few times that it would not accept the SZDSZ among its ranks if it leaves the coalition. What impact has this made on your attitude?

[Bauer] It has not made any impact. The opposition is not a club, no one can be registered or admitted to it. If a party gets into parliament out of the will of the voters and is not part of the government, then it is part of the opposition, whether certain people like this or not. Today in Hungary, we are forced to face incredibly hollow opposition politics. For four years, as an opposition party, we were very careful only to question the government about things we ourselves would have been able to achieve. At every possible opportunity, the current opposition demands more money for social goals, education, technical development, justice issues, defense, and so on, while it would also expect taxes to be reduced. In the election battle, the opposition even tried

to alarm the world by claiming that a Socialist majority government will not continue the economic change of the regime, and will endanger the establishment of a market economy based on private ownership. However, when the government made its concrete privatization plans public, the opposition, which calls itself civic, took on the role of protector of state property. Similar contradictions accompany the opposition's foreign policy. In relations with the neighboring countries—for example, in its attitude toward the Hungarian-Slovak basic treaty—the four opposition parties follow the tradition that was created by Jozsef Torgyan's Independent Smallholders Party and the Hungarian Justice nation policy group—the later Hungarian Justice and Life Party—in connection with the Ukrainian basic treaty. Should this opposition come to government in 1998, the voters would suffer much greater disappointment compared to the current disillusionment of some of those who voted for the MSZP last year. [passage omitted]

[Pinter] What impact have the Constitutional Court's decisions made on recent political activities?

[Bauer] The Constitutional Court is an element of key importance for the Hungarian political system, it has had a major role in consolidating democracy and seeing that the principles of the constitutional state are respected in Hungary. The parliamentary majority governing after 1990 would liked to have implemented a more revolutionary legislation in the provision of justice [for past crimes], compensation, and vetting. The Constitutional Court forced the government majority to respect the continuity of the constitutional state. A different type of conflict has now emerged between the Constitutional Court and the new parliamentary majority. For example, the fight against the illegal economy would require the state authorities to have more thorough information on the citizens' financial circumstances so that illegal ways of becoming rich can be captured. At the same time, this concept of protecting personal data, which is an important element of civic rights, contradicts this. The Constitutional Court is acting very correctly in defending this, even if this makes the fight against the illegal economy more difficult. Furthermore, the requirements of economic stabilization have now come into conflict with a certain understanding of the constitutional state. At the Constitutional Court, a long series of appeals attacked almost all elements of the stabilization law in the hope that at least some of these would hit the target. In the course of the assessments, the Constitutional Court abolished several important sections of the law, but it also rejected a number of appeals. In my view, this is all right. The problem is that the country needs stabilization legislation. The government makes its decisions, the parliamentary majority approves the

rather unpopular measures after a long struggle, and the Constitutional Court only makes its decisions after this, sometimes months later. This undermines the credibility of the stabilization policy and, in a certain sense, also creates legal uncertainty. The law on the Constitutional Court makes it possible for the government to request abstract constitutional interpretation from the Constitutional Court before submitting a bill. It would have been expedient to use this facility after 12 March but, in spite of the legal opportunity, the Constitutional Court refuses to do this. Although it once interpreted the Constitution's relevant passages at the request of the Antall government before the compensation law was made, it later refused to do this. It also refused to apply—actually, at an SZDSZ request—the so-called preliminary norm control. It would improve legislation if, in justified cases, the government requested abstract law interpretation and the Constitutional Court responded to these within a reasonable time limit in accordance with the laws in force.

Nonparliamentary Parties Organize Demonstrations

*LD0810211795 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network
in Hungarian 1700 GMT 8 Oct 95*

[FBIS Translated Text] Forty-nine organizations of the National Opposition Roundtable, which was reestablished last week, have joined a call by the Hungarian Justice and Life Party [MIEP]. Therefore, as of 22 October, demonstrations will be held until the government resigns. This was announced at a press briefing held today. Agnes Pap reports.

[Pap] With its operation, the government plunges the country into a national tragedy, Elek Szabo, chairman in office of the National Opposition Roundtable, said. Quoting the resolution passed by the plenary session today, Elek Szabo, leader of the Smallholders' and Workers' Solidarity Party said: In this situation, the parliamentary opposition parties should walk out of parliament because today a policy that ruins all generations and increases the number of starving people is being pursued, and banks are in power in Hungary. Debt rescheduling should be requested, privatization should be revised, and those who brought the country to an impossible situation should be called to account, the chairman of the National Opposition Roundtable said.

The most famous members of the organization, the MIEP, the Workers' Solidarity Party, the Hungarian October Party, the National Democratic Alliance, the Republic Party, and POFOSZ [National Association of Political Prisoners] have taken the position that they will continue the demonstrations, if necessary with a call for a nationwide general strike, until the government resigns.

Republic Party Not Included

*LD0810222195 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network
in Hungarian 2100 GMT 8 Oct 95*

[FBIS Translated Text] In our earlier program, it was said that joining a call by the Hungarian Justice and Life Party [MIEP], the reestablished National Opposition Roundtable would hold regular demonstrations demanding the government's resignation.

Among other things, it was said at the briefing that the Republic Party would also participate in the action organized by the roundtable. Janos Palotas, chairman of the Republic Party, has phoned us asking for a correction. Then the roundtable's spokesman will also be asked.

[Palotas] The Republic Party has received an invitation, it was addressed to me. I have clearly noted on this invitation that the Republic Party cannot be represented at this event, because here there are political factors which are banned as political partners for us, according to the prevailing political norms of the Republic Party. There is no way we could participate in this event in an official form. We work with different political means and expertise.

[Correspondent] Why did you [Sandor Batonyi] tell Hungarian Radio that the Republic Party had participated in the work of the National Opposition Roundtable? Here is Spokesman Sandor Batonyi.

[Batonyi] We have to apologize both to Janos Palotas and the radio reporter for the mistake. He was among those invited and not among those attended. We made a mistake when looking at the list of attendants.

[Pap] Does this mean that there are no 49 participants?

[Batonyi] There are 49 participants, and this number will be even more than this at our next session.

Fidesz-MPP Leader Views Political Developments

*AU1110080995 Budapest MAGYAR NEMZET
in Hungarian 7 Oct 95 p 7*

[Interview with Viktor Orban, chairman of the Federation of Young Democrats-Hungarian Civic Party, by Noemi Sumegi; place and date not given: "The Three Parties Might Even Obtain an Absolute Majority"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The 1996 budget shows that the government is unable to change its economic policy and it continues to be the victim of its previous bad decisions; therefore, it is in Hungary's interest that this government leave as soon as possible, Viktor Orban, chairman of the Federation of Young Democrats-Hungarian Civic Party [Fidesz-MPP], told MAGYAR

NEMZET. According to Viktor Orban, the opposition could face new parliamentary elections today with good conscience.

[Sumegi] In your view, what are the most interesting political processes in Hungary today?

[Orban] I see four exciting and important issues, and three of them are discussed in public. One of them is the future of the coalition: the long-term effects of the coalition debate on the organization of the Hungarian left are perhaps less clear here. The other exciting issue is the relations among opposition parties. The third one is the budget, an issue that also receives sufficient publicity; however, the fourth issue does not receive publicity, namely how Hungary wants to occupy its place in Europe, including the issue of how Hungary is developing its relations with Russia.

[Sumegi] In your view, what is the basis of the coalition debate?

[Orban] The way I see it, the essence of this debate lies in the fact that the coalition was formed with a bad conscience, a coalition that totally lacked confidence. The leadership of the Alliance of Free Democrats [SZDSZ] drew their self-esteem in the eighties and then under the Hungarian Democratic Forum [MDF] cabinet from the premise that they accepted this political risk for moral reasons, a political risk that other groups of intellectuals refused to take upon themselves. All this, irrespective of whether this was a real self-esteem or not, and irrespective of the fact that I do not agree with this appreciation. However, they are now in a ruling coalition with those against whom they accepted this political risk at the time; I realize that this is difficult to understand. The prevailing lack of confidence can be seen from two things: On the one hand, it is unusual that the chairman of the junior coalition party is not a member of the cabinet; on the other hand, as a result of bargaining, both sides appointed mainly political state secretaries in the so-called mixed ministries. This is not surprising either, because the SZDSZ openly justified its decision to form a coalition with the Hungarian Socialist Party [MSZP] by claiming that it was the mission of the SZDSZ within the coalition to keep and eye on its "recidivist partner of a bad character." Now that the Bokros package has failed, lacking a cohesive force of confidence, this failure started the gradual breakup.

[Sumegi] Is all this in contradiction with the previous Fidesz position according to which the leaders of the two parties belong to a common elite and they had been deliberately preparing the coalition since 1992?

[Orban] In itself, belonging to one political-intellectual elite does not exclude the possibility of conflicts within

this elite. Let me refer to the prevailing struggle between revisionists and hard-liners in the history of the Hungarian Communist Party.

[Sumegi] You mentioned that the way the Hungarian left emerges is one of the interesting dimensions of the coalition debate.

[Orban] Whether the MSZP and the SZDSZ like it or not, the line dividing the Hungarian left and the Hungarian right goes through the Fidesz and the SZDSZ. The question is what the spiritual character of the Hungarian left will be like. The MSZP has lost its self-identity. Partly because the Hungarian economic situation does not help the party in representing its own natural economic policy, and partly because the SZDSZ is carrying out a planned ideological-spiritual activity, while the spiritual workshops have been forced into the background within the MSZP, or perhaps have even disappeared. Therefore, the MSZP has more of a social-liberal character today. Clearly, there are politicians in the MSZP who are not willing to come to terms with the spiritual and ideological hegemony of the SZDSZ. However, the issue at hand also has an organizational aspect, namely the number of actual parties that will form the Hungarian left: One party or, with a possible fusion, two parties that cooperate, or two parties that will be unable to cooperate, for example because of the possible coalition break?

[Sumegi] Should we take it that the Fidesz chairman is concerned about the fate of the left?

[Orban] In my view, the six-party parliamentary rule has failed in Hungary today: We need much more predictable conditions, namely a center of a strong center-left and a strong center-right. The type of left that will emerge is important for Hungary's fate.

[Sumegi] How does the "Sandor Nagy affair" fit into all this?

[Orban] There is a consensus in today's public life, one free of political sympathies and party affiliations, a consensus according to which Sandor Nagy is one of the strongest figures of the Hungarian left, perhaps the strongest figure. It seems that the future image of the left in Hungary is connected with Sandor Nagy's future. Our different concepts regarding Hungary's fate and future should not hinder us in recognizing Sandor Nagy's position and weight in his own camp. It would be a mistake to disregard this.

[Sumegi] You said that the line dividing the right and left in Hungary goes through the SZDSZ and the Fidesz. In that case, is the SZDSZ right in claiming that you are trying to divide the political field so clearly as to make it impossible to cross the line at all?

[Orban] In my opinion, it is in Hungary's interest to have a Hungarian policy based on the rotation management or cooperation of two firm forces.

[Sumegi] Is then the aim to "place" the SZDSZ near the MSZP for good?

[Orban] Since 1989, every party had five years at its disposal to find itself and to formulate its values. The time of truth arrived on 29 May 1994. The SZDSZ crossed the Rubicon of the change in the regime. Voluntarily and, according to the parliament's mathematical logic, uselessly, the SZDSZ joined a postcommunist government. The fact that the SZDSZ did not take into account the long-term consequences does not change this either. Both the winners and the losers of the elections must carry the burdens of their decisions.

[Sumegi] It seems that the opposition is interested in maintaining the coalition and avoiding a possible government crisis.

[Orban] The interests of the opposition cannot be separated from the interests of this country. As for Hungary's interests, the way I see it, this government should change its economic policy. However, the 1996 budget shows that the cabinet is unable to do this, and it continues to be a prisoner of its previous bad decisions; therefore, it is in Hungary's interest to see this government leave as soon as possible.

[Sumegi] Is the opposition prepared for such a situation?

[Orban] We can face new parliamentary elections with a good conscience.

[Sumegi] Even today?

[Orban] Even today. The lessons the opposition cooperation has learned from the experience of the past one and a half years is that we could quickly come to an agreement with our allies when this was needed.

[Sumegi] In this case, the following question always arises: Who would be the joint candidate of the opposition for the position of prime minister? There is a "myth" in the public that Viktor Orban would be this candidate.

[Orban] It is very flattering that my name is considered at all. However, I must say that, among other things, this "myth" lives among the public because the journalists find it obliging to bring up this issue. Not every journalist does this without some hidden intention. The three opposition parties will decide this together, and the Fidesz would subordinate its position to cooperation. We do not regard this as the most important issue.

[Sumegi] In an interview in April, you said that it would become clear by autumn whether the opposition turns into a bipolar one or not. Has it become clear?

[Orban] No, it has not. We still need a few months for this to become clear. The Christian Democratic People's Party [KDNP] has not yet decided on whether to join the Civil Alliance or to cooperate with the Independent Smallholders' Party [FKGP]. However, this decision cannot be delayed for long.

[Sumegi] All the more so because 23 October is coming, and the three parties will have to decide on whether to celebrate together or not. The other problem could be that, while the Fidesz and the Hungarian Democratic Forum [MDF] clearly distanced themselves from the planned demonstration of the Hungarian Justice and Life Party [MIEP], the KDNP commented on it in a "permissive" style.

[Orban] Indeed, this is the source of argument because, if we regard the MIEP demonstration as the main event of 23 October, there is less need for the three-party festivities; if we do not accept the aforementioned demonstration, a joint three-party event would be fortunate. I would like to point out firmly that the Fidesz is a democratic party and it is impossible that we participate in a demonstration the character of which is alien to us. We will not demonstrate under slogans calling for the demise of X or Y. Our position is that Ivan Peto should not disappear, but he should lose at the next elections. These two slogans are two different worlds.

[Sumegi] Recently, Peter Boross did not exclude the possibility of an MDF-FKGP coalition.

[Orban] I regard the three-party cooperation as the best chance of winning the citizens' confidence; so much so that, in my opinion, the three parties can even obtain an absolute majority in parliament and, thus, the debate on whether we should open to the right or to the left could be put on hold. These are questions put ahead of time.

[Sumegi] Is the preparation of the joint statement of intentions being delayed because of the upcoming national holiday on 23 October?

[Orban] The formulation of the joint statement is hindered by two reasons. One of them is that all this requires adequate care; the other is that the approaching national holiday has indeed delayed the formulation of the document.

[Sumegi] What can this document contain regarding the nomination of a joint candidate? Is it possible that the parties will divide up the electoral districts on the basis of party?

[Orban] Irrespective of the document, my opinion about a possible common stand in the elections is that this can only be based on mutual respect, appreciation, and equal rights. We cannot cooperate with parties that criticize the members of the alliance without respect. At this moment, I think any solution that deviates from the three party's participation in the alliance at a proportion of one-third each is inconceivable. The position of the Fidesz is that the closest cooperation should emerge as soon as possible. It depends on the decisions of the MDF and the KDNP whether this cooperation will materialize. The Fidesz understands the responsibility of a party that makes it impossible for the moderate civil center right forces to cooperate today, namely that, by this, such a party is preparing a new victory of the present coalition. The Fidesz does not take upon itself to forfeit the future of a bourgeois Hungary.

[Sumegi] It seems that Fidesz regards this cooperation as the most important thing, and the closest cooperation raises the idea of party fusion.

[Orban] The word "closest" means that we should also work out the conditions of joint participation in the elections as soon as possible, including the preparation of a joint program. According to our intentions, this would not affect the independent status of the parties involved, for the time being. Nor should we treat the issue of the future shape of the right in Hungary as a taboo, namely the number of parties or blocs that will form this right wing. We have all the conditions to follow a separate policy and we could also draw advantages from the fact that we have not yet been in the government, neither between 1990 and 1994, nor at present. Perhaps a policy distancing itself on two directions would meet with a greater sympathy of the public. Instead, the Fidesz prefers to give up short-term advantages when it emphasizes the importance of cooperation, and we do this out of commitment to Hungary's interests.

[Sumegi] After your congress, you promised to start an intensive party building from this autumn. Has this process begun?

[Orban] Things turned out differently than we imagined. We spend more time on party building trips and lectures, but these are mostly two or three-party meetings. At present, we subordinated our forces to the goal of building the background of the civil alliance.

Fidesz-MPP on Army Reduction, Kosa Resignation

*LD0910220595 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network
in Hungarian 1700 GMT 9 Oct 95*

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The Fidesz-MPP [Federation of Young Democrats—Hungarian Civic Party] is dissat-

isfied with the fact that the new defense law has not yet been born. Geza Gecse reports from the session of the party's parliamentary deputy group.

[Gecse] It is likely that tomorrow the government will make the parliament vote on the drastic reduction of the army as early as this autumn, despite the fact that it has not even discussed the medium-term plan and long-term program of the reorganization of the Armed Forces. This jeopardizes Hungary's security, said Bela Gyuricza, Fidesz-MPP deputy and deputy chairman of the Defense Committee, and added that Fidesz-MPP does not agree with the reduction of the Hungarian Army's response capacity in this unprepared way.

Zoltan Pokorni, deputy chairman of Fidesz-MPP, considered the intended resignation of Ministers Kosa, nee Magda Kovacs, and Pal Vastagh a sign of the government's inability to operate as a body. The reason for this can be either the fact that the budget has not been prepared in a professional way or the admission of the failure of the hitherto activities. The Interest Coordination Council is going to fall apart, the Ministry of Labor operates as a chief department of the Ministry of Finance, and if any member of the government is in conflict with the minister of finance, he or she has no other option but to resign. [passage omitted]

Fidesz-MPP has reservations regarding the agreement between the students and the government, and anticipate with serious worry its realization, since it depends exclusively on Gyula Horn's word of honor. However, according to Fidesz-MPP the prolongation of the messy situation will not necessarily have been better.

Trade Union Leader Denies Political Ambitions

*LD0810215195 Budapest MTV Television Network
in Hungarian 1800 GMT 8 Oct 95*

[FBIS Translated Text] Sandor Nagy [outgoing chairman of the National Federation of Hungarian Trade Unions, MSZOSZ, largest trade union federation] considers the Finance Ministry's position unacceptable, because Magda Kosa, has resigned. The MSZOSZ chairman criticized the government's economic policy for the lack of strategic planning. The politician [Nagy], who attended a political festival in Győr, denied that he was trying to win the chairmanship of the Hungarian Socialist Party [HSP] at the forthcoming party congress [scheduled to be held on 24-26 November].

[Correspondents] The participants of the festival were asking Sandor Nagy mostly about his plans. One of them claimed to know that the outgoing trade union leader's name had been mentioned as a possible successor to HSP Chairman Gyula Horn.

[Nagy] I have no specific ambition. It may be strange, believe it or not, I have no plans to become either a prime minister, or a party chairman, or a parliamentary group leader, or a NATO secretary-general, or an UN secretary-general.

[Correspondent] He is not planning to bid for the post of Mrs. Kosa, nee Magda Kovacs either, he added, answering a question. However, he added that it did not mean his withdrawal.

[Nagy] Whenever I have been called to go somewhere—and if I thought that I had some kind of abilities for the task—I have never said no.

[Correspondent] Sandor Nagy criticised the government's economic policy saying that it did not give an answer to key questions, such as the development of infrastructure and the future structure of Hungarian industry.

Ethnic Serb Leader Criticizes Education Program

*LD0510214195 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network
in Hungarian 1700 GMT 5 Oct 95*

[FBIS Translated Text] Council of Europe experts are giving lectures to leaders of the minority self-governments, which were set up nearly a year ago, at a two-day conference. There was mention, among other

things, of the framework agreement on minority protection and the European charter of minority and regional languages. Hungary was among the first countries to join both agreements. Erzsebet Kiraly reports:

[Kiraly] Although Hungary has undertaken bilingual or mother tongue education in the case of some minorities, it has not been implemented in practice, Pero Lasztity, chairman of the [ethnic] Serb national self-government, said. In his view, the minority law is not in harmony with the law on public education, because according to the minority law, a nationality class must be started if eight or more students apply. The financial conditions for this, however, are missing due to a normative support system based on the number of students:

[Begin Lasztity recording] Although there is supplementary support per student in the area of minority education, this sum is too small compared with the extra expenses. On the other hand, according to recent news, this sum will decrease in 1996. [end recording]

[Kiraly] According to Pero Lasztity, the existence of nationality schools has become endangered. Representatives of minorities are of the view that the conditions for a so-called positive discrimination must be created from the central budget.

Muratovic: No Agreement Reached on Cease-Fire
LD1010232295 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina
Network in Serbo-Croatian 2300 GMT 10 Oct 95

[FBIS Translated Text] At a meeting held last night [10 October] at Sarajevo airport, and organized by the UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force], no agreement was reached on the deadline for a cease-fire, Hasan Muratovic, chairman of the state committee for UN relations, said in a statement.

Our delegation offered a cease-fire at midnight between 11 and 12 October, in other words in the first minute of Thursday 12 October 1995. The Serb side did not have authorization to accept this deadline. The UNPROFOR will either make public a deadline for the cease-fire to begin, after it has been agreed and with UNPROFOR mediation, or it will convene another meeting. The remaining work to make fully operational the electricity supply system for the capital will be completed today.

Silajdzic Demands Removal of Serb Checkpoint

AU1010140995 Paris AFP in English
1158 GMT 10 Oct 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tunis, Oct 10 (AFP)—Visiting Bosnian Premier Haris Silajdzic said here Tuesday [10 October] that his government was insisting on the lifting of a Bosnian Serb checkpoint near Sarajevo before agreeing to implement a ceasefire agreement.

"We still have the siege of Sarajevo and I don't think we will have a ceasefire until they remove" the checkpoint, he told a press conference capping a two-day visit here.

Until now, the Moslem-led government had linked the implementation of the U.S.-brokered ceasefire, which was to have gone into effect at 2300 GMT Monday but was delayed indefinitely, to the resumption of gas and electricity supplies to Sarajevo.

Silajdzic said that the electricity had been partially restored and the Russians had agreed to start resupplying the county with gas but the government wanted the Serbs to lift the checkpoint.

"In my mind, it (the checkpoint) is something we cannot overlook," he said.

"I want the American peace plan to be a real peace plan," he added. "I'm (opposed) to any peace plan that would postpone the end of the war and produce another war in five years."

Silajdzic Comments on U.S. Peace Initiative
AU110110895 Sarajevo VECERNJE NOVINE
in Serbo-Croatian 30 Sep-1 Oct 95 p 4

[Interview with Bosnia-Herzegovina Prime Minister Haris Silajdzic by Mirjana Micevska; place and date not given: "State Is Not Just a Shell"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Although the Geneva and New York agreements on the future Bosnia-Herzegovina setup solved the basic problem of preserving the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina within its internationally recognized borders, they nevertheless remained incomplete and undefined in some respects. We have been talking about that, as well as issues to do with the jurisdiction of the Government of the Republic and Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, with Prime Minister Dr. Haris Silajdzic, who began by calling these peace agreements a solid basis for future negotiations and added the following:

[Silajdzic] With these agreements, we have elaborated on the survival of our state, the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, as independent, that is to say, the legal existence of our state has been prolonged [produziti]. Bosnia-Herzegovina is, therefore, sovereign and integral within its recognized borders, with the essential institutions of the presidency, parliament, government, and, of course, constitution, which will probably be revised.

Central Institutions

([Micevska] Does this mean that, with these agreements, Bosnia-Herzegovina has really ensured its existence as a state?

[Silajdzic] Certainly. What is involved here is not a mere shell, as the Belgrade regime would now like it to be. As it failed to achieve that through war, this regime now wants to use political means to leave a mere thin membrane around Bosnia-Herzegovina, which could burst under the slightest pressure. That would mean that we would have war again in some five or 10 years. For that reason, we insisted on having central institutions that would establish sovereignty and defend our territorial integrity.

I should point out that, while our delegation was waiting in New York for instructions, we insisted on direct elections, that is, on a popular, people's, direct ballot. Why? Because this is the basic issue of democracy, which does not exist without a secret and direct vote. Therefore, without free elections, there cannot be any primary democracy, that is to say, democracy that is not delegated. The agreement does not mention such direct elections; it only calls them free and democratic. This is how it is written there. After all, this is acceptable

for the West, but not for us. This is not a sufficient guarantee for us.

This is why it is stated in the New York announcement that free and democratic elections are to be direct elections as well. Since direct elections had been deleted, we demanded that the Americans state—and they did so—that the United States would oppose secession.

[Micevska] Has any date for the elections been designated?

[Silajdzic] A commission appointed by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and other international organizations will take care of that. That will establish when the political-democratic structures have been brought back to some sort of normality and when the minimum human freedom has been ensured to make the elections valid.

The Government and Refugees

[Micevska] There are some uncertainties about the government, as the agreements do not mention it as such. Could you clarify its future for us?

[Silajdzic] A cabinet is mentioned with several ministers, which is effectively the government. A cabinet is the Western name for government and the confusion comes about because by government the West means the authorities in general and in our country it means this, the government that I head. Therefore, it does not matter whether we call it a government or a cabinet, and the number of ministers will be established as required.

[Micevska] The latest government session was, for the first time in a long time, attended by ministers who are members of the Croatian Democratic Community. Is this a good sign in terms of further strengthening the Federation?

[Silajdzic] I hope so, although things are still not as they should be.

[Micevska] Is the government working on any specific programs for the return of refugees in the wake of the decision by the Government of the Republic of Croatia to abolish refugee status for those of our people who fled from the Bosnian Krajina [western Bosnia]?

[Silajdzic] People have already been returning. There are some large-scale movements, our ministers are there, and the government is aware of everything. Some 5,000 people have returned to the newly liberated territories of the Bosnian Krajina, to Bosanska Krupa, many on their own initiative. We are providing the conditions for their return as best we can and international organizations are also helping.

[Micevska] We would like to remind you of a government decision to demobilize 50,000 people in order to improve production, which would be very significant in this situation. How far has implementing this decision come?

[Silajdzic] I think that this is necessary for the economy to be able to survive. We have many problems precisely because all the able-bodied population has been mobilized. We have already been talking about this for a year, since we agreed to do it. I do not know why it has not been done. We will be talking about it again, of course.

Jurisdiction

[Micevska] Will the central institutions and government, in addition to foreign affairs, have economic, monetary, and customs policy under their jurisdiction?

[Silajdzic] It was planned to negotiate about everything else, but one should carefully read the statement that the central institutions' jurisdiction covers everything from customs policy to border protection. Everything is under the jurisdiction of these institutions, although a number of issues are still to be discussed.

Izetbegovic Welcomes 'Removal' of Akashi

AU1010204195 Paris AFP in English
2006 GMT 10 Oct 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, Oct 10 (AFP)—Bosnian television rejoiced Tuesday over news of Yasushi Akashi's impending departure after two years as the UN special envoy to the former Yugoslavia.

"Although this item is not an announcement of Bosnian army military victories, it will certainly make Bosnians happy," said the news presenter on Bosnian television.

Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic also told Bosnian television that the removal of the hapless Japanese statesman was "a good initiative by the United Nations."

Akashi has been widely criticized by NATO countries as being too timid for the job. Numerous Bosnian government officials refused to meet him over the past several months, accusing him of being blatantly pro-Serb.

UN Secretary General Butrus Butrus-Ghali said Tuesday that Akashi would be replaced by the current head of UN peacekeeping operations, Kofi Annan of Ghana, who will also serve in an expanded role as envoy to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

Ganic, Sarajevo Officials Reject City's Division*AU1010121095 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1100 GMT 10 Oct 95*

[FBIS Translated Text] Ejup Ganic, member of the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina and vice president of the Federation, yesterday received Sarajevo Mayor Tarik Kupusovic and Deputy Mayor Ante Zelic, who informed him about activities being implemented with a view to lifting the blockade on Sarajevo.

It was pointed out at the meeting that Sarajevo should remain a united and undivided capital city of the republic and Federation as its name has become a symbol of heroism and resistance to fascism. It was concluded that the fascists cannot demand division and the right to a single Sarajevo street. The positive process of implementing the Constitution of the Federation in Sarajevo is a good indicator that should be followed by Bosniaks and Croats in other parts of the Federation.

Koljevic, Plavsic View Prospects for Cease-Fire*AU1110121695 Banja Luka Srpski Radio Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 10 Oct 95*

[Report by Vesna Dragic, including statements by Bosnian Serb leaders Nikola Koljevic and Biljana Plavsic "to Srpski Radio" in Banja Luka on 10 October—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Dragic] If we assume that the problems concerning the cease-fire in the former Bosnia-Herzegovina are of an exclusively technical nature, does it mean that, as opposed to last night, tonight will be the crucial night for peace, or will the Muslims [Bosnia-Herzegovina Government] again show to what extent they are really interested in ending the war? Used to excuses and obstructions on the Muslim side, [words indistinct] postponed the cease-fire again. When did they ever stick to an agreement? They are not bound by any document, signature, or seal. However, if the conditions for a cease-fire are met tonight, the New York and Paris conferences, scheduled for later this month, will not be questioned. If this is not so, the world will have another chance to see who wants peace and who does not. Dr. Nikola Koljevic stated today that the cease-fire will not be easy to implement in any case. He also said this:

[Koljevic] The cease-fire agreement signed has, unfortunately, not come into force because the Muslim side said that it did not agree to it because the natural gas had not been supplied. The gas pipeline goes through Hungary and Serbia towards the territory of the former Bosnia-Herzegovina. UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force] rep-

resentatives have confirmed that the Serb side has done what was up to them, since it is the Russian Federation that supplies the gas, not us. The U.S. representative, who was present here, confirmed that the Russian side would meet this condition and that the issue was technical, rather than a political problem. Another meeting with a Russian representative is supposed to take place today. It seems that there were technical problems on the side of the Russian Government and their company, Gasprom, which supplies the gas. According to the latest information that we have received, the gas has been delivered and the conditions should be met this evening for the cease-fire to start tonight, rather than last night, one minute after midnight, as was anticipated.

[Dragic] [Words indistinct] mechanisms with which the enemies of the Serb people could be forced to play fair, not only with threats, but also by physical means, since without a cease-fire peace negotiations would be pointless, and equal treatment of the conflicting sides questioned again. Dr. Plavsic was asked what would happen if the cease-fire was not achieved tonight, either.

[Plavsic] [Words indistinct] they cannot expect us to abide by the cease-fire if our enemies are attacking. It would be insane to even think that, since it would be suicide. Therefore, both sides must be willing to stop. Ever since the Geneva negotiations prior to the Contact Group plan, we have, and not only verbally, shown that we are in favor of a cease-fire and a peaceful resolution to this crisis. However, it takes both sides to take that approach for something like that to happen.

[Dragic] Finally, it is clear that the Serbs [passage indistinct] have no choice but to respond to the unscrupulous enemy in the same way. If the deadlines are not observed, defense of the ethnic territory and Serb territory is the only aim and task on the road to achieving final peace, stated the deputy presidents of the Serb Republic [Serb entity in Bosnia-Herzegovina] in Banja Luka today.

Krajisnik: RS Will Integrate With Serbia*LD1010195695 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1803 GMT 10 Oct 95*

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Brcko, 10 Oct (SRNA)—Momcilo Krajisnik, the speaker of the People's Assembly of the Bosnian Serb Republic [RS], said in Brcko today "this town is of fundamental importance for the RS, and an end to Brcko will be an end to the RS."

Speaking at a meeting with Deputy Speaker Branko Simic, Brcko and Pelagicevo war presidency presidents, members of the Serb Democratic Party, council and prominent Brcko businessmen, Krajisnik said that the

border on the Sava River and the broadening of the Brcko corridor were among the main RS strategic interests.

"We have told the Muslims, the Croats, and the international community that without the broadening of our corridor of life—along which air, road, and river transport traffic will flow safely—there can be no qualitative peace agreement especially regarding the RS status within the so-called Bosnia-Herzegovina union," the Serb assembly speaker said, voicing his impression that this issue will not pose problems at upcoming peace conferences.

Krajisnik stressed that he was convinced that unless "the Muslims and Croats make some unexpected moves," the conflict in former Bosnia-Herzegovina will be resolved within one month, and that in the time of peace, during arduous negotiations about numerous problematic issues with the other two sides in the conflict, the RS will become an integral part of Serbia within two years at the latest. [passage omitted]

UN Says 'Last Obstacle' to Cease-Fire Removed

AU1010181395 Paris AFP in English
1749 GMT 10 Oct 95

[Report by Adrian Brown]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, Oct 10 (AFP)—The last obstacle to a countrywide Bosnian ceasefire, the possible prelude to a peace deal, was cleared Tuesday [10 October] with the arrival of gas and electricity supplies to Sarajevo, UN officials said.

"We have gas, we have electricity. Technically, the utilities have been restored," UN spokeswoman Myriam Sochacki declared.

However Hasan Muratovic, Bosnia's minister for relations with the UN, remained cautious on whether the government would give its blessing to start a 60-day countrywide ceasefire first thing Wednesday.

"It's up to UNPROFOR (the UN Protection Force) to decide. We left it to them, the agreement is very clear and they can judge whether full restoration has been met. If they say yes, we will also accept," he said.

The truce had been due to go into effect shortly after midnight Monday but was delayed by the Bosnian authorities who said one of their main conditions, the full restoration of utilities to Sarajevo, had not been met since gas had not been supplied by Russia.

The delay also allowed fighting in various parts of the country to rumble on with last minute actions aimed at firming up frontlines in sensitive areas.

UN officials said Tuesday that government forces had encircled a town straddling a key road in western Bosnia which would allow allied government and Croat forces to link northwestern and central Bosnia.

UN officials were due to hold a meeting at 7:00 p.m. (1800 GMT) with the Bosnian Government and Bosnian Serb representatives at Sarajevo Airport to finalise the position of the two parties. A press statement will be made by 2000 GMT, UN officials said.

Edin Ramovic, a Sarajevo gas company official, said gas was "flowing in all the pipes but the pressure is still being built up. Be cautious with the valves."

Many homes here are illegally hooked up to the mains supply, causing gas explosions which have claimed numerous lives in the Bosnian capital where gas and electrical supplies have been cut since May this year.

For most of the war, and through the first two winters of the conflict which began in April 1992, there was supplies of neither gas nor electricity.

Gazing at the roaring gas fire in his front room, the first time it has been lit in six months, Fedja Bekic said: "We are all much happier. We were only waiting for gas. Wood is so expensive and it is impossible to bring it into the city."

Many of the city's high rise apartment blocks are blackened by the make-shift chimneys from home-made wood stoves. Wood currently costs 70 German marks (50 dollars) per cubic meter, enough to cook a meal a day for four weeks.

Gas supplies were only possible after a last-minute wrangle with Moscow over unpaid gas bills had been resolved.

Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev confirmed Tuesday that Moscow had turned the gas back on overnight Monday. He said during a visit to Finland that a hold-up in the resumption of shipments through a pipeline had been due to "technical" problems and had not been aimed at putting political pressure on the Moslem-led Sarajevo government.

An accord with Bosnian engineers visiting Moscow was signed at 1:00 a.m. Tuesday and the order to turn on the pipelines was issued immediately after, he said.

An official of the Hungarian gas and oil company MOL said in Budapest that the pipeline transiting through Hungary had been opened overnight Monday.

Electricity has also been restored here, though at a low level. Eight-hour periods were being offered to homes on a rotating basis. Improvements to the supply would

require a ceasefire, UN experts said, as repairs were needed in areas close to confrontation lines.

If a ceasefire agreement is reached Tuesday evening, UN peacekeepers will want to see implementation of other parts of the agreement "immediately," a UN spokesman here said.

The US-brokered accord signed last Thursday includes a commitment from the Bosnian Serbs to open up two routes to the eastern government-held enclave of Gorazde and to allow free movement of "humanitarian" traffic in and out of Sarajevo.

The latter requirement was not set as a pre-condition for the truce. Despite the removal of the Serbs' heavy guns from around Sarajevo, little progress has been made on opening up the city.

Civilian traffic is limited to a UN-protected road across the city's airport which leads along a crowded and difficult mountain route to government areas west of the capital. In the meantime the only road in and out of the city crosses a Bosnian Serb checkpoint. Bosnian Prime Minister Haris Silajdzic, speaking in Tunis called for the checkpoint to be removed before the ceasefire began.

Koljevic: Gas Issue Excuse To Extend War

*LD1010223495 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian
2152 GMT 10 Oct 95*

[FBIS Translated Text] Banja Luka, 10 Oct (SRNA)—Nikola Koljevic, vice president of the Bosnian Serb Republic, assessed that "the latest terrible attacks by the ustasha-Muslim units on Mrkonjic Grad and Sanski Most today, the day when the cease-fire was due to come into effect, indicate why it was not respected, and that gas for Sarajevo was not the issue."

The Muslims and Croats "bought" another day in which to carry out a very well planned and terrible action that was realized today in Mrkonjic Grad and Sanski Most," Professor Koljevic stressed while appearing as a guest on this evening's "Daily News" program in the Banja Luka studio of Serb TV.

"Ten minutes ago, as chairman of the Committee for Cooperation with UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force], I was informed that this evening all the conditions have been achieved for the cease-fire to be signed and that there was no opposition to this on the Muslim side," Koljevic said, and added:

"These words sound very ironic at a time when NATO has been operating as the Muslim-Croat air force, including yesterday when it again bombed Serb positions in the Tuzla area."

"So the cease-fire was supposed to come into effect when this suited the opposing side in terms of its acquisition of the maximum amount of territory. In addition, they obtained an extra day—today," Professor Koljevic concluded.

Gas to Sarajevo Paid Up for Next 3 Months

*AU1010190995 Paris AFP in English
1816 GMT 10 Oct 95*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, Oct 10 (AFP)—The Bosnian government has paid for gas to Sarajevo for the next three months, an official government communique said Tuesday, the day supplies finally reached the city after much delay.

"Today (Tuesday), the Bosnia-Herzegovina expert team and the Russian representatives signed an agreement on supplies and payment for the next three months," Bosnia's official press stated.

No figure was given for the sum paid. The Russian federation is owed \$100 million for gas consumed in Sarajevo, Serb-controlled Bosnia and neighbouring Serbia over the last three years. The bulk has been used by the Serbs, UN experts say.

Restoration of gas supplies to Sarajevo via a pipeline from Russia was among preconditions for the start of a countrywide cease-fire for Bosnia due to have begun at one minute past midnight Monday.

But last-minute wrangles over payment held up the opening of valves and delayed implementation of the cease-fire for at least one day.

Hasan Muratovic, the government minister handling the restoration of utilities to Sarajevo, met Tuesday with Leonid Kerestodijanc, Russia's ambassador to Croatia.

"The (pair) discussed the gas supplies to Sarajevo, particularly the agreement the Bosnian government reached in Moscow recently," the Bosnian press statement said. Muratovic and Bosnia's Prime Minister Haris Silajdzic visited the Russian capital last week.

Santer To Hold Meeting on Postwar Reconstruction

*AU0610095895 Paris AFP in English
2227 GMT 5 Oct 95*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Brussels, Oct 5 (AFP)—European Commission president Jacques Santer will meet next Thursday with EU mediator Carl Bildt and Bosnian Prime Minister Haris Silajdzic to discuss rebuilding war-ravaged Bosnia, Santer's spokesman said on Thursday.

The European Union is emerging as the most likely body to coordinate the recovery effort.

The meeting, held at the Bosnian prime minister's request, will focus on the post-war reconstruction of Bosnia-Herzegovina after more than three years of devastating warfare.

"The European Union will probably be our most important partner in reconstruction," Silajdzic said after meeting with Bildt in Sarajevo on Wednesday to discuss long-term planning.

All the parties to the conflict agreed on Thursday to a ceasefire, due to go into effect next Tuesday.

There is no official estimate of what it will cost to rebuild Bosnia, but the United States, according to diplomatic sources, has put forward the figure of at least four billion dollars.

During the EU summit in Spain in late September, France suggested that the cost should be split three ways between the European Union, the United States and, finally, Japan and Moslem countries.

Zubak: No Danger of Croat-Bosniak War

AU1010181295 Vienna Oesterreich Eins Radio Network in German 1100 GMT 10 Oct 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Lininger] In the office of Kresimir Zubak, president of the Muslim-Croat [Bosnia-Herzegovina] Federation, two flags are hanging: one with the coat of arms of Bosnia and one with the coat of arms of Herzeg-Bosna [Croatian entity in Bosnia-Herzegovina]. These are the coats of arms of the two state structures that exist, from a realistic political point of view, on the territory of the Federation, but which, strictly speaking, should actually no longer exist as independent units. The units should have merged into one state with eight cantons long ago. However, nothing of the sort has happened. This is also admitted by Federation President Zubak:

[Zubak] It is quite normal that no progress has been made with the Federation. The Federation has been talked about, but it has never really been engaged in, because people first want to see what will become of the country.

[Lininger] If one comes today from Croatia via Herzeg-Bosnia to territory under the control of Bosnian Government troops, one has the impression that the state border does not run between Croatia and Bosnia, but rather within the Federation. Kris Janowski, UNHCR [United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees] spokesman in Sarajevo, said:

[Janowski] If you go across this area, as soon as you are on Croatian territory, you will see that all the cars have Croatian license plates, the police are all Croats,

everything is virtually Croatian. The Croatian currency is also used.

On Bosnian territory everything is Bosnian.

[Lininger] Also as far as people are concerned, the two parts of the Federation are developing in different directions.

[Janowski] Within the Federation, there is still a rather clear division between the Muslims and the Croats. Thus, what we will probably witness in the near future will be the formation of ethnically clean units, where Croats live with Croats and Muslims with Muslims.

[Lininger] Federation President Kresimir Zubak says that this ethnic division is completely normal. Zubak is a Croat and he is not only the president of the Federation, but also the first man in the Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosna. Zubak rejects the assumptions that he would actually prefer Herzeg-Bosna's incorporation into Croatia to the Federation with the Bosnian Muslims. However, this is precisely what many people in Bosnia fear. [passage omitted]

The ideas of what the Federation is supposed to be are rather different. What has held it together so far has been the fight against the joint enemy, the Bosnian Serbs. This is only a war alliance, says the chief subeditor of OSLOBODJENJE, the biggest daily of Sarajevo.

But what will happen if a permanent armistice is achieved with the Serbs? Will a new war between Croats and Muslims be imminent?

[Zubak] There might be certain incidents between Croats and Muslims here and there. However, these will be minor. There is no danger that a war or large-scale fighting might develop from it.

[Lininger] Many citizens of Sarajevo are less optimistic. Asked whether a war might soon break out in the Federation, the chief of the political editorial department of OSLOBODJENJE has a short answer pat: Yes, of course.

Commentary Says Bosniaks Lack Political Will

AU2809120895 Split SLOBODNA DALMACIJA in Serbo-Croatian 26 Sep 95 p 13

[Commentary by Veso Vagar: "Federation Being Banned"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The liberation of areas in Bosnia-Herzegovina that were occupied until yesterday creates the conditions for the true realization of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and of a future for its two nations. One of these conditions is the opportunity for the displaced persons and refugees who fled before

the Serbian aggression to return home. It is an often mentioned issue, the issue above all other issues of the establishment of the Federation, or, we can say, the reason for its creation and existence. And now that large areas of Bosnia-Herzegovina have been liberated, the conditions have been created, and the process of people returning to their homes has started. However, it has started in such a way that it gives more cause for concern than rejoicing.

Everybody knows that most of the Bosniaks-Muslims evicted from Donji Vakuf by the Serbs in 1992 came to Bugojno and stayed there. Only a small number moved on to the Republic of Croatia and third countries. When the Croats were expelled from Bugojno by the Muslims in 1993, the Muslims from Donji Vakuf moved into their apartments and houses. Since Donji Vakuf was liberated some ten days ago, the Bosniaks-Muslims from Donji Vakuf have been leaving Bugojno and returning to their own homes. Before leaving the Croatian houses and apartments many Bosniaks informed their Croatian owners so these could get them back and the Bosniaks could hand over the keys. Meanwhile, even without such notice, more and more Croats are returning to Bugojno to check the state of the property they once had to leave, and see how to protect it.

When the Croats return and meet those Bosniaks who have lived in their houses, there is normal communication and the Bosniaks are, as a rule, willing to hand over the keys. And just when everybody expects that there will be a happy end and the one will be satisfied with leaving for his own home, while the other is satisfied to arrive, the authorities in Bugojno react very rudely. In all the cases in which the Croats have attempted to get back their houses, the authorities, that is, the housing office and the police have thwarted the Croats in their attempts to move in. They tell the Croats that they have no right to move in, and give them a short time to leave their apartments, houses, and the town of Bugojno.

The deserted Croatian houses are being plundered. Literally everything is taken out of them, including window frames, doors, tiles, wooden roof beams. By allowing such behavior toward Croatian property, or even encouraging it, the authorities have been destroying the material conditions for the Croats to return to Bugojno.

Thus the opening of the opportunity for the displaced people and refugees to return, instead of opening the way to the rapid establishment of the Federation, is creating new problems. The return of the one group to their own houses creates an opportunity for the others to return to theirs, too. And that is the principle that has been advocated by the leadership of the Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia for a long time. That is,

they have been advocating a process in which all will be able to return to their homes and in which this most important question will not be dealt with partially. If things continue like this, with the return of one group destroying the material conditions for the return of the others, then the process of return cannot be universal. And if the return of the displaced people and refugees is not carried out completely, at least in the territory of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, then the Federation itself loses its sense and the reason to exist. Because the Federation is not needed for only one nation.

The point at issue in Bugojno is obviously the complete lack of political will of the Bosniak authorities to carry out the agreements and treaties signed a long time ago between Croatian and Bosniak leadership; even before then, when a transitional Municipal Council was to be formed, and now when the process of the return should start. In this way all agreements, even the last agreement of Presidents Franjo Tudjman, Alija Izetbegovic, and Kresimir Zubak in Zagreb, have been trampled upon. For the second time the Croats are being expelled from their own houses and apartments and banished from Bugojno. In this way the Federation is also being banished.

Aid Officials See Increase in 'Ethnic Cleansing'

AU0910174395 Paris AFP in English
1705 GMT 9 Oct 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, Oct 9 (AFP)—Bosnian Serb extremists have stepped up their campaign to rid Serb-held northern Bosnia of the estimated 25,000 Moslems still living in the region, UN aid officials said Monday.

"In the last four to five days, between 3,000 and 4,000 Moslems have been expelled from Sanski Most, Bosanski Novi and Prijedor. These are extremely brutal expulsions with reports of men being separated from women and children," Kris Janowski, a UNHCR [UN High Commissioner for Refugees] spokesman said.

In Geneva, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) said rebel Serbs had expelled 3,500 Moslems from their northwest Bosnian stronghold of Banja Luka over the past three days.

The refugees are women, children and elderly people after men were stopped from getting onto the buses with their families, said an ICRC spokesman, adding that 1,400 out of the 3,500 were expected Monday at Zenica.

The ICRC is trying to get in touch with displaced people whose whereabouts since Friday are unknown.

Another group of 600 mainly women and children are expected to cross frontlines to reach government held central Bosnia later on Monday, Janowski said.

"The expulsions are continuing," he said adding that interviews with those who have already come to government areas reveal a series of abuses, many attributed to units loyal to the Serb warlord Zeljko "Arkan" Raznatovic who is operating in the area.

"These people were expelled in a fairly appalling way. We have accounts of people being forced to cross a river on foot. Some apparently drowned in the process while others died of exhaustion, allegations of brutality," the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees spokesman said.

There is also concern for the whereabouts of Moslem men from the region who have failed to turn up, Janowski said. "We don't know how many people we are talking about, but if it is all draft age men then it is in the thousands. We have one report of men being taken to a concentration camp," he said.

Northern Bosnia before the war had a Moslem population of around half a million. Many of these were forced from their homes by Serb militia as part of so-called "ethnic cleansing" in the first weeks of the war.

Bosnian Serb leaders have made little secret of their support for the expulsions in their pursuit of ethnically-pure areas under their control. Janowski said because of the presence of Arkan's "thugs," "many local Serbs who had been tolerant towards the remaining Moslem community were intimidated into behaving towards them with hostility."

Minister Says Refugees To Remain in Croatia

LD0710163295 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 7 Oct 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Muharem Cero, minister for refugees and social policy, has said that, according to the information available to his ministry, the Croatian Government decision to unilaterally revoke the refugee status for the Bosnia-Herzegovina refugees has been revoked until further notice and that our refugees in Croatia still have refugee status. [passage omitted]

Sarajevo Radio Reports Locations of Serb Camps

AU1010204095 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 10 Oct 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The killing of the civilians and their expulsion from ancient homes is a constant element of the Fascist policy of the Pale regime. These days, when the soldiers of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army are breaking the backbone of the chetnik army, an exodus

of the Bosniaks from Prijedor, Banja Luka, Bosanski Novi, and Sanski to the territory of central Bosnia is underway.

Some 3,000 Bosniaks from Sanski Most were received in Zenica alone, and they continue to arrive daily. The exodus from this town continues because the chetniks decided to expel all people who remained on this territory and, a month ago, they were expelled from their homes and taken to the village of Sehovci, where they were hiding in the forest.

According to the testimonies of the expelled persons, they traveled for 24 hours without a halt. A great number people and children drowned while crossing a river in the vicinity of the territory controlled by the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army. Arkan's men separated several hundreds of men from women and children and took them to an unknown destination. According to the testimonies of the witnesses, several hundred men from the left bank of the Sana River are being imprisoned in a camp in the ceramic tiles factory Sana Keram, without any blankets and basic conditions for life, as well as in the coal mine in Kamengrad. The men who used to live on the right bank of the Sana River are kept in a camp in the former art gallery, in the brick factory in Kruhari, and in the Betonirka factory.

EU Commission Lists Conditions for Aid

BR2809152795 Antwerp DE
FINANCIEEL-ECONOMISCHE TIJD in Dutch
28 Sep 95 p 5

[Article by "PL": "EU Commission Wants To Coordinate Bosnian Aid"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The European Commission, which Wednesday [27 September] welcomed the provisional New York agreement to restore peace to Bosnia, is willing to coordinate international aid for the restoration of peace in Bosnia. Although the EU already provides Bosnia with the necessary aid, the Commission believes that over the next year the international community will have to supply more aid to help the reconstruction of Bosnia.

The EU will contribute to this aid and cooperation will also be required with the UNHCR [United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees]. The European Commission spokesman stated that the international aid must concentrate primarily on creating a stable economic and political system in the former Yugoslavia. It is a matter of restoring a balance between all the countries and peoples in the region.

This aid must not only come from the European Union. The EU Commission is calling on the United States,

Japan, the Islamic countries, Russia, and the international financial institutions to help. Central and eastern European countries are also expected to contribute in accordance with their resources. The EU Commission is prepared to call a conference of donor countries.

The Commission spokesman left no doubt that EU aid will be linked to certain conditions. The Commission will be informing EU foreign ministers of these conditions on Monday.

To start with, the Commission believes that macroeconomic aid to the region must be subject to the normal conditions as always apply to such aid. In addition, the countries in question must agree to respect human rights and the fundamental freedoms and rights of minorities. Guarantees must be given for the voluntary return of refugees.

The countries receiving the aid must create the necessary conditions for the development of a genuine market economy. They must also disarm and cooperate with the International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. All the countries in the region must also establish political, economic, and cultural ties.

Article Views Role of Serbian Volunteer Guard

*AU0510131795 Belgrade VECERNJE NOVOSTI
in Serbo-Croatian 4 Oct 95 p 6*

[Unattributed report: "Guard Near Kljuc"]

[FBIS Translated Text] In the last 10 days, during which the soldiers of the Serbian Volunteer Guard have fought for the survival of the Serbian people across the Drina River together with the police and the army under whose command they are, seven Serbian guardsmen have died and 27 have been injured. Simultaneously, 300 Muslims were captured, however, not a single guardsman fell into enemy hands alive.

As acting party president Borislav Pelevic emphasized at the press conference in Belgrade yesterday, when the ustasas massacred three guardsmen, all members of the Guard were issued with the order not to let themselves be taken alive. The guardsmen of the Party of Serbian Unity, led by Party President Zeljko Raznatovic Arkan, are currently in the surroundings of Kljuc, whose fall is expected any moment.

Pelevic stressed the importance of the Guard, which, as he said, prevented the fall of Sanski Most and participated in the defense of Novi Grad. He did not deny that deserters have their heads shaved and are then returned to their units.

"On the territory of the Serb Republic, we formed three centers for the reception of deserters," Pelevic confirmed. "We send them back to their units; although we are aware that they will never be soldiers, however, they can at least help others. In accordance with the old Serbian custom, the deserters who where unit commanders also have their heads shaved, are given 25 lashes, and tied to the pillar of shame."

Although such behavior resulted in disputes with some generals, which have all been overcome, "a firm military hand prevented the fall of Sanski Most and Novi Grad [Bosanski Novi]," according to Pelevic. Apart from that, as Pelevic said, the guardsmen also beat up a colonel of the Serb Republic Army who ordered a withdrawal from Sanski Most, and he was added to the list of officers who will answer for cowardice on the front. Pelevic could not say how many names were on this list, however, he confirmed that these men would definitely be tried, "if this has not been done already, immediately and militarily on the front."

In the attack on Mrkonjic Grad, when the Guard attacked together with the Army of the Serb Republic (capturing the elevations of Podbrdo, Manjaca, Redzepovica, Laketica Koliba...) the 501st Bihac (Muslim) Brigade was destroyed and a courier and a lookout captured "who provided valuable information," according to the Party of Serbian Unity. The Travnik Brigade was routed near Sitnica and had more than 100 dead Muslims.

When asked how many Krajina men were mobilized, Pelevic replied that about 2,000 were mobilized forcefully, but that a far greater number of draftees from the Serb Republic of Krajina enlisted in the Guard voluntarily.

The representatives of the Party of Serbian Unity distributed "a war plan," Sarajevo "Drina" [cigarettes], Rovinj "sardines," and German margarine captured from the 17th Krajina Chivalrous Brigade Travnik.

Tudjman Comments on Elections, Domestic Issues

*LD0610141395 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network
in Serbo-Croatian 1100 GMT 6 Oct 95*

[News conference given by Croatian President Franjo Tudjman at the Presidential Palace in Zagreb—live]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Curic, Croatian TV] Mr. President, we have big news from Bosnia, but I would like to begin by asking about domestic affairs. Could you comment on the current situation ahead of the elections? Could you say anything about the Croatian Democratic Union's [HDZ] state list, and statements by some of your officials that there will be a lifelong president, or king of the Croats?

[Tudjman] [Laughs] None of my officials has said this. If you think that such a thing would have my approval, well, it is the most absurd stupidity to think that Croatia might be proclaimed a principality [banovina], because it is a sovereign state. At the same time it would never enter my head to accept such a proposal, regardless of the fact that I receive such letters—I have perhaps about 10 of them. Nor has such an idea that the current president could become a life president been given any consideration by the Croatian state and political leadership. I believe this to be the political thinking of some individuals who do not have any connections either with myself or with, as I said, the thinking among most HDZ members.

As regards the elections, the lists will be presented today, and everything will be evident. I believe that the coming elections will contribute to the strengthening of the democratic system and the seriousness of multiparty, parliamentary democracy in Croatia.

[name indistinct], Croatian Radio] Yesterday's news told us of the signing of a cease-fire in Bosnia-Herzegovina, to be followed by peace talks. Mr. President, would you be so kind as to tell us whether in these peace talks you expect further pressure to form some kind of new union in this area?

[Tudjman] Did you say new union?

[Correspondent] The creation of a new union of the countries that evolved after the demise of the former Yugoslavia.

[Tudjman] No. I do not believe it is realistic to expect any such thing in the framework of these peace talks, and the peace initiative, which is being led by the United States, with the agreement of the EU and Russia.

But now that you have asked this question let me say that we should truly take note of the fact that we are faced with certain efforts—both in the media and in some diplomatic circles. Take what was printed in

the London THE GUARDIAN two or three days ago: namely, that in the area of the former Yugoslavia, and not only the former Yugoslavia, a new economic and political grouping should be formed—something that was previously called the Yugoslav, Balkan, or Adriatic confederation—after which a union of southeastern Europe would probably be more acceptable.

So, according to THE GUARDIAN, and some thinking in diplomatic circles in Europe and the world, this union should encompass all the countries of the former Yugoslavia, apart from Slovenia, including Albania and, it seems, Bulgaria, too, according to what is now circulating among diplomatic representatives, and about which, it seems, they dream. This is very serious—not in the framework of the current peace talks and official talks, as I said, but such intentions certainly exist.

As far as we are concerned, we take the view that we are in favor of the normalization of relations with all the countries that have emerged out of the former Yugoslavia, and with all others. We are in favor of the establishment of normal economic, communications-related and political relations in the sense of cooperation between sovereign states. But it is quite certain that Croatia will not accede to inclusion in any kind of Balkan or southeastern European union, where it would lose the sovereignty it has achieved in this historic period.

[Ramljak] I am Olga Ramljak of 'Slobodna Dalmacija.' The EU, according to foreign media reports, has also been pushing Croatia into a grouping made up of everyone except for Slovenia. The key reason for this is the violation of human rights in the liberated Croatian areas. Could you tell us what the Croatian authorities will do—and whether they will do everything—to prevent any violation of human rights, especially anything akin to a war crime. Is there any truth in reports that police, civilians, and soldiers have already been arrested precisely for the violation of human rights in the liberated Croatian areas?

[Tudjman] Yes, one could say that we in Croatia are now faced with a very intense campaign, which says things to the effect that Croatia is violating human rights because there has been an alleged cleansing of the Serb populace, because there have been crimes in the liberated areas, and because the Croatian authorities have done nothing to prevent this.

Regarding ethnic cleansing: People who say that Croatia and the Croatian Government are to blame for the emigration of the Serb populace forget that Croatia, both in a constitutional and political sense, did everything, for its part, to see that the Serb population stayed in Croatia on condition that they were prepared to recognize

Croatia as their own state. So we gave constitutional and legal guarantees. I personally appealed to the Serb population to remain, and at the same time there was an appeal to the Croatian authorities at all levels to ensure that these rights would be guaranteed to them.

However, a mass exodus of the Serb population took place as a consequence of imperialist Serb policy designed to thwart a sovereign Croatia and rule over it. These people forget that these were, unfortunately, phenomena which have been unavoidable over the centuries and throughout all wars in history.

Without going further into history, one should remember that after World War I about 2.5 million people were resettled, driven out, or forced to emigrate. The most important examples were Armenia and the exchange of populations between Greece and Turkey. After World War II there were 12 million Germans—and not only Germans—expelled from the Soviet Union and other places. And now when we read in some German media that Croatia should have prevented this and it should allow these people to return, one should first ask such people who are so concerned about the violation of human rights in Croatia why it is that they did not allow three million Germans to return to Poland, three to four million to the Sudetenland and so on; 450,000 of them were driven out of Yugoslavia, 570,000 from Germany and so on.

So, unfortunately, emigration, the departure of a population, and the exchange of populations have been the consequences of all wars, since, as I said, the beginning of history.

We did not want this and do not want this but this is the consequence of a policy caused by those who began the aggression against Croatia in order to bring it down or to seize its regions.

Regarding the violation of human rights, and what one can call war crimes, one should recall that—above all, in the area occupied by the Yugo-communist army, Serb extremists, Serbia, and Yugoslavia, an area which is about 13,508 square km and which has now been liberated, and we should recall that this area is equal to the whole territory of the Republic of Montenegro and equal to two-thirds of Slovenia or over half of Slovenia and Macedonia [as heard]—in this area the democratically elected and established authorities in 70 municipalities and towns, the regular Croatian authorities, were destroyed, so that after the liberation and the departure of the Serb population from these areas, the occupying authorities disappeared, too.

Into this area, after the liberation following Operations Flash and Storm which liberated western Slavonia and

the central Croatian areas from Sisak and Petrinja to Knin—into this area poured 120,000 exiled and ill-treated Croatian people. In this area, in virtually every village, hamlet and town there were killed, massacred Croats. One should recall the crimes committed in the Pakrac area or in Skabrnje where about 81 or 87 Croats were massacred and that graves of massacred people were discovered. These areas were liberated during an aggression and a struggle for the survival of the Croatian state and Croatian people. Of the 13,000 killed Croatian soldiers up to now, certainly up to 10,000 were killed in fighting for this area, and about 30,000 Croats were wounded.

I do not want to use these figures to justify any act of revenge by any Croat. Furthermore, both in my internal instructions and in my public speeches I myself called on the Croatian authorities to ensure order and the functioning of the legal system, and on the occasion of the journey by the Freedom Train I spoke about this problem. I did this in Karlovac, and in great detail in Knin, and in Split.

[Tudjman] I have called on the Croatian people to be reasonable. I have condemned all illegal acts of revenge, all plundering, all robbery, and I have called on the Croatian Government to guarantee order. However, as I have said, in circumstances of the complete absence of any authority and the return of these grief-stricken people to these areas, when they saw the destruction of their homes, their houses, when they saw the destruction of Croatian monuments, churches and so on, it is understandable that justified anger was aroused in these people. There were those, as there are everywhere, in all war situations, who succumbed to looting and plundering. However, the Croatian Government has not tolerated this, but has striven in the circumstances of total anarchy and lack of authority in this massive territory, which is as I have said the equivalent of Montenegro or half or three-quarters of Slovenia and Macedonia, in circumstances where there have been incidents of theft and looting, arson and destruction, and even killing...[pauses] but the Croatian Government has not looked favorably on this nor has it sat back and looked on, but has taken steps.

According to the information I have, proceedings are under way in 611 cases of theft and looting, in 27 cases of explosions and destruction, and in seven cases of murder, and the Croatian Government is examining 36 cases of murder where it is still not completely clear whether they occurred in war circumstances and the mopping up of sabotage groups or were the result of crimes committed by unbalanced and uncontrolled individuals. In these cases which have been reported to the judicial organs there are currently 24 offenders being

held in prison. This information clearly shows that the Croatian Government is most certainly taking steps to prevent such illegal incidents, to prevent the violation of human rights and in particular war crimes.

We expect that the courts, which in Croatia really are fully independent, will carry out their tasks in all the cases which I have mentioned.

We should remember—seeing that almost all countries have accused Croatia of allegedly tolerating these incidents—that in all wars, nor even the most organized, and much more powerful countries and powers could not prevent such incidents. Let me not say anything about the Second World War. Should I say something about the Israel-Egypt war, during which—we read—there have been violations even against prisoners of war? They should be reminded of the Falklands, and even of the American army's war in Vietnam, where there were also similar incidents. Do I need to say anything about any other warfare, such as in Algeria and so on? So, there have been similar incidents in all war conflicts, but these cases of population resettlement and violations that occurred during the liberation of the occupied Croatian areas are being cited as our sin, as though Croatia was the only example of this.

The inevitable question is why this is happening. It is happening because nowadays Croatia has found itself under a synchronized campaign to discredit the democratic Croatian authorities. Why?

I think there are three reasons for this. One, in order to force us to tolerate the state of occupation in eastern Slavonia, western Srem and Baranja, to refrain from the operations such as Flash and Storm, which were carried out by Croatian Army and police forces in a professional way, admired even by those who are not favorably disposed towards Croatia. So, they are trying to force us not to launch such operations, but to suffer the occupation.

We do not want to do that. We will do everything to solve the problem of the remaining occupied areas by peaceful means, just as we wanted to and did everything to solve the problem of western Slavonia and the Knin area by peaceful means and in line with Croatia's constitution and the constitutional law—we held negotiations, signed agreements. We are holding talks even now in the framework of the international peace initiative, and direct talks with both Belgrade and the local Serbs in order to solve the problem of that area by peaceful means, to return it to Croatia's constitutional and legal system.

However, this campaign will not prevent us from resorting to anything that any free, sovereign state and

a democratic country has the right to if these efforts do not bear any fruit.

This is one of the reasons why Croatia has found itself under such a merciless campaign aimed at discrediting the Croatian authorities in the eyes of the international public.

The second reason seems to be that everyone—both the domestic and foreign enemies of the modern day democratic Croatian authorities—wants to discredit the Croatian Government ahead of the forthcoming elections, in the hope of influencing the outcome of the elections so that the outcome is not what the Croatian public would like it to be.

The third reason is the one you mentioned earlier, to force Croatia—possibly even through a change of the government in Croatia or by creating such a climate—to accept becoming part of some kind of Yugoslav or Balkan alliance or union or, as it is euphemistically called, economic-political entities.

We should tackle the essence of the problem. The Croatian authorities are doing and will do everything—as the figures I presented earlier show—to prevent all illegal actions, to punish those who committed crimes and violated human rights, and to ensure that in this respect Croatia can under no circumstances be described in the terms the enemies of Croatia's democracy and sovereignty would like to use.

I think I have answered your question.

[Unidentified correspondent] Mr. President, the forthcoming elections will not be held only in a liberated Croatia, but also in a Croatia which will need to be developed and reconstructed. When do you expect Croatia could be reconstructed and become a competitor on European and international markets in some important areas?

[Tudjman] Under the aggression and the state of war and semiwar Croatia displayed admirable vitality. Do I need to remind you that we fought the war, created the army and coped with everything, and there has never been shortage of bread? On the contrary, we had problems with surplus wheat. There has been no rationing, no gas coupons or anything similar, which in fact existed at the time when former Yugoslav Prime Minister Ante Markovic tried to democratize Yugoslavia, and it existed in some other countries.

So, Croatia has proved its economic vitality at the hardest times of the Yugo-communist and Serbian aggression and occupation of Croatian areas. Of course, now that 95 percent of the occupied territory has been liberated, and that the liberation of the rest of Croatia is

imminent, Croatia will have conditions to become one of the most prosperous countries that existed under the socialist system—as some objective economists from the West say.

This will happen because many people are returning from abroad. You know that more than half of Croatia's population is dispersed all over the world. These people are coming back. They are taking an increasingly active part in the economic and cultural life, as well as in state bodies. This will facilitate the process of overcoming the vestiges of the communist system and to speed up our development, including the economic recovery.

Now you asked me this, I would like to say that there has been some misunderstanding as to why those people [living outside Croatia] can elect 12 deputies to the Chamber of Deputies of the Croatian assembly, under the new electoral law. There have been claims that this is an disproportionate number, that there are only around 470,000 people living abroad who have Croatian citizenship and the right to vote.

Those who are against that law forget several issues. First of all, the door to all emigrants is open, including those 470,000 who have the right to vote. All parties can send their programs and their lists of candidates and win all the 12 deputies. So this law is not in the interest of only the ruling party. I have heard these claims in particular from some people who are now back in Croatia, but who used to be party leaders in emigration. This law gives them all the more opportunity to take advantage of it.

Secondly, this is not a matter only of 470,000 people who have our citizenship and who can use their right as citizens of Croatia. They are in fact representatives of 3.5 million Croats who are spread all over the world. And we want them to return as soon as possible. Clearly, we cannot bring them all back, but some of them we can. And everyone who becomes an elected representative in parliament can play an effective part in parliament and approve regulations and legislation which will ease the return of Croatian people and their involvement in the overall social, economic, and political life of Croatia.

So this is only a sign of the democratization of Croatian political life and the resolution of one of the vital questions—the demographic situation of the Croatian nation and efforts to see that these Croats return to their homeland as soon as possible, as they wish to.

[Correspondent] I am Mr. Saleh. Has there been any international pressure on Croatia to withdraw its forces from northern and western Bosnia or was this a condition for the negotiations in Erdut [eastern Slavonia].

And if the cease-fire in Bosnia is violated will Croatia be involved again?

[Tudjman] There was no such pressure as you have described it, nor was this a precondition for the negotiations in Erdut. The Croatian forces are in Bosnia on the basis not only of an agreement with the government of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation but at their invitation. They are still there and they will remain there for as long as this is necessary and in accordance with a mutual agreement.

[Correspondent] [Name indistinct] Could you please comment on the statements made in an interview to 'Globus' by Mr. Ivan Jakovic [leader of the Istrian Democratic Assembly, IDS], who said that the HDZ [Croatian Democratic Union] has all the time been calling for, or offering, a coalition with the IDS?

[Tudjman] I have heard about this. It is true that the HDZ, and I personally, have been offering IDS leaders a coalition, a cooperation bloc—but not all the time—only during the first two years when we tried to do this for the sake of the recognition of the results of the democratic elections and for the sake of the interests of Croatia as a whole and Istria. When we offered this, the IDS gained a majority in Istria, and the HDZ gained a majority in Croatia as a whole. It is in the interest of both Istria and Croatia that those who gained a majority in Istria should cooperate with the party which is in power throughout Croatia so that we might resolve more successfully all the Istrian and Croatian problems and so that they, too, might be able to take part in the resolution of general Croatian problems.

[Tudjman] So we offered them both cooperation in the county of Istria itself and in the government. So this is a reflection of a principled policy on the part of the majority party and on my own part to resolve things not in a party way but in the interests of the whole people and the state as a whole.

However, the gentlemen did not accept this, and it turned out very quickly that they were not interested in seeing Istria within the framework of Croatia, what with their demands for the demilitarization of Istria and their demand to create a transregional region of Istria in which the Slovene and Italian parts of Istria would also be included—so as to create transregional regions in Europe. Clearly, this was not in the interests of Croatian policy and, as a result, they obviously did not accept our proposal, but they linked up instead with those political forces which worked directly to the detriment of, and against, Croatia.

It is known that they had links with the aspirations of the remnants of Italian fascist and irredentist political

forces. It is likewise known that they assisted a regionalism being promoted by certain circles—something we mentioned just now with reference to a sovereign Croatia and attempts to send Croatia off down a different track.

Istria was a testing ground—the most favorable testing ground—for those who were not inclined towards a sovereign Croatia and who favored the destabilization of the Croatian state and the Croatian democratic authorities, and not only the destabilization of Croatia but also, in a certain sense, the destabilization of the existing European order—something, naturally, of which most of the IDS membership, and leaders, were unaware. But this does not mean that the consequences, as a result, were any different.

Our proposal—the proposal of the HDZ and my own proposal to the IDS leadership at that time, immediately after 1990 and up to 1992 and even after the second elections—was along these lines.

[Skugor] I am Smiljana Skugor, for HINA. Mr. President, if the principles, already outlined in the Erdut agreement, are signed, who will guarantee to Croatia that in perhaps one year's time, should there be such a deadline, it will not have to militarily liberate these areas once again? And a second question, if I may, since I come from Dalmatia, can you comment on the election slogan of the Dalmatian Action—we don't want what belongs to others, but we shall not give up Dalmatia.

[Tudjman] Who guarantees this? The strength of the Croatian state, the unity of the Croatian people, and the Croatian state policy, which has not only won its place in the international order, but which is also a necessary and inevitable factor in the European and world politics, without which it will no longer be possible to build anything in this region.

If the U.S. secretary of state said in his talks with our foreign minister that relations between the United States and Croatia were built on strategic interests, and if the French president repeated, during a meeting with me, that Croatia could count on France as its objective friend and ally, this speaks of changes in relations vis-a-vis Croatia's status in the world today. Our strength, which we demonstrated, has proved to the world that we will be capable of responding to possible provocations if the latest agreement fails to be implemented.

As for the slogan, it proves that all the Dalmatian Action wants is to split Istria off from Croatia. As we know, Dalmatia is the cradle of Croatian statehood.

We also know that imperialist interests are nurtured and alliances made in Dalmatia, as well as visits and agreements between exponents of Italian and Serbian

imperialism [as heard]. Consequently, demands for the autonomy of Dalmatia [pauses] as if these people had not lived through everything Dalmatia had lived through, and everything Dalmatia had contributed to the creation of the democratic Croatian state, Croatia's defense, the building of democracy, and what it would be difficult to repeat anywhere in the world—how Split and Dalmatia greeted the Freedom Train. There are people who are not capable of learning anything, about their own area and especially about their homeland or the world.

[Correspondent] Mr. President, I am Miro Kokic, Croatian Army newspapers. Claims have lately been appearing in the media that the Croatian Army would not have been capable of carrying out Operation Lightning, and especially not Operation Storm, had it not had the educational support from U.S. expert officers and logistic support from Germany. Is it the intention in this way to diminish Croatia's great victory, emphasize Croatia's dependence, or is it something else? Thank you.

[Tudjman] Yes, these claims are fairly widespread in the European and world media. True, within the framework of overall friendly relations with the United States, we have established good relations with its Defense Department. However, there has been no training of Croatian troops by U.S. experts or officers. Some retired members of U.S. Army, generals, gave lectures—there were two or three—for a group of military and civilian Croatian people, and this had nothing to do with military leadership in the sense of technical preparations and the use of the army.

It goes without saying that such exchange of experience was purposeful, we value it and we shall continue to develop such relations with every friendly country.

It is an even greater nonsense to say that Germany gave us logistic support, that the mark backed us up, etc. Once again, we value Germany's role in the recognition of Croatia, its role as one of the European countries which took on a large number of Croatian refugees of the 400,000 expelled after the Yugo-communist and Serbian aggression against Croatia, and a large number of refugees from Bosnia, more than any other country.

But the truth is that Germany on its own has never ever provided any logistic support to Croatia. Furthermore, Germany was consistent in its adherence to the embargo against the selling of anything which could be used for Croatian military purposes, to the point that we could not bring back two of our police helicopters, not military, which happened to be there before the war, since they could have allegedly been used for this purpose.

Germany was consistent in its respect of international regulations relating to the embargo on the imports of arms or any military equipment.

[Tudjman] I know that at the beginning of the aggression two Croats, who were concerned for the president's safety and obtained weapons to defend him, were arrested on the way to Croatia via Germany, and the weapons were confiscated. This is the truth. We appreciate Germany's friendship in the political and economic sphere, but there has been no military assistance.

On the contrary, we could read in our and foreign newspapers over the past two years that Croatia has always received at least a green light, if not open assistance, from both the United States and Germany. Ladies and gentlemen, I will say this again. We highly appreciate the change in those countries' policy—from the policy which aimed at preserving Yugoslavia in 1991 and even in 1991 to the recognition of Croatia and the establishing of friendly links—but all decisions the Croatian leadership and me personally, as the head of state, have made, were our own decisions.

If we had heeded advice from the world, we would not have this news conference as we are having it now. There would have been no Maslenica operation, no cancellation of UNPROFOR's [UN Protection Force] mandate, no Flash and no Storm. Everyone, even those who were favorably disposed towards us, who were genuinely concerned for Croatia, everyone thought we could not launch the Maslenica operation, or Flash, or Storm, to say nothing of Breeze and so on. They believed that these operations would provoke an intervention by the Yugo army or Russia, or cause another world war and so on. So we had to make our decisions alone on the basis of our judgment of Croatia's internal potentials and of relations in the territory of the former Yugoslavia and the opponents we face, as well as possible changes of international circumstances. This is the truth. Everything else are only attempts to force us to heed every piece of advice.

We are people who know how to listen, but we also know how to decide alone what is in the interest of Croatia, but not only Croatia. This is precisely why Croatia's policy has won. We knew how to harmonize Croatia's policy with our own forces, while we built up our potential, as well as with international circumstances, knowing full well that the moves we made would be in the interest of the democratic powers in Europe and in the world, too. This is the cause of the success of our policy.

When I am reading these days that opportunities were missed, that Flash and Storm could have been launched as early as in 1990 or 1991, well, then ladies and

gentlemen, this is repeating particularly nonsensical things. For, had we attempted to do something like this in 1990 and 1991, when we had nothing, had we nevertheless attempted, well a drunkard can attack a most elegant shop window and smash it but he can also smash his own nose and head, etc.

Consequently, precisely because we rendered the circumstances accurately and because we were building our force, then we carried out such flashy and stormy endeavors which yielded not just military but political results, too, and which have really led Croatia to the position of a regional power which has to be taken into account today. Regardless of what kind of dreams and ideas they might have about creating a new order on this soil.

[Borozula] I am Drazen Borozula, 'Glas Slavonije.' Mr. President, could you tell us whether in the context of the latest agreements with the international mediators and following the talks in Erdut any concrete deadlines have been defined for starting the process of reintegrating eastern Slavonia, Baranja and west Srem?

[Tudjman] These talks will resume on Monday [9 October] in Zagreb. Understandably, we are not going to tolerate indefinite delays as we will seek a solution, a political solution within the framework of a general peace plan. You heard President Clinton yesterday. He said he expected a top meeting as early as late October. This means an end is expected to these negotiations, general peace negotiations. Today is also the final deadline, the expiry of the UNCRO [UN Confidence Restoration Operation] mandate.

[Milcic] Stjepan Milcic, Bavarian Radio and ARD. Mr. President...

[Tudjman, interrupting] What kind of radio?

[Milcic] Bavarian Radio and ARD. Following President Clinton's suggestion, can you tell us something more about it? Do you expect any signing or some global agreement for this whole area, say, by the end of the UNCRO mandate?

[Tudjman] Yes. This is something we aspire to. Given the fact that the world, the United States, the EU, and Russia have reached the highest degree of agreement so far in these efforts one can expect an end to this war crisis, regardless of the fact that there will be difficulties and that all kind of things may ensue.

[Juresko] I am Goranka Juresko, 'Vjesnik.' I would like to take up the point raised by my colleague Ramljak, i.e. the accusations made by the foreign media to the effect that Croatia will not tolerate the return of Serbs from

occupied areas. What action is being taken on this? Will Croatia allow those who wish to return to do so?

[Tudjman] Croatia will allow all those who raise such demands and who meet the requirements for Croatian citizenship to return individually. Following what I said that this was not just a consequence of a certain policy but it had a purpose too, one can expect that this cannot be a matter of total return, they are talking about 250,000, I do not know, 300,000 people. There can be individual returns while the Croatian authorities will accept this—this is perfectly certain.

[Correspondent] I am Curic. Regarding a large number of reports about Muslim-Croatian clashes, what kind of relations do you have with President Izetbegovic and where is the federation now?

[Tudjman] There have even been reports that General Dudakovic was wounded in Croatian-Muslim clashes. As you could see, yesterday, a few days ago the chief of general staff of the Croatian army visited Bihac and yesterday top-level talks were also held in Zagreb. Consequently, in the spirit of the Washington Agreement on the federation and confederation and in the spirit of the Split Agreement we are still doing our best to implement as soon as possible the federation and its relations with Croatia along the lines of the interests of both peoples, Croats and Muslims, and the interest of establishing a new order. Without the implementation of such an agreement which dates back to Washington and so on, the current peace process put forward by the United States would not be possible.

Despite the fact that there are those who oppose it, I would say not just among the Muslim ranks but in Croatian political life too, both in Bosnia-Herzegovina and even in Croatia itself. I nevertheless believe that one could conclude that there is a smaller number of such opponents among the Croatian ranks whereas among the Muslim ranks there is a growing number of those who favor the true implementation of this agreement, who see their future in relying on Croatia in the materialization of the agreement on the federation and in links with Croatia in the economic sphere in a way that would suit both countries.

Tudjman Threatens To Use Force in Slavonia

*LD1010194595 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network
in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 10 Oct 95*

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Croatian President Franjo Tudjman, accompanied by high-ranking state officials, paid a visit to Imotski this afternoon. On this occasion a grandiose election meeting of the Croatian Democratic Union was held in the town stadium. We have a report by Dragica Lemesic:

[Lemesic] Around 20,000 people from Imotski, all villages in the Imotski area, and numerous Croats from central Bosnia and the Croat Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia enthusiastically welcomed Croatian President Franjo Tudjman in Imotski late this afternoon. [passage omitted]

At the beginning of his address to the people of Imotski, Dr. Franjo Tudjman himself recalled his election meeting in Imotski in 1990. [passage omitted]

[Lemesic] Now, when everything has been achieved and when we have our democratic, independent, and internationally recognized state we are facing a task, President Tudjman said, to liberate the symbol of Croatian resistance—Vukovar and Baranja.

[Begin Tudjman recording] We want to do that in a peaceful way with help from the international community. However, if our efforts to also liberate these areas in a peaceful way—in order not to suffer further casualties—prove futile, then the Serb occupiers and the world should know that Croatia will have enough strength to return these occupied areas to our homeland by all possible means at our disposal. They are of such a nature [applause] as we showed to the world with our Flash and our Storm, with our strength and skill that made those who have had their own armies for decades and centuries envious.

We created our armed force on the unity of the people, the people's will to have their own state and defend it in less than five years. These are our guarantees—our state, our armed force, and the fact that Croatia is recognized, not only recognized—but the main international players need such a democratic state—which is also a guarantee that we will achieve our direct goal of liberating the remaining part of occupied Croatia with Vukovar and Baranja very soon. [end recording]

[Lemesic] The meeting was also addressed by prominent people from Imotski—Miomir Zuzul, Antun Vrdoljak, and Ivan Milas. [passage omitted]

Tudjman Pledges Support for Croats in Bosnia

*LD1010204295 Mostar Croatian Radio Herzeg-Bosnia
in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 10 Oct 95*

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Dr. Franjo Tudjman, the president of the Republic of Croatia, spoke at a big Croatian Democratic Union [HDZ] election rally in Imotski this evening. Apart from the citizens of the Imotski Krajina, many Croats from Bosnia-Herzegovina and HDZ officials for Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Croat Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia also attended the rally. [passage omitted]

[Begin Tudjman recording] Clearly, Croatia must provide help so that the crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina ends, it must safeguard the survival of the Croatian nation in Herzeg-Bosnia and the entire Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the strategic interests of the Croatian state and the Croatian nation for the future centuries, so that these areas that are the purest and the most resilient part of the Croatian nation are not divided, but they are the cornerstone of unity necessary for the survival of the future of the Croatian state and the development of an independent and sovereign Croatian state. [end recording]

Dispute Over Venue Halts Talks on Eastern Slavonia

LD0910165495 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1600 GMT 9 Oct 95

[Report by Zoltan Kabok]

[FBIS Translated Text] Talks between Croatia's state delegation, headed by Hrvoje Sarinic, and local Serbs from eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and west Srijem, headed by Milan Milanovic, in the U.S. Embassy in Zagreb did not take place today. Both delegations did arrive at the U.S. Embassy offices but it was only separate consultations that took place in the presence of Thorvald Stoltenberg, cochairman of the conference on the former Yugoslavia and U.S. Ambassador to Croatia Peter Galbraith.

Four hours later the head of the Croatian delegation appeared outside the U.S. Embassy, telling reporters that there was no meeting with the delegation of the local Serbs because the Croatian side had suggested that the talks be held in the Palace Hotel. The Serbs did not want to accept this.

It is important to have goodwill in negotiations whereas I could not see it among the local Serbs today, Sarinic said. Croatia will continue negotiating, not on no-man's-land but on the territory of the sovereign and internationally recognized Republic of Croatia. The negotiations have not been adjourned but they will no longer continue in this form. Sarinic reiterated that the negotiations would not drag on. An agreement has to be signed by 30 November when the UN Confidence Restoration Operation [UNCRO] mandate in the Republic of Croatia expires.

Serb Official Views Reasons for No Negotiations

LD1010163095 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1527 GMT 10 Oct 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Erdut, 10 Oct (TANJUG)—The Serb side is ready to continue negotiations with Croatian Government representatives, Milan Milanovic,

the head of the Srem-Baranja area negotiating team, told TANJUG today.

After talks with mediators Thorvald Stoltenberg and Peter Galbraith, who are due to come to Erdut in the next few days, it will be announced when the negotiations will be resumed, Milanovic added.

He underlined that the Serb side did not know the reasons why the Croatian delegation yesterday refused to have talks on basic principles for a peaceful resolution of the issue of the future of the Srem-Baranja area in the U.S. embassy in Zagreb.

"We arrived at the U.S. embassy in line with the agreement reached with Croatian chief negotiator Hrvoje Sarinic and mediators Thorvald Stoltenberg and Peter Galbraith in Erdut a week ago.

"However, the Croats did not want to negotiate there, insisting that we should go to the Palas Hotel, which we—in line with the previous agreement on the negotiating venue—refused to do," Milanovic said.

As far as Sarinic's demand that negotiations cannot be held in foreign embassies, but on "the sovereign Croatian territory" or in "appropriate venues in the occupied eastern sector," Milanovic stressed that if no agreement is reached on this issue, Croatia will have to provide much better safety guarantees for the Serb negotiators than those in Zagreb yesterday, when the Serb delegation visit ended in an incident.

Commentary Examines Preelection Party Strategy

AU0610105495 Zagreb VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian 30 Sep 95 p 5

[Commentary by Branko Podgornik: "All Preelection Calculations and Chances"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Croatian political parties have not yet shown all the cards with which they will compete in the elections. The party in power hopes that the majority of the Croatian electorate will judge, as in 1992, that "one does not change the winning horse in the middle of a swollen river." In other words, the Croatian Democratic Community [HDZ] is convinced that because of the success of Operations Flash and Storm, the voters will entrust them with the mandate to return occupied eastern Slavonia and steer the state into peaceful waters.

The Croatian opposition calculates that the voters will not cast their votes under too strong an impression of the recent military successes, but that they will think about the reality of the life they live and that they are facing. If this, the only serious oppositional preelection card proves to be too weak, the whole opposition can

count on less than a half of the election cake, so that the HDZ, as matters now stand, will win the majority in the Croatian parliament.

If the party in power goes over 41 percent of the votes, it will, as the HDZ strategists expect, automatically cross the desired boundary of 50 percent of the parliamentary seats that are elected by the proportional electoral system. Such overrepresentation will be made possible through the election law, which envisages that the "wasted" votes (of those parties that did not manage to cross the election threshold), will be distributed primarily among the parties that took first and second place.

More radical oppositional circles are already suggesting to the opposition that in the case of their winning more than 50 percent of the votes, and less than half of the parliamentary seats, the opposition should boycott the parliament until it is given an "independent television" at state level.

At the beginning of this week the opposition managed to agree on their mutual distribution of 28 electoral units in which, according to the system of relative majority, 28 parliamentary representatives will be elected. The oppositional parties will here appear in a coalition, by which they have enlarged their chances to win in many electoral units. The optimists from the opposition calculate that the united opposition could win about 20 out of a total of 28 representatives who are elected according to the system of relative majority. Meanwhile, the optimists from the party in power claim that the HDZ could win the same.

In the proportional part of the elections for the Chamber of Representatives, in the competition for at least 80 representatives, all major political parties that can go over the 5-percent election threshold, will appear on their own. It is known that HDZ, HSLs [Croatian Social Liberal Party], HSP [Croatian Party of Rights], SDP [Social Democratic Party] will run on their own, but it is still not known whether HSS [Croatian Peasants Party] will go it alone, or join the coalition with IDS [Istrian Democratic Congress], HNS [Croatian National Party], and Party of Slavonia-Baranja. The HSS Presidency will make a final statement on this in the next few days. It is still not known in what coalitions, in the proportional part of the elections, the parties that scarcely go over the 5-percent threshold will appear, like HND [Croatian Independent Democrats], ASH [Action of Social Democrats of Croatia], IDS, DA [Dalmatian Action], SDU [Social Democratic Union], HSP 1861, HKDU [Croatian Christian Democratic Union], HKDS [Croatian Christian Democratic Party]. Observers do not even exclude the possibility of an alliance such

as between Mesic's HND and Paraga's HSP 1861. Tripalo's ASH has suddenly proposed an alliance to SDP in the proportional part of the elections, and the SDP Main Board is to respond to this on Sunday.

In the last few days the liberals, like other parties, have made up the state list, which will be headed by the chairman of the party. Drazen Budisa has suggested that immediately after him on the state list, there should be the representatives of the regions, and that people like Bozo Kovacevic, Mladen Vilfan, and Goranko Fizulic be candidates in the electoral units. The HSLs main committee is to give its opinion on that suggestion on Saturday.

The leading members of the party in power are also working on the state list. Observers expect that it will be drawn up in such a way that only a half of the present HDZ representatives, supposing that HDZ wins the majority, can count on the possibility of returning to the parliamentary benches. Almost half of the representatives of the party in power could be shed, following the motto: "A new era seeks new people."

It is true that the "left faction" has dropped away from the HDZ, and that the position of the "technocrats" has been seriously shaken, too, but in the meantime they are being compensated by the politicians from HSLs or HNS, but rarely from the "right-wing" parties. That could mean the revival of the "left wing" in the party in power. One should not, however, expect that in the HDZ party election convention in the middle of October some more significant conflicts will occur, because the HDZ has managed to stabilize this year. Besides that, the strategists of the party in power will certainly convince their dissatisfied members that a public confrontation would very much harm the reputation of the HDZ in the eyes of the electorate, in view of the fact that the party convention will take place at the height of the preelection campaign.

HSLs Leader on Secret Document, Transfers

95BA0383A Split FERAL TRIBUNE
in Serbo-Croatian 11 Sep 95 pp 9-10

[Interview with HSLs President Jozo Rados by Zoran Daskalovic; place and date not given: "We Will Never Be the Authorities' Hostages Again"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *There is a stable nucleus of people in the party leadership who are trusted, their morality and political sense are trusted, and so I do not think that there will be any extensive loss of membership. The HSLs [Croatian Social Liberal Party] would like to preserve a coalition government in Rijeka, but not with Linic as the mayor, because that is against all the elements of*

any normal, civilized policy and cooperation. Now that Croatia's backbone has been secured, we no longer have any reason to be hostages to these authorities. At this time the HSLS is the party that has the best prospects of threatening the HDZ [Croatian Democratic Community].

[Daskalovic] What is the basis for the HSLS leadership's belief that the document on the HSLS's destruction that was made public a few days ago is genuine? Is there any possibility that document was planted on you?

[Rados] Planting that document does not make any sense at all. We can say that everything that has happened is to a great extent in accordance with that document. I think that document is genuine, and that it was written with the intentions that appear in it. It is a document of about 30 pages, which cannot have been written just for someone's amusement. It must have some sort of purpose. The main thing, however, is that these people's activity over the last few years coincides with the instructions in that document.

[Daskalovic] Why have certain of your members who were supposed to participate in implementing that document, but refused to, kept silent about it for a year?

[Rados] They thought it was harmless, and that it did not have any significance. In a way, they considered these others to be misguided, and because of certain relationships of sympathy, friendship, and closeness they did not try to expose it all. I think the psychology is quite simple.

[Daskalovic] Why are they still avoiding talking about it in public today?

[Rados] I don't know what will happen. Budisa called upon them to speak out about it publicly, but the decision is up to them. I think it is a fundamental aspect of the psychological relationships of those people, who were close to each other, not just in the HSLS but possibly earlier as well. And then that respect, and in a certain way the awkwardness, was crucial, both for their behavior earlier and for their behavior now. Some of these people who worked on breaking up the HSLS thus abused the sympathy and tolerance of others.

The Plan Failed

[Daskalovic] In that plan, the "Initiative for the Destruction of the HSLS," one of the goals was to win over the party leaders at the regional and city levels, especially where the HSLS was in power. The recent events, the defections to the HDZ and the replacements in the Zagreb and Split HSLS organizations, indicate that that part of the plan was carried out. Will it all stop there,

or is there any possibility that the process will be intensified and result in more widespread abandonment of the party in Zagreb and Split?

[Rados] I think the plan failed. What happened in Split and what happened in Zagreb cannot be compared. The process that occurred in Split was completely different in nature. This business in Zagreb has some characteristics of that, but it is not a city in which the HSLS was in power. I read through that document without any particular attention because I think it is a theoretical one and whoever drafted it did not have enough ability to prepare a really concrete plan. In my opinion, it is a dumb but obviously wicked attempt. I think in that regard there really is no danger. The reactions of our branches and the zupanija councils are very appropriate, and people can recognize what is going on from afar. There is a stable core of people in the party leadership who are trusted; there is trust in their morality and in their political sense. I thus think there have not been any widespread consequences, and there will not be, based on that plan and based on everything that has been done.

[Daskalovic] What about Rijeka? The initiative from the Liberals there to replace Rijeka Mayor Slavko Linic, which was joined by an initiative from the Rijeka HDZ council members, viewed from the outside, seems to have had the same origin.

[Rados] Rijeka is not an area that could even have been emphasized by that plan, because the people who were supposed to be the main executors of that plan almost recoil from the Rijeka HSLS. Rijeka is another question. In Rijeka, the HSLS tolerated Mr. Linic's autocratic style of government for a long time, and on that basis there was a conflict between the city and country HSLS, i.e., between two concepts of government. Things went too far when Mr. Linic started to speak out about his colleagues in a very crude way, and the HSLS decided to put a stop to it. What the HSLS wanted was for a coalition government to be preserved in Rijeka, but not with Linic as the mayor, because that is against all the elements of any normal, civilized policy and cooperation.

[Daskalovic] Is there any sense in replacing Linic immediately before the elections? Will that hurt the Liberals, or even the opposition as a whole?

[Rados] It could do some damage. The fact that Mr. Linic systematically pushed the HSLS into a corner, and then attacked it in the crudest possible way, systematically harmed the HSLS. I therefore think that what the HSLS did in Rijeka is good. It is an exit from an impossible situation of constant marginalization and

humiliation. Naturally, there are political risks, but there is also a prospect of political gain.

Political Reasons

[Daskalovic] The HDZ's ranks are criticizing you because now that some of your members have started to cross over to the HDZ, you have started accusing them [the HDZ] of totalitarianism, but a year ago you supported Mesic and Manolic when they caused a schism in the ruling party and drew some HDZ members into their new party. Are those criticisms justified?

[Rados] They are completely different processes. What happened at the time of the so-called parliamentary crisis, in our opinion, strengthened democracy, but this is weakening democracy. On the basis of some sort of papers, the HDZ members accused, and are still accusing, the HSLS of trying to destroy the HDZ and thereby to destroy the Croatian state. Now they are not using those methods of changing the elected government; their methods are based on completely dirty aspects, using everything the authorities have at their disposal, so it cannot be compared to any extent. In any case, they are constantly trying to draw the parallel that the destruction of the HDZ—as is completely legitimate, and an element of a normal political struggle—is at the same time the destruction of the Croatian state. From the very beginning, we have taken the position that it is not true, and that the HDZ is not the same thing as Croatia. In our opinion, if a different political group had come to power in 1991 and 1992, Croatia would have been happier and enjoyed better development.

Time of Harshness

[Daskalovic] How is it that the HSLS, if I may say so, has spoken out, at the top of its lungs, about the danger of totalitarianism in Croatia only now that it has experienced it for itself?

[Rados] We talked about all that earlier. We did not talk about it as harshly as we are now, and as harshly as we will in the future. The main reason is that we always took into account the situation that the Croatian state was in. We really are consistently promoting all three guidelines of our program. One of those guidelines is a national one. Now that Croatia's backbone has been secured, there is no more reason for us to be hostages to these authorities, especially since the methods they are using now are escalating considerably, and assuming their crudest and worst form. This is the right time for the HSLS to oppose that.

[Daskalovic] What are the reasons for that escalation when public opinion polls show that the HDZ and the

current regime have strengthened their positions after "Flash" and "Storm"?

[Rados] I think they want to take over Croatia completely on "Storm's" wings, and to rule Croatia as simply as possible, without any real need to cooperate with the political opposition, even without any possibility of a serious threat to them from the opposition. The opposition to date has been relatively weak, but it nevertheless was a major thorn in the HDZ's side. The HDZ now wants to clean that up completely, gain a two-thirds' majority in parliament, with several small and fragmented parties, and then rule completely in terms of the relationship between President Tudjman and the people. Everything else is to be derived from that. Naturally, the political opposition has no place in this, and has to be purged as soon and as radically as possible.

[Daskalovic] Are there any particular reasons for this attack against the HSLS?

[Rados] Of course there are, or rather, the main and sole real reason is that at this time, the HSLS is the party with the best prospects of threatening the ruling party. What is happening to the HSLS today would also happen to any other party or political group in Croatia if they got into that position, regardless of their platform or any other characteristics. If it were some other party, whether left-wing or right-wing, the methods and means of attack would be very similar.

Unresolved Issues

[Daskalovic] In recent days, Mr. Budisa has twice publicly asked President Tudjman what the recent statement that Croatia had assumed the shape of a pretzel and that shape had to be changed meant to him. Is the inevitability of an imminent definitive Croatian position on the fate of Bosnia-Herzegovina encouraging President Tudjman and the HDZ to seize absolute power?

[Rados] The HDZ has many slippery topics and questions, and before those topics and questions show their full seriousness, before they become a public fact, the HDZ wants to seize absolute power. It is not just the overall issue of Bosnia; the issue of Bosanska Posavina is also unresolved, there is the issue of whether central Bosnia has been lost, the issue of what the status of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Srijem will be, there is the issue of the economic transformation that has only barely begun, and there is the corpus of difficult social issues that are waiting. Before those issues are raised and become vital, it is necessary to seize absolute power as soon as possible. That is the reason why the elections, in my opinion, will be considerably earlier than the public has thought so far. I think at the

Assembly session this month all the legal prerequisites will be adopted as quickly as possible and the elections will be scheduled. The HSLs expects the elections at the end of October.

[Daskalovic] The government leadership itself claims that the structure of Croatia's population has substantially changed, but at the same time it is insisting on quick elections before those changes can be precisely determined by a population census. Will those elections be legitimate, and not just for that reason?

[Rados] There is a great deal that is very questionable with respect to our overall electoral legislation. There are also other aspects of the possible illegitimacy of the elections: the issue of voting abroad, the issue of possible supervision, the issue of participation in political life by those who are not directly affected by that life, the issue of the impossibility of political propaganda abroad. All of this is bringing the issue of the legitimacy of the elections into public focus, and the opposition parties are particularly interested in it. The political opposition will have to take a very clear stance on this. If the elements that would lead to the illegitimacy of the entire electoral process are too strong, then certain consequences will have to be drawn.

List Against the HDZ

[Daskalovic] Does that mean that a boycott of the elections is also possible?

[Rados] For the time being that alternative is not being seriously considered, but if the processes I have discussed escalate, that is always left as a possibility.

[Daskalovic] What are the other possibilities?

[Rados] We will do everything possible to have the job we are doing assumed necessary in the activity of developed democratic parties—naturally, taking our real circumstances into account, and especially our financial capabilities. We will try to point out to the public what kind of dangers loom over Croatian democracy; we will try to unmask very sharply all the blunders made by the ruling party, and we will try to present the positive elements in our program. We are convinced that the public is slowly becoming fed up with this type of rule. As far as the technique for conducting the campaign is concerned, we will do everything in accordance with the rules for conducting a campaign—naturally, in extremely difficult circumstances, not knowing about the electoral law, and not knowing how much money we have available, with relatively nonexistent mass media as far as the opposition is concerned. We have no other choice but to make use of the little freedom that exists in Croatia to find some alternative means of communication.

[Daskalovic] Don't the conditions you are talking about make it necessary to create what one might call a list against the HDZ? Something like the 1990 elections, when the opposition acted almost unanimously to recruit voters against the communist authorities?

[Rados] That goal is out of the question, at least verbally, as far as the opposition is concerned. In that regard, there have been very longstanding and high quality contacts among the opposition parties; but naturally the opposition parties are also each others' political rivals, so it is a very complicated process. As for the HSLs, we will try to respect the strength of every party, and allow every party to participate in that project, but naturally we will not act to the detriment of our own party. We will try to achieve a gentlemen's agreement on that. If that is not possible, we will regret it, but we will have to go our own way.

Official Views Work To Examine Mass Graves

AU0910170795 Zagreb NEDJELJNI VJESNIK
in Serbo-Croatian 2 Oct 95 p 7

[Interview with Croatian Deputy Prime Minister Ivica Kostovic by Mirjana Priscan; place and date not given: "Mass Graves—Evidence for the Court in The Hague"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] "Operation Storm" has enabled at least some of thousands of people who have already been living in the uncertainty of not knowing anything about their relatives for four years to learn the truth about the over 2,800 Croatian soldiers and civilians who were displaced or detained during the aggression against Croatia and are still missing. There can still be hope that these people are still alive only when dead bodies have been identified. This is what Mr. Ivica Kostovic, deputy prime minister in the Croatian Government, told us in summarizing the aim of the very sensitive operation initiated by the Croatian Government to locate, protect, exhumate, and identify the remains of bodies in mass graves. Because of the sensitivity of the issue, the operation was prepared extremely carefully and professionally. Mr. Kostovic is the coordinator of the government body in charge of the operation. He points out that the research into the locations where Croatian soldiers and civilians lost their lives during the aggression against Croatia in 1991 will be a long process and that all these places will be appropriately marked once the process is completed. The International Court for War Crimes in The Hague will have fresh evidence for the crimes committed against the Croatian people.

A Mine Under the Corpses

[Kostovic] We have found mass graves in the newly liberated territories near where the victims were killed.

Some of them are located next to rubbish heaps. The criminals who made them even thought how to harm those who should happen to find the graves some day. At the bottom of the mass grave at Gavrilovic Palace a mine was found under the corpses.

[Priscan] The search for mass graves has started in over 50 places in Croatia. What locations are being examined?

[Kostovic] An organization was set up at government level consisting of representatives of several ministries. The Ministry of Justice gives the orders for the exhumations, the Ministry of the Interior guards both the location and the excavators, the Ministry of Defense offers logistics, and the Ministry of Health and Zagreb University provide experts in forensic medicine. The Commission for Detained and Missing Persons partially coordinates the technical side of these tasks. An operation coordinated with local bodies at the level of counties has started in the Banovina [formerly Banija] and Pakrac regions and will be followed by an operation in southern Croatia. The government body will also cooperate with the authorities of Herzeg-Bosnia regarding the examination of the graves in the liberated Kupres area.

According to eyewitness accounts, there are 25 places in the Banovina region where three or more persons have been buried. We will be examining another 25 locations in Banovina in which single Croatian civilians were buried or from where they were forcibly taken away.

More Than 100 Locations

The mass grave at Gavrilovic Palace above Petrinja was exhumed. The remains of 16 Croatian soldiers and one civilian were found. The Croatian soldiers killed there had first been arrested, which in other words means that a war crime was committed there. We started on-site work at Gavrilovic Palace following an account by an eyewitness to the execution, who was wounded himself but succeeded in escaping. We had ante-mortem data, that is information about the missing persons before their deaths, which had been submitted to us by the Information Division of the Ministry of Health and the Commission for the Detained and Missing.

A search also started at the Nova Bolnica [New Hospital] in a Petrinja suburb, but we did not find anything at the site that was shown to us by a gravedigger, who claimed that there was a mass grave there. According to the assessment of archaeologists, the mass grave is probably at another location, also within the hospital grounds.

The Ministry of the Interior took photographs of all the locations in southern Banovina. We know that there is a large mass grave with more than 40 bodies in Saborsko

and work will be starting there in the near future. In the former Sector South, it is more or less known who was killed and when.

The places that we shall be examining in Banovina include Skelisce and Krecana; in Petrinja they are Budicina, Taboriste, Stara Belnica, Kozara, the Croatian cemetery in Petrinja, Petrinjska Stream and the Kupa River dams. In Glina, we shall be examining the locations of Maja, Graberje, Seikovac, Hadzer, Gornji Vidusevac, Mt. Pogledic, and the Catholic cemetery in Dvor na Uni. We shall be examining Brlek, Zelenik, Babina Rijeka, and Rosulje in Hrvatska Kostajnica, as well as Donji Hrastovec and the Kinjacka woods in Sunja.... As soon as eastern Slavonija is accessible, we shall be examining more than 100 such locations there. [passage omitted]

Identification Help

[Priscan] What have you learnt so far about the fate of those who were displaced and have been missing since the aggression on Croatia in 1991 and about whom nothing is known?

[Kostovic] We do not know anything about the destiny of 2,850 people who were either detained or forcibly taken away. We have learned what happened to 16 Croatian soldiers and one civilian, whose remains were found in a Petrinja mass grave. The remains of 40 people for whom we had been looking since 1991 were found in mass graves in the former Sector South, but we have not yet established their identities. [passage omitted]

[Priscan] You have visited several places in Banovina, where most of the mass graves are located. How many people from that area have been missing since 1991? The fates of how many do you think will be revealed?

[Kostovic] I am assuming that the fates of approximately 500 people will come to light. There are 597 people missing from the Banovina region and it is known of 39 of them that they died and for 184 there is evidence that they were killed. This does not mean, however, that all of the missing people from Banovina are dead; it only shows, if the accounts are true, that more than 200 people died.

The Documentation Found

[Priscan] It has already been published that not a single detainee has been found in Serb prisons in the newly liberated territories. Are there even any clues about them, have you found anything in the Knin prison, in Glina, etc.?

[Kostovic] Documentation found in the newly liberated areas indicates that some of the people whom we are

looking for were imprisoned in Knin, Glina, etc.; we know that they were taken alive by the Yugoslav Army or paramilitary units. It is stated in the documents that we have found that some of them were hospitalized and operated on. Apart from that, the documentation shows that some of them were somewhere on this territory at the beginning of 1992, although they were not visited by the International Red Cross. We have traced a very small number of people in this way. The documentation that we found after "Operation Storm" is inconclusive. For example, we found medical documentation and court documents in Knin, but we could not find a single document or person in the former Serb prisons. The Yugoslav Army withdrew the prisoners from all military prisons in the Croatian territories occupied in 1992. They confirmed in writing that there was no military prison left in the occupied Croatian territories. They may have been telling us the truth, but they never stated whether they left some of the prisoners to the Chetniks, who then took them to Bosnia or Serbia.

[Priscan] Who stopped the examination of the mass grave in Ovcara?

[Kostovic] The Serbs. They said that they could not guarantee safety to the teams of international physicians during the exhumation. A Dr. Snow succeeded in making a pilot exhumation, however, since he was working on the basis of very precise information that he had and "very silently." After that the Ovcara region was protected and this protection was guaranteed by monthly reports by an experts' commission. We received photographs of the whole location, as well as some photographs depicting soldiers, who were watchmen there, and a visit by a UN officer. I cannot guarantee that Ovcara is protected now, since I have not received the report for a month.

We Must Not Lose Hope

[Priscan] Will the Croatian Government also continue with the research into mass graves in eastern Slavonija, Baranja, and western Srijem?

[Kostovic] As soon as these territories are accessible, the location and examination of graves will become a priority. According to testimonies, over 1,000 people were killed in the Vukovar region alone during the first few days of the occupation. We have 1,150 reliable testimonies from Vukovar. International observers and independent associations have submitted them to the International Court for War Crimes. [passage omitted]

Ethnically Pure Schools in Croatia Opposed

95BA0362A Split FERAL TRIBUNE
in Serbo-Croatian 28 Aug 95 pp 22-23

[Article by Milivoj Djilas: "After the War, We Are on the Threshold of an Educational Storm"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Following the so far unsuccessful attempt to have exclusively pure blooded Croats learn the Croatian language in Croatian schools, and following the ethnic count taken of the children in kindergartens and schools that was initiated last year by the Ministry of Education and Sports, this school year that same institution has decided to institute ethnically pure schools, regardless of all the consequences that might ensue from that decision.

The "Instruction on the Enrollment of Children Who Are Croats in Organizations (Institutions) for Upbringing and Education Established for Members of Ethnic and National Communities or Minorities for Preschool Age and Elementary Education," signed by the minister herself, Ljilja Vokic, who, wonder of wonders, is a teacher, recently reached the desks of principals of schools for ethnic minorities in Croatia. According to her instruction, from now on "only children of parents who declare themselves to be members of various ethnic and national minorities shall be enrolled in organizations for the upbringing and education of preschool- and elementary-age members of ethnic and national communities or minorities." If, therefore, "children of parents who are Croats enroll in upbringing and education organizations established for the upbringing and education of members of ethnic and national communities or minorities, then conditions must be provided in those organizations (institutions) for the upbringing and education to be provided in the Croatian language for the enrolled children who are Croats...."

Segregation of Children

In practice, this means that a child's nationality must be determined even when the child is enrolled in kindergarten, and the parents will presumably have to present a certificate of belonging to the nationality which is allowed to be enrolled in that kindergarten. If that is not the case, they and their child will have to seek some other institution for "upbringing and education" (as published!) in which their nationality, their community, their ethnoses, and their minority will be welcome, and enroll with the blessing of the almighty minister. The same thing will be true for the child and parents when they enroll in the first grade of elementary school. What is more, not only will they have to make a declaration when they enroll in these

institutions, but during the child's entire schooling his ethnic designation will be entered in the register, immediately after his first and last name, as has also been done on the new Croatian employment cards. All those who opt for Croatian schools will be spared the terror of ethnic interrogation and proof of ethnic fitness for enrollment in kindergartens and schools, because this communication was not delivered to them, and accordingly they are not required to enforce it.

"This is ghettoization," was the infuriated response of Prof. Giuseppe Rota, president of the Assembly of the Italian Union and principal of the Italian school in Umag, one of 20 or so which have been opened in Croatia and which have been hit the hardest by this instruction. "It is interesting that this instruction was sent only to the Italian schools, not to the Croatian schools in which there are children of Italian nationality. Once they decided to send it out, it would have been logical to send it to both sides. What this procedure does is limit the number of children enrolled in Italian schools, but the Italians are prohibited from enrolling their children in the Croatian schools, which leads to the possibility that the Italian schools will be closed. But, regardless of who is enrolled where, which I personally deem unimportant, this instruction segregates children on the basis of their nationality, and the Italian schools, just like all the schools of the ethnic minorities, are put in a position which is not customary anywhere in the world. Above all else, this is a great shock to the children, and one can just imagine the consequences this separation will have in their later life. It is certain, however, that nothing good will come of this, especially in families where the parents are of different nationality. To require these children to make a commitment to nationality so that they can go to a particular school is highly uncivilized and very harmful."

Aside from the fact that she has violated the Constitution of the Republic of Croatia, with this instruction the minister has placed herself, her procedures, and her requirements entirely in opposition to the Constitutional Law on Human Rights and Freedoms and on Rights of Ethnic and National Communities or Minorities in the Republic of Croatia and then the Law on Public Concern for Children of Preschool Age, as well as the laws on elementary schooling and on upbringing and education in the languages of nationalities, and she has also overstepped her powers as prescribed by the Law on the System of Government. The Italian Union has therefore filed a petition with the Constitutional Court

to institute proceedings to evaluate the instruction's conformity with the Constitution and these laws in Croatia.

Upbringing by Directive

According to their allegations, in her instruction the minister "is limiting and violating the guaranteed rights of citizens to the inviolability of human freedom and personal identity, which implies the freedom of upbringing and education regardless of ethnic background," and is also restricting "the rights of parents to make independent decisions on the upbringing of their children"; above all, the instruction has trampled on "civil rights guaranteeing everyone security and secrecy of personal information, which may not be gathered and used for purposes not envisaged by law without the consent of the individual."

The instruction has, of course, restricted the freedom not only of members of minority nationalities, but also that of all citizens of Croatian nationality who might possibly want to enroll, in this case, in Italian schools, whereby, alleges the Petition for the Institution of Proceedings Before the Constitutional Court, the minister has restricted "the dissemination and enrichment of culture, language, and education in multiethnic communities, which the Istrian and Goranije-Primorje Zupanijas certainly are."

Nor dare we forget the fact that Minister Vokic signed the contested document at a time when enrollments had already been completed, and most of the teachers were on their annual vacations. In the schools of ethnic communities, this took enrollment procedures back to the very beginning, that is, it completely annulled them, which means that everything has to be repeated, but this time on an ethnically pure basis. When she wrote the instruction, she forgot (or did she?) the fact that many teachers in Italian schools will be left without jobs, and a need will arise for Croatian teachers, a need that cannot be met by the beginning of the new school year (in two weeks), which is when the orders contained in the instruction are to take effect.

Shameless Messages

When we also take into account the fact that the proposed version of the new law on elementary schools provides that schools of ethnic and national communities are to be established only in places where minorities constitute a relative majority of the population, and if such a provision should become law (knowing the logic of the Croatian Assembly, this is quite certain), a majority of the Italian schools would be closed, while the schools of the other ethnic communities would most probably disappear completely.

The minister's act of flagrant violation of the Constitution and many laws cannot be interpreted as anything but ethnic cleansing of the Italian schools in Croatia, which could not fail to have repercussions in the outside world. As a matter of fact, during a recent visit of representatives of the Italian Union to the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Mrs. Agneza, representative of that ministry, expressed astonishment that "such an illiberal instruction could be written in a state which intends to become part of Europe," Professor Rota said.

And while Europe is horrified at the generally negative attitude of the Croatian authorities toward Istria, domes-

tic turbo-Croats' have hastened to proclaim the minister's instruction a weapon against the Italian irredenta and "alienation of our children from their own kind." After that, is it any wonder that officials of the ministry are shamelessly saying that there cannot and must not be a debate of the instruction, which is to say that worthy Croatian ministers are allowed to violate as they see fit the Constitution and all the laws in which at least a crumb of civilization has been incorporated, and all of this to the detriment of the ethnic minorities, as well as to their own nation?

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Interior Minister Frckovski Reportedly Resigns

LD1010203195 Belgrade BETA in Serbo-Croatian
1924 GMT 10 Oct 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Skopje, 10 Oct (BETA)—Macedonian [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] Internal Affairs Minister Ljubomir Frckovski has handed his resignation to Prime Minister Branko Crvenkovski, MAKPRES has reported.

The agency further says it has unofficially been learned that, according to one source, the resignation has not been accepted, while according to other sources, the move remains to be discussed.

Dime Djurev, undersecretary in the Internal Affairs Ministry, said at a news conference today that he had not been informed about Minister Frckovski's resignation.

Andov Chairs Security Council Session on Crisis

LD1010164495 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service
in Serbo-Croatian 1447 GMT 10 Oct 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Skopje, 10 Oct (TANJUG)—The Security Council of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia [FYROM] today held a session chaired by Assembly Speaker Stojan Andov, a statement issued in Skopje says.

The session discussed the security situation in the country following the assassination attempt on President Kiro Gligorov.

The council noted that the situation in the country was stable, stepped-up security measures have been undertaken, that the constitutional and legal regulations have been observed, and that regular and everyday state functions are being discharged normally.

The statement adds "international state activities are also being undertaken normally."

The council was also briefed about the course of the investigation into the possible perpetrators and organizers of the assassination attempt on President Gligorov. [passage omitted]

Possible Role of 'Foreign Activists' Suggested

AU1010191095 Paris AFP in English
1829 GMT 10 Oct 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Skopje, Oct 10 (AFP)—The car bomb that nearly killed Macedonian [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] President Kiro Gligorov last week may have been planted by foreign activists, a senior Macedonian Interior Ministry official said Tuesday [10 October].

Dimitar Djurev told journalists that last Tuesday's blast, which left the leader of the former Yugoslav republic in a critical condition, may have been the work of "a terrorist organisation based abroad."

Djurev's comments came days after other officials said a group of extremist Macedonian emigres in Australia had threatened the life of the president.

Gligorov, 78, underwent another operation Tuesday on his right eye and was bearing up after the treatment but remained in intensive care, a medical bulletin said.

Djurev said he was optimistic about the investigation as police had several leads.

But he stressed that no arrests had been made and declined further comment in the interests of the investigation.

The day after the blast police said they had questioned around 150 people in connection with the attack, while Sunday they released a composite picture of a man who allegedly owned the booby-trapped car.

VMRO-DPMNE Leader Denies Role in Attack

AU1110144695 Sofia 24 CHASA in Bulgarian
7 Oct 95 p 14

[Interview with VMRO-DPMNE leader Ljupco Georgievski by Lyubo Denov in Skopje; date not given: "VMRO-DPMNE Is Not a Terrorist Organization"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Denov] Mr. Georgievski, what is your comment on the allegations that the "grandsons" of Ivan Mikhajlov, that is the VMRO-DPMNE [Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization-Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity], are the ideological instigators of the attack on President Kiro Gligorov? In NOVA MAKEDONIJA, Krste Crvenkovski, the former leader of the Macedonian [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] communists, recalled "the tragic incidents in the 1920s, when Ivan Mikhajlov's terrorist gangs gunned down prominent VMRO revolutionaries on the streets of Sofia."

[Georgievski] The accusation against the VMRO-DPMNE that appeared on the pages of your newspaper is groundless. The bad thing is that all of this may lead the investigation up quite the wrong path.

If you are looking for the true ideological successors of Vance Mikhajlov, they are not here, but in Bulgaria.

[Denov] Is there any danger that the Skopje authorities may use the attack to settle accounts with the opposition?

[Georgievski] Everything is possible. How things develop depends whether individuals, organized groups, or foreign states lie behind these tragic incident. I do not believe that it will come to a direct reckoning with us. It is true that we are the most ferocious political opponents of Kiro Gligorov, but assassination is not an acceptable method for our political struggle. We are not a terrorist organization.

[Denov] A rumor is going around Skopje that certain people in the government stand to benefit from the assassination attempt, as now they are much more firmly seated in the government.

[Georgievski] I will not answer your question directly. I will merely recall one fact from the investigation of the attack. Two people traveling in the car in front of the president's Mercedes were originally detained as suspects, but later they suddenly turned out to be policemen in civilian clothes and were released. It was this car that slowed down and held up the president's car just by the car bomb.

Suggests Gligorov Aide Involved

LD1010211395 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1915 GMT 10 Oct 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Skopje, 10 Oct (TANJUG)—At a news conference in Skopje today, the main opposition nonparliamentary party in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia [FYROM], the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization-Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity [VMRO-DPMNE], accused the authorities of intentionally and erroneously directing the investigation in the wake of the assassination attempt on Kiro Gligorov, the head of state.

According to VMRO-DPMNE leader Ljupco Georgievski, the climate in the country "has been exploited, since the first day following the assassination attempt, for a classical settling of scores with the largest opposition political opponent, VMRO-DPMNE."

Georgievski said that at the time some countertheses were going around intimating that, perhaps, the motives for the organization of the assassination were not emotional, and that this was a matter of political dominance and economic interests.

Bearing all this in mind, the VMRO-DPMNE leader said, it is possible that the assassination was organized by one of Gligorov's closest colleagues and that the investigation was intentionally directed against the extreme nationalists who, in Georgievski's assessment, are not capable of such a thing.

Foreign Media Coverage of Attack Criticized

AU1010214995 Skopje MIC in English 10 Oct 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] The unsuccessful assassination of our President, regardless of the goal and character, is causing numerous political, diplomatic and journalistic, professional, but also amateur stories, commentaries and analyses. And, especially abroad, which is or isn't acceptable to us. Good-natured, speculative, manipulative. To those who carry within them concern for Macedonia's [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] stability, and the stability of the whole region—gratitude from the bottom of the heart. To those, on the other hand, who tendentiously and dilettantishly want to deal with our fate more than us, a message: that they are not convincing, even as fog spreaders. Because, they identify themselves or speak in or on behalf of the name of the read out conspirators of destabilization, chaos and regression back to the Balkans. In this case, with the wished for, but unrealized start from Macedonia.

In the last two, three days, the Bulgarian foreign minister, the Sofia newspapers STANDART and KONTINENT, the Athens TO VIMA, the anonymous author in the NEW YORK TIMES, who called on some kind of anonymous sources from Macedonia, the radio "France International," some anonymous graffiti writers in Macedonia, etc, "stood out" or, if it suits them more, "became famous."

There's no problem that they include speculations, manipulations, half-truths. Because, contrary to their malicious goals, right, we can't force them to look on things the way we do. But... For instance, the president's health. If they don't use them, at least they should take into consideration, foremost, the expert bulletins of the medical team, which is unselfishly helped by ten world-renown medical names. Or, for example, the basic postulates of our state order, which is based on the constitution. Or the political-security situation in the country, which the enemies are trying, unsuccessfully, to present as unstable.

Yet, even with a living president—in relation to whose future there were a lot of concoctions even before the assassination attempt, namely, the speculations regarding a possible presidential successor, we would like to say: The Republic of Macedonia is not a monarchy. It is a democratic state. And, when the need comes up, its head will be elected at general and direct elections, with secret ballot. So goes Article 80.

And, when the astonishment of NEW YORK TIMES is in question, with, as the newspaper puts it, calm atmosphere in the country, these days, following the

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assassination attempt or the comment of radio "France International" that "it's always dangerous when too many important things depend only on one man." Let us underline a part of what could be heard today from the stand in the Macedonian Parliament. The Republic of Macedonia is continuing to realize its national and state interests. The state—in the key points—is functioning on the basis of a healthy, thorough and clear course. With the will and capability of the authorities, the collective consciousness and maturity, which is expressed today by the citizens of our state, independently from their nationality or party affiliation.

In the imperative peace necessary to shed light on the background and to discover the executors of the assassination attempt. And, let us be aware: that might not go so fast as we all want it to. But, the culprits, sooner or later, will be caught. In their own trap.

Gligorov Reported Recovering Well From Surgery

AU1110131895 Paris AFP in English
1231 GMT 11 Oct 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Skopje, Oct 11 (AFP)—Macedonian [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] President Kiro Gligorov, 78, seriously injured in an assassination attempt last week, is making a good recovery, according to a health bulletin published Wednesday.

Surgeons Tuesday carried out a second operation on Gligorov's right eye, which was said to be in a "satisfactory" condition, according to the bulletin.

It added that Gligorov was beginning to eat normally and was undergoing intensive rehabilitation exercises.

The Macedonian president, targeted in a car bomb attack last Tuesday, underwent a first series of operations to the head immediately following the attack.

The attack raised fears for the stability of the former Yugoslav republic, in which ethnic rivalries persist in a climate of tension.

There has been no reported progress in investigations into who carried out the attack.

Crvenkovski Praises Gligorov's Achievements

AU1010160895 Skopje VECER in Macedonian
10 Oct 95 p 4

[Article by Gj. Risteski and V.V. Adzigova: "The Planners Made Wrong Evaluation of the People"]

[FBIS Translated Text] In his address to the members of parliament, Prime Minister Crvenkovski spoke about the assassination attempt on President Gligorov. He said:

"On 3 October 1995, an event took place that will undoubtedly be sealed in the collective mind of several generations—an assassination attempt on the president of the Republic. It was an assassination attempt against a constitutional institution which symbolizes the sovereignty of the state, an assassination attempt on a personality who is identified with the political platform that I mentioned before and who is closely connected with the previous achievements and all new perspectives. It happened just at the time when this political platform started achieving results and when the Republic of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM]—which was known by only a few a couple of years ago—was pointed out as a positive example. Perhaps this is the real reason why it happened, exactly at this moment.

"Theoreticians say that terror appears whenever political options are fully defeated, and Kiro Gligorov, with his policy of the past years, has really defeated many political options. He defeated the centuries-long option for the nonexistence of the Macedonian nation; he defeated the option that was directed against the existence of independent Macedonia; he defeated the option for interethnic division and ghettoization; he defeated the option for lack of perspectives and for looking back to the past instead of to the future.

"The intention of the perpetrators of this plot is totally clear if we see what Kiro Gligorov was identified with among the people and in the world. In other words, the goal is apparent—to cause destabilization, chaos, retreat....

"Where did the planners of this outrageous act err? Just where the enemies of this people have always erred—in the evaluation of its collective awareness and maturity. Namely, Kiro Gligorov is not a president who imposes his own policy which is contrary to the determinations of his people. On the contrary, he is a statesman of great magnitude who feels well the pulse and aspirations of the people and who knows the best way to combine these aspirations with appropriate political decisions. Bombs do not help here. Many bombs are necessary to liquidate 2 million people.

"President Gligorov is recovering at the Surgical Clinic of the Medical Faculty and I would like to avail myself of this opportunity and ask all of you to wish him a return to his presidential duties as soon as possible. At the same time, I would like to inform you that the institutions of the state are functioning and that they are even stronger after the event; the Republic of Macedonia is a state with sound foundations; we have a clear course from which we will not be deterred; and we have sufficient will and skill for leading the country

to the accomplishment of the basic national and state interests."

This part of the address of Prime Minister Crvenkovski was followed and welcomed by a loud applause by all the members of parliament who were present in the parliament hall.

Albanian Ambassador Condemns Attack on Gligorov

AU0610195895 Zurich BOTA SOT in Albanian 5 Oct 95 p 6

[Statement by Albanian Ambassador in Skopje Shaban Murati; place and date not given]

[FBIS Translated Text] "As ambassador of the Republic of Albania, I strenuously condemn this ugly terrorist act. This is an assassination attempt against the state itself as a democratic institution, against the efforts of the citizens of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] to establish democratic developments and harmonious relations, against peace and stability in the country and the region, for which the respected President Gligorov has and is rendering a great contribution. I have conveyed to President Gligorov the greetings and concern of Albanian President Sali Berisha, together with wishes for a speedy recovery."

Negotiations on Implementation of Accord Resume

AU1010213495 Skopje MIC in English 10 Oct 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] The talks between the delegations of the Greek and Macedonian [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] foreign ministries on the practical measures for application of the Interim Accord, signed on September 13 in New York, will continue at the Macedonian Foreign Ministry today and tomorrow. The delegations are led by Assistant Minister Ljupcho Arsovski, from the Macedonian side, and Ambassador Dimitreos Kipreos, director of the Department on the Balkans, from the Greek side.

Yesterday evening, after landing at the Skopje airport, the head of the Greek delegation Ambassador Kipreos stated that he hoped "the same spirit of good will and constructiveness which was shown in Athens, will prevail here as well."

In the brief meeting with the press, Ambassador Kipreos reiterated his condemnation of the terrorist act on President Gligorov, which was also expressed in the messages from the president and prime minister of the Greek Republic.

A number of questions and measures for opening liaison offices of the two countries are expected to be worked

out at the two-day talks, as well as for enabling the unobstructed movement of citizens and goods, the Macedonian Foreign Ministry announced yesterday.

NDP Writes Council of Europe on Ethnic Issue

AU1010141295 Skopje FLAKA E VELLAZERIMIT in Albanian 27 Sep 95 p 5

[Letter from the People's Democratic Party to the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly in Strasbourg: "Albanians Are Discriminated Against in an Institutional Way"]

[FBIS Translated Text] On the eve of the discussion regarding the admission of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] to the Council of Europe, the People's Democratic Party [NDP] has sent a letter to the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly, which states:

As an Albanian parliamentary political party in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, with regard to the republic's application to join the COE, the NDP reminds you as follows:

Starting with the approval of the declaration for independence, the referendum for independence, and the current constitution as ignoring the multinational reality, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia has been trying to establish itself as a single-nation unitary state on the basis of the will of one people—the Macedonian people—ignoring the will of the Albanian people, who constitutes at least one-third of the republic's population.

The Albanian people in this republic are being discriminated against in an institutional way, having limited rights compared with the Macedonian people in the sphere of education, science and culture, equality of language, national symbols, information, representation in state bodies and institutions, etc.

In the absence of interest by the government, every initiative undertaken by the Albanians to meet their needs is qualified by the regime as anticonstitutional in order to ensure a cover for using police violence against the Albanians and framing political trials, such as the one involving the so-called arms affair, as a result of which a number of Albanians are still suffering prison terms, events with the Tetovo Albanian University, etc.

Among other things, let us cite in support of our argument that national and human discrimination exists against Albanians the latest report by Tadeusz Mazowiecki, UN special rapporteur for Macedonia, the U.S. State Department report on human rights in Macedonia in January 1995, and the report on Macedonia by

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UN Secretary General Butrus Butrus-Ghali on 22 March 1995.

The letter from the three chairmen of the Albanian parliamentary political parties to U.S. President Bill Clinton on 24 August 1995, a copy of which we enclose with this letter, also reveals that the Albanian political parties and institutions are not satisfied with the status of the people they represent.

Based on its five years of experience, it is the NDP's view that interethnic issues can hardly be resolved without pressure from international institutions. That is why we call on the Council of Europe, before declaring itself in favor of the admission of this republic, to oblige the republic first to resolve the interethnic issues, that is, the constitutional-judicial status of the Albanians, to legalize higher education in the Albanian language, treat the languages as equivalents and all citizens in every segment of life as equals, with no national or religious distinction.

With deep respect!

PPDSH: Authorities Intimidate Ethnic Albanians

AU1010141095 Skopje FLAKA E VELLAZERIMIT
in Albanian 3 Oct 95 p 5

[Communique by the Party for Democratic Prosperity of Albanians: "Police and Judicial Pressures Continue"]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] The pressure on the Party for Democratic Prosperity of Albanians [PPDSH] from the police and judicial authorities continues incessantly. With the aim of intimidating its members and activists and creating confusion among them and resorting to uncivilized and outdated methods, the authorities continue to declare the party leaders responsible perpetrators as often as current policy requires. Recently, under the direction of the Interior Ministry, the regional unit in Tetovo, and with evidence from three policemen,

the Misdemeanors Court in Tetovo fined the highest-ranking PPDSH leaders: Arber Xhaferri, chairman; Menduh Thaci, vice chairman; Sali Ramadani, deputy; Xhevair Xhemaili, former chairman of the Tetovo branch; and Ruhi Bakiu, former administration secretary of the party. They were charged with having used during last year's election campaign a national flag considered to belong to a foreign state. They were also charged with disturbing the peace and were fined 5,057 denars.

Meanwhile, Menduh Thaci and Sali Ramadani are charged with another act. The first is charged with stating at an authorized meeting in Tetovo Square that: "The attempts of those who try to clip the claws of the eagle [reference to the eagle in the Albanian flag] are futile, as it cannot be caught because it flies all over the diaspora." The other statement of his was that "Albanians are not 200,000 or 400,000 as claimed by the official statistics, but 7-8 million and there is no force to stop them from gaining autonomy." These statements were a response to the Macedonian League parties and their leaders, respectively, who a week before the PPDSH meeting had declared in the same square that: "The eagle that flies high will have its claws clipped." The second, Sali Ramadani, is blamed for calling on people to respect the road of the sole Albanian leader Sali Berisha and to follow the road of the European Gandhi, Ibrahim Rugova. That is why, on the basis of Article 21, Clause 1 of the Law on Infringement, they have been fined 8,114 denars for inciting religious and national hatred.

These blows are neither the first nor the last. The PPDSH will persist even more in giving life to all our objectives on the basis of the program definitions. We leave it to the court to reflect in accordance with judicial norms rather than the dictate of daily politics upon such verbal delicts as the new "democratic" system has long since consigned to the basket of bygone times.

Former Ambassador to U.S. on NATO Expansion

WS1110083095 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA
in Polish 7-8 Sep 95 p 5

[Commentary by Kazimierz Dziwanowski, former ambassador to the United States, under the "Always on Saturday" rubric: "NATO—What Really Happened"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The decision to postpone implementation of the NATO expansion plan until early 1997 triggered various, frequently conflicting, interpretations. RZECZPOSPOLITA discussed this issue very competently yesterday. However, I would like to come back to this subject because there are increasingly more misunderstandings about it.

First, attention must be drawn to the fact that formally nothing was changed. After all, it has never been said so far that the organization will be expanded as soon as 1996. Only a general schedule was announced. In line with it, in 1995 NATO was to prepare principles which it would take into account and the procedure according to which the entire issue would be discussed—both within the organization and with the countries applying for membership.

Such principles were adopted a few days ago in Brussels. Commentators have discussed it quite extensively already; however, they often failed to note the most vital element: The fact that it was the first time when all the NATO member states approved of the principle of expanding the organization to the east and that this was not linked to membership in the EU. This is the first such document. Now it is to be submitted to the countries concerned. In the case of Poland, this will happen as soon as next week. It is also known that the first candidates are Poland and the Czech Republic.

In line with the schedule, 1996 will be devoted to discussing more detailed issues, ones which call for decisions in areas that are technically and organizationally complex. All this work has by no means been stopped.

There are two reasons why it was decided that the final decisions would not be made in 1996. The first one concerns Russia, and the other—the United States.

The Russian motive does not really need to be elaborated. It is a vital motive. It is in the best interests of the world, Europe, and Poland that the process of building an integrated Europe is not accompanied by a conflict with Russia. Despite the belligerent rhetoric of many Russian politicians, there is no reason for this to happen. That is, there is no such reason in NATO, Europe, and Poland. Just as the unification of Germany did not weaken Russia's security—in fact, the process strengthened it by removing all the possible areas of conflicts—the transformation of Central Europe into a

stable zone will not weaken Russia's security, but will in fact strengthen it.

This may be protested only by those politicians who do not want stabilization, but restoration of domination, which ended in the catastrophe of the Soviet Union and could have ended in a nuclear annihilation of the world.

The American reason is simpler. Bill Clinton wants to avoid a situation in which during the election campaign he would be accused of wanting to expand NATO for political purposes. In 1996 there will probably be elections in Russia as well. It would not be good if the issue of NATO expansion became the primary subject of the campaign. Russia has many more important issues to deal with, yet certain politician would like to divert voters' attention from them. This should not be made any easier for them. The success of democratic reforms in Russia—if it is still possible—is worth waiting for.

The risk which this involves is that Russia may submit even stronger objections. In addition, in our country the trends—which are already noticeable—toward not enhancing our security, may become even more visible. However, it is up to us to oppose these trends.

One final remark: What magic the year 2000 seems to have for us! This issue keeps coming up, as though it really were of paramount importance.

Military Cooperation With Ukraine Discussed

WS1010155395 Warsaw GAZETA POLSKA in Polish
9 Oct 95 p 5

[Article by Pawel Wronski and Edward Krzemien: "After Meeting of Polish and Ukrainian Defense Ministers: Kiev's Keys to Security"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *Military cooperation between Ukraine and Poland may be the best possible reply to Moscow's charges that NATO expansion may lead to a new iron curtain on the Bug River.*

On Wednesday [4 October] Polish Defense Minister Zbigniew Okonski and his Ukrainian counterpart Valeriy Shmarov signed a declaration on cooperation for stability and security in Central and East Europe. Poland has not signed such a far-reaching agreement with any of its eastern neighbors.

Both Poland and Ukraine are active participants of the Partnership for Peace project. Ukraine—unlike Poland, which considers NATO membership to be a prerequisite of security—declares neutrality. It has no intention of joining NATO; it also refuses to join a military pact mounted by Russia within the CIS.

"Our good military contacts with Ukraine should not be viewed as a reply to Russia's reservations to our

membership in NATO," says former Defense Minister and Freedom Union Deputy Janusz Onyszkiewicz. "The Polish *raison d'etat* is to prevent the drawing of a new border line separating NATO from territories on which Russia has a free hand. We cannot leave Ukraine stranded in a void."

"Unlike Russia, Ukraine claims Poland's decision to join NATO is sovereign. Military cooperation between both states proves that NATO membership does not create new barriers in Europe," says Jerzy Reit, head of the Association of the Ukrainian Minority in Poland.

Apart from the signing of the agreement, the last few weeks also saw the restoration of the activities of advisory committees to both presidents, a visit paid by Sejm Speaker Jozef Zych to Kiev, and a visit paid by the Ukrainian prime minister to Poland.

The expansion of relations between Warsaw and Kiev coincides with the strengthening of the Ukrainian position on the international arena—it has been admitted to the Council of Europe prior to Russia; in the most recently published document on NATO expansion, it is mentioned (alongside with Russia) as a state with which the alliance intends to maintain special relations.

A huge contribution was made by Polish diplomats—who keep persuading Western partners to see more than just Russia on the territories of the former USSR. Since 1991 Polish politicians have been stressing that relations with Ukraine are our top priority; we were the first state to recognize Ukraine's independence. Similar assurances come from Ukrainian politicians. Political declarations and gestures, however, did not often translate into practice to date.

Let us hope this will now change. The keys to security in this part of Europe also lie in Kiev—the capital of a state with a population of 50 million and an army of 300,000.

Walesa Questions Revision of Pensions Law

LD0610200595 Warsaw Polskie Radio First Program Network in Polish 1800 GMT 6 Oct 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] President Lech Walesa has sent an application to the Constitutional Tribunal questioning the revision of the law on pensions and annuities for next year. A week ago, the Sejm rejected the presidential veto of this law. [passage omitted]

The president has applied for an examination of the accordance of the law with the constitutional principle of a democratic state of law implementing the ideal of social justice. In his view, forsaking the principle of revising benefits several times a year in conditions where there is a continuing fairly high rate of inflation

will render impossible an improvement in the living conditions of pensioners and annuity holders. The press spokesman of the Constitutional Tribunal, Adam Jankiewicz, has confirmed the fact that the presidential appeal had been received:

[Begin Jankiewicz recording] The Constitutional Tribunal has received an application from the president of the Polish Republic, questioning one of the regulations of the law of 29 September 1995 on a change in the law on the revision of pensions and annuities, on the principles of calculation of pensions and annuities and on changes to certain other laws. The important thing is that this application is a preemptive accusation, that is, in other words, a regulation of the law has been queried before the law is signed by the president.

It is not possible at this moment to say when the Constitutional Tribunal will look at this. The Constitutional Tribunal is not limited by any deadline. In a case where the Constitutional Tribunal agrees with the views of an applicant, and confirms that a given regulation is indeed unconstitutional, such a ruling would more or less end the legislative road. As I say, a law adopted by the Sejm and not yet signed by the president thus ceases to exist. Such a ruling is not subject to being passed to the Sejm and is not a subject of further address by the Sejm. On the other hand, if the Constitutional Tribunal were to fail to share these views, that is if it acknowledges that the regulation questioned by the president is constitutional, the president is obliged to immediately sign this law, and it becomes a law which is in force with all the consequences that this brings. [end recording]

Government Press spokeswoman Aleksandra Jakubowska said that if the Constitutional Tribunal does indeed acknowledge the reasoning of the president as being correct, it will be necessary to carry out cuts in the budget for next year to the sum of 50 trillion zloties and that this might ensue at the cost of the budget financed sector. [Passage omitted]

Oleksy on Attacks by Freedom Union, Church

LD1010102695 Warsaw Polskie Radio First Program Network in Polish 0900 GMT 10 Oct 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Prime Minister Jozef Oleksy is of the opinion that a document published by the Union of Freedom, which very critically assesses the government's achievements, presents a false picture of Poland. In an interview for Polish Radio Jozef Oleksy stressed that this is by no means a summary of achievement, but an untrue picture presenting the alleged destruction of the state and hostile activities against the nation. In the prime minister's view, the document forms a part of the election campaign and,

as he put it, fear of Aleksander Kwasniewski and his popularity causes attacks on the government with which he has been associated.

Speaking on the Concordat, Prime Minister Oleksy said that he was disappointed by the church's attitude toward the issue. Instead of appreciating the government's good will and approaching the issue in a working and matter-of-fact fashion the church has used the Concordat as an opportunity to attack the government. The prime minister stated that even a one-week technical delay [in discussing the Concordat] had caused a subsequent explosion of hatred.

The council of ministers is today going to discuss a declaration by the government and episcopate joint commission explaining controversial issues connected with the ratification of the Concordat.

Presidential Candidate Kaczynski on Platform

WS1110122095 Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY
in Polish 7 Oct 95 p 4

[Interview with presidential candidate Lech Kaczynski by Piotr Zaremba; place and date not given: "I Demand Equal Treatment"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Passage omitted] [Zaremba] How do you understand anticommunism? What can the president accomplish in this area?

[Kaczynski] Anticommunism means fighting with "the pension of power" which the former communist elites are benefiting from. Second, it means acknowledgement of the fact that the acts of wickedness of that period should be persecuted. Finally, it is a direction of our foreign policy. I do not mean enmity toward Russia, but counteracting the efforts to bring us back into its sphere of influence.

[Zaremba] No one, including the postcommunists, openly wants to develop links with Russia.

[Kaczynski] I do not identify the pro-Russian lobby only with the present governing coalition, with the Democratic Left Alliance. Part of this lobby is linked to the Belvedere; they are the people who belonged to the former special services and who are running their own companies today. One of the president's tasks is to take over the eastern policy of the Third Republic. It should be a more active policy—I must add that I do not want confrontation. However, this policy cannot be implemented by people of the former epoch.

There was a case when a certain deputy minister flew to Moscow and held talks about some trivial matters. A high-ranking official of the former secret services split with others at the airport, went off to discuss

something, and only after he made those preparations was it possible to start the real talks. One can say that it is good that we are taking advantage of the old contacts. However, is the other side so naive as to demand nothing in return?

[Zaremba] Who are you talking about?

[Kaczynski] I will not reveal any names now. However, I will if such a need arises.

An anti-Russian policy would be nonsense; yet, we must have an appropriate ambassador in Moscow and take advantage of the official channels. I am not saying that a good specialist, a man with a communist record, cannot work in the diplomatic services. He may work there, but not at this particular place. Russia must know that it will not achieve anything through channels other than the official ones.

[Zaremba] If the president is to do something about it, he must have control over the Foreign Affairs Ministry. However, you are not an advocate of the idea of "presidential" ministries.

[Kaczynski] We are talking about the current legal situation, when these ministries actually exist and Prime Minister Oleksy is responsible for that. After all, he might dismiss two of the presidential ministers. I am talking about two, because I can only be glad that Mr. Bartoszewski agreed to become a member of the Oleksy cabinet.

[Zaremba] What else, aside from control over the diplomatic services, would you like to regain for the Third Republic?

[Kaczynski] The special services, which does not entail the necessity of replacing every single officer with new ones.

[Zaremba] Politicians of the [Freedom] Union [UW] always claimed that more profound changes in the special services were impossible. They said that we would have destroyed those services just like—according to UW politicians—the Czechs destroyed their services.

[Kaczynski] These are views of [Internal Affairs Minister] Andrzej Milczanowski. However, this alternative is false. [passage omitted]

[Zaremba] You are in favor of civilian control over the Armed Forces. However, solid exertion of this civilian control involves decreasing the president's powers and strengthening the powers of the civilian defense minister.

[Kaczynski] The president chairs the National Defense Committee (earlier referred to as the National Security

Council), he appoints the chief of staff, and via the National Security Office, he exerts influence over the war doctrine. He may convene the government and chair the session. He has instruments with which to exert influence. He must act toward changing the equipment the army uses, and changing the doctrine. He must exert pressure to change the principles of financing the Armed Forces. An awful lot of money is being wasted there.

It is also necessary to speed up personnel changes, even though the Armed Forces, as an institution, is irreplaceable.

[Zaremba] Walesa has recently pressed the present governing coalition to increase spending on the Armed Forces. Would you follow in his footsteps?

[Kaczynski] I would, by making a speech in the parliament. However, it is better to exert influence on a coalition that is favorably disposed toward the president, which does not mean that he should take on the role of the head of the government.

[Zaremba] You are counting on such a coalition. What would such a coalition do to decommunize the economy?

[Kaczynski] This does not entail complex measures or anything that would require violation of the market economy foundations. It is a matter of regaining institutions such as banks, and social insurance. When I was with the Supreme Chamber of Control [NIK] I once came across a situation when a bank refused to give us access to the control of several specific loans. The only reason for this was that those loans were extended to very well-connected people. There are people who organize balls and pay \$30,000 for them and who get loans at the cost of tax payers. [passage omitted]

[Zaremba] Part of the right wing considers the Polish Peasant Party [PSL] to be an increasingly attractive political partner. What is your opinion of the peasants, especially in the context of your views on decommunization of the economy?

[Kaczynski] I would pin some of my hopes on PSL only if it reviewed its governing philosophy.

My evaluation of the present philosophy is bad; this assessment also includes what is going on in NIK. This is not a philosophy of governing, but one of benefiting from power.

If I were to choose between a coalition of the peasants and postcommunists and a coalition of the peasants and the post-Solidarity camp, I would choose the latter. However, I would prefer a government without PSL. This is not because I have something against the Peasant Party—on the contrary. However, I have quite a lot

against the methods which the present PSL is using to govern. [passage omitted]

Fast Economic Track To 'Catch Up' With West

LD0810175295 Warsaw PAP in Polish
1452 GMT 8 Oct 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Warsaw, 8 October—According to Leszek Balcerowicz, the leader of the Freedom Union [UW], maintaining Poland's fast economic development will allow us to catch up with the West in two generations, within ten to twenty years.

Balcerowicz spoke at a Sunday conference of the UW devoted mainly to the assessment of the Democratic Left Alliance [SLD]—Polish Peasant Party [PSL] coalition government in the last two years. He adds the converse is also possible, a development standstill.

According to Balcerowicz, the Solidarity governments left Poland "to a large extent reformed." However, those who took over power in 1993 also took advantage of that gift, primarily to gain immediate popularity, "by getting political mileage out of something they did not contribute themselves." They are also adding very little to the breakthrough reforms initiated in 1989.

Provided the reforms are completed speedily, the scenario that we shall catch up with the West in two generations is feasible, the UW leader said. Therefore the UW requires consolidation, as an "indispensable element in any package of reforms." This means better party effectiveness, coherence, and "political marketing." These changes are in progress, Balcerowicz said.

Poll Shows Platforms Vital to Potential Voters

WS0910090595 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA
in Polish 6 Oct 95 pp 1-2

[Article by R.W.: "Platforms Come First"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *The election platforms presented by candidates are of tremendous importance to their potential voters in the presidential election. This, at any rate, is the result of the opinion poll which the Social Research Laboratory [PBS] conducted for RZECZPOSPOLITA in mid-September.*

Other factors which voters consider very important before deciding whom to support in the first round are the achievements of the candidates, their behavior, and party membership. In the second round, if the originally chosen candidate is eliminated, many voters will try to find someone whose views are similar.

He Does Not Have To Be Rich

The respondents were first asked what they will primarily take into account when trying to decide whom to

back in the presidential election. They were presented with a list of possible factors; each respondent could select three which he considered the most important. Nearly two-thirds selected "the election platform presented by the candidate." This factor proved to be particularly important to voters with higher education, holders of high posts, school and university students, as well as to the supporters of the Freedom Union [UW], Polish Peasant Party [PSL], and the Democratic Left Alliance.

If voters really intend to attach so much importance to platforms presented by the candidates, then the election campaign may change their preferences quite considerably. All the more so because a large portion of the society are still undecided, and the fact that there are 17 candidates running for the candidacy does not make the choice any easier.

On the other hand, however, it is also possible that after all the experiences related to elections the faith in preelection promises has decreased. Answers provided to other questions in our poll suggest that few Poles believe that the most important problems of the country will be resolved after the presidential election.

Nearly half of the respondents say that the achievements which the candidates have had so far will influence their decisions in the elections. This issue is stressed especially by people with secondary and higher education, well-off people, public sector employees, and managerial cadres. Less than one-third of the respondents pay any attention to the behavior of their candidates.

Among the important factors influencing their election decisions, one-fourth of the respondents mention the political position of the candidates—to what party they be-

long or what party supports them. This especially goes for educated and well-to-do people, private entrepreneurs, unemployed persons, peasants, as well as voters of the Confederation for an Independent Poland, Union for Real Politics, and PSL.

The candidate's record is of vital importance to one in five potential voters, his looks—to one in 10 voters, opinion of the church—one in 14, opinion on the candidate expressed by his relative or friend—to one in 20, and the candidate's financial status—to one in 25.

Searching for a Similar One

If the candidate chosen before the first round did not get elected to the second round (after all, only two out of the 17 candidates actually will), voters will have to decide once again whom to support. Some voters—13 percent—will not go to the polls at all in such a situation. The rest will back a candidate whose platform will suit them the most (39 percent) or whose views will be close enough to the views of the "first favorite" (31 percent). A similar candidate will be sought primarily by respondents under 40 years of age, with at least secondary education, voters of the Non-Party Bloc in Support of Reforms, Union of Labor, and UW.

Also in the second round of the elections voters will attach importance to such factors as the candidates' achievements, party membership, and their behavior.

PBS conducted the poll for RZECZPOSPOLITA on 16 and 17 September 1995 on a 1,140-person representative sample of adult inhabitants of Poland.

What will influence your decision regarding whom to vote for in the first round of the presidential election?

	Percent
The election platform	62
The candidate's achievements so far	47
The way the candidate behaves	31
Party membership or support from a specific political party	26
The candidate's record	20
The candidate's looks	9
Support of the church	7
Opinion of a relative or friend	5
The candidate's financial status	4
Hard to tell	6

NOTE: Percentages do not add up to 100 because the respondents could list up to three factors.

What will influence your decision regarding whom to vote for in the second round of the presidential election?	
	Percent
The election platform	39
The degree to which the candidate's views are similar to the views of my candidate	31
The candidate's achievements so far	27
Party membership or support from a specific political party	17
The way in which the candidate behaves	15
The candidate's record	10
The candidate's looks	5
Support of the church	5
Opinion of a relative or a friend	4
The candidate's financial status	2
In such a situation I will not go to the polls	13
Hard to tell	7

NOTE: Percentages do not add up to 100 because the respondents could list up to three factors.

No Joint Government-Episcopate Declaration

LD1010191195 Warsaw Polskie Radio First Program
Network in Polish 1700 GMT 10 Oct 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The government has failed to adopt the declaration on the Concordat prepared by the Joint Government-Episcopate Commission. The government has decided to pass its remarks regarding the text of the declaration on for deliberation by the Joint Commission, Deputy Premier Aleksander Luczak has reported. He told journalists that in the view of ministers the text of the declaration might influence legislation consequent upon the Concordat. This relates, amongst other things, to matters of the recognition by registry offices of marriages contracted in church, the compulsory handover by priests of information on the contraction of marriages, burials of persons of other denominations in Catholic cemeteries, the financing of the Papal Theological Academy in Krakow, and the teaching of religion in nursery schools. It was decided that these remarks will be presented to the Joint Commission.

Deputy Prime Minister Luczak said that he is an optimist as to the church addressing these remarks.

The secretary-general of the Polish Episcopate, Bishop Tadeusz Pieronek, called the doubts of the government regarding certain of the clauses in the Concordat frivolous. According to the bishop, the matter of burials in Catholic cemeteries of persons of other denomina-

tions and of atheists is regulated in current legislation, whereas and the administrative recognition of church marriages requires only the determination of the deadline within which a priest is to inform a registry office.

Economic Council Views 1996 Privatization Plan

WS0910090895 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA
in Polish 3 Oct 95 p 9

[Article by A.K.K.: "The Economic Committee of the Council of Ministers Held a Session; Privatization Directions for 1996"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *It is not known yet whether privatization in 1996 will be implemented in line with the old law or with the new one—the law on commercialization and privatization of companies, which was passed by the Sejm and then directed to the Constitutional Tribunal by the president. The Privatization Ministry has prepared a document entitled "Privatization Directions for 1996," which will be a supplement to the budget; the document was based on the "old" law. During its Monday session the Economic Committee of the Council of Ministers [KERM] decided to recommend this document to the Council of Ministers.*

Next year's "Directions" differs from previous such documents in that, for example, it contains an estimate of the value of the national assets which are yet to be privatized. At the end of 1994 there were 3,610 state-owned companies, 386 single-proprietor Treasury-owned companies, 14 financial institutions, and "remnants" from

privatization processes implemented earlier. As much as 76 percent of the national assets (calculated on the basis of the companies' own funds) is concentrated in 176 state-owned firms. The value of these assets is estimated at 75 billion zlotys [Z]; however, the sum is not final and it will be estimated once again.

It follows from the document in question that privatization should be quicker and more efficient next year. Capital privatization should be continued. However, as soon as this year it will be supplemented with a method which has not been used as yet—bidding. In all, the ministry would like to privatize approximately 90 companies by means of this method.

As [Privatization] Minister Wieslaw Kaczmarek said during a briefing after the KERM session, the ministry is planning privatization of several big trade firms (Cefarma, Centrum Department Stores, the Wholesale Food Enterprise, Pewex, Baltona), as well as privatization of the Polish Airlines LOT and the Cegielski Plant. Privatization of industry branches is to be continued as well: tobacco, chemical industry, beer-brewing industry, cement-lime industry, and the machine and electrical engineering industry. The future of the Polish State Railroads and coal holding companies was not decided.

Direct privatization is to remain a very popular method; the ministry would like to select between 150 and 200 companies for this type of privatization.

Another thing which will help speed up privatization processes will be the program of the National Investment Funds [NFI]; last week the government approved the fourth group of companies which are to take part in the program and their shares will be contributed to the funds. The program of Stabilization, Restructuring, and Privatization, which envisions transformation of debts into shares, will be further implemented.

A novelty in the ministry's plans is first of all the issuance of compensation bonds, which are to offset the losses incurred by some senior citizens, pensioners, and the public sector employees; the State Treasury made some financial commitments and then failed to meet them. The ministry prepared conceptions of two draft laws: a law on compensation funds and a law on compensation bonds, which KERM is to discuss again some other time.

According to Wieslaw Kaczmarek, the capital privatization can yield approximately Z1.8 billion to the budget. As far as revenues from fees for shareholders' certificates in the NFI program are concerned, it will be possible to say how high they are no sooner than 1997, that is, when the one-year period of their distribution is over.

Daily Reports on Money-Laundering Offense

WS1110093395 Warsaw **RZECZPOSPOLITA**
in Polish 6 Oct 95 pp 1, 15

[Article by Anna Marszalek: "VAT [value-added tax] as a Paradise for Intelligent Swindlers: A Play for Millions of Dollars"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] *Under the supervision of the local prosecutor's office, the Voivodship Police Headquarters in Krakow is investigating one of the biggest cases of money-laundering and of obtaining value-added tax refunds under false pretenses.*

The group of offenders, which operated until last July, obtained under false pretenses approximately 22 billion old zlotys from tax offices and had prepared documents to obtain another 100 billion [old] zlotys. The tax offices would have paid 18 billion as soon as 7 July, had it not been for the action of the police. So far the police have arrested four businessmen and pseudobusinessmen, sent a "wanted" notice for three, and for one person bail has been produced. **RZECZPOSPOLITA** was told by Krakow Voivodship Police Chief Boguslaw Strzelecki.

According to the police, the money used by the group was obtained by illegal means, and at least \$15 million was laundered in Poland. In addition, between \$10 and \$20 million were to be legalized in the Polish banking system. Involved in this offense were several foreign companies based in: the Virgin Islands, the Isle of Man, Hong Kong, Liberia, Ireland, Liechtenstein, as well as over a dozen Polish firms, including private and state-owned companies having the status of protected job plants [companies employing invalids]. [passage omitted]

Drnovsek, Kucan, Thaler Assess Perry's Visit
AU1010215095 Ljubljana SLOVENSKA VOJSKA
in Slovene 22 Sep 95 p 8

[Unattributed report: "Important Partner for the United States"]

[FBIS Translated Text] A visit by the U.S. Defense Secretary Dr. William Perry was definitely a first-class event. For that reason, we can agree with a correspondent who said that this was the most important visit since Slovenia became an independent country. We asked some of the collocutors with U.S. Defense Secretary to briefly assess the visit by the high U.S. guest to our country for our magazine:

[Box, p 8]

Slovene Prime Minister Dr. Janez Drnovsek: "In the talks, we assessed positively the relations between the countries and concluded that Slovenia definitely wanted to be an element of stability in this part of Europe. I expressed our great interest in the continued cooperation in the defense and strategic sphere. I also informed him about our efforts for the integration with the European Union and NATO alliance. I emphasized Slovenia's great interest in full-fledged NATO membership because our country could, in this way, contribute more toward peace and stability in this part of Europe. I told him about the unfairness of the arms embargo against Slovenia. Dr. William Perry assured us that the United States will study thoroughly and acknowledge Slovenia's expectations regarding the integration with NATO and the lifting of the arms embargo. I am convinced that the visit by State Secretary William Perry will contribute to an even closer cooperation between the states in the defense sphere and other departments."

[Box, p 8]

President of the Republic of Slovenia Milan Kucan: "Slovenia must still be concerned about securing its distinct place on the international scene. The proximity of the Balkan war, the regulation of the relations with Croatia, the bilateral questions raised by Italy, the obstacles in the integration with the European Union, the arms embargo that is preventing us from arming our army with modern arms and technology and is, thus, lowering the guarantees for our own safety and defense—these are all questions that cannot be bypassed in talks with any high-level guest who visits Slovenia. The visit by Defense Secretary Perry showed that Slovenia is an important partner for the United States, which views positively our internal development and our achievements. They assess our development in the defense sphere, the fulfillment of our Partnership for

Peace obligations, the assertion of democratic standards, the depolitization of the army, and the supervision of the civilian state and society over the army particularly positively. The evaluations of the level of training of the Slovene Army are very flattering. They form the basis for future intensive cooperation with the U.S. defense forces and NATO, for the furnishing of the Slovene Army, and for the training and education of our officer cadre. The visit by Defense Secretary Perry is primarily a confirmation of the United States' interest in stability and cooperation with Slovenia and recognition of the Slovene efforts in the process of transition."

[Box, p 8]

Foreign Minister Zoran Thaler: "Mr. William Perry is the defense secretary, however, his visit was very important for Slovenia in terms of foreign policy. It was evidence, which the United States demonstrated at the highest level, that Slovenia is an important partner in this part of Europe. The United States also showed that it is interested in our stable development and that it respects our achievements in the economic and political sphere."

Kacin, U.S. Admiral Discuss Military Cooperation
AU1010214795 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network
in Slovene 1430 GMT 10 Oct 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Defense Minister Jelko Kacin visited the U.S. flagship (Lasalle) in Koper today. The ship has been anchored in Koper harbor for the past few days. With Vice Admiral (Donald Peeling), commander of the 6th Fleet, Kacin discussed future U.S.-Slovene military cooperation. At a working lunch, they were also joined by the U.S. ambassador to Slovenia, Victor Jackovich. Radio Koper correspondent Robert Rakar reports:

[Begin recording] Minister Kacin pointed to the excellent relations and cooperation between the U.S. and Slovene Armies. As he said, both countries are paying the greatest attention to the cooperation of naval units. Kacin and Vice Admiral (Peeling) discussed further cooperation with the U.S. Navy, as each U.S. ship that will sail into Koper will be from the 6th Fleet.

Kacin and (Peeling) also discussed possibilities of providing a full range of supplies for the U.S. ships during their stopover in Koper. A concrete plan of visits by U.S. ships next year will be completed in a little more than a month.

Vice Admiral (Donald Peeling) told the correspondents that the main purpose of his visit was to learn more about the officials in the countries that had joined the Partnership for Peace plan, and also, to introduce the

protocol, decisionmaking, and communication standards that prevail in NATO member states. The visit by the U.S. 6th Fleet commander is, thus, proof that our country was one of the most serious candidates for NATO membership.

U.S. Ambassador Victor Jackovich added that such a high-level military visit, coming very shortly after the visit of U.S. Defense Secretary Perry to Slovenia, was proof of the U.S. Government's support for the democratic processes that have taken place in Slovenia over the past few years. [end recording]

Government Passes 1996 Budget Within Limits

*AU1010220295 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network
in Slovene 2100 GMT 10 Oct 95*

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] After several days of coalition coordination of the distribution of budgetary funds for the coming year, the government met this evening, after it reached an agreement on all fundamental open issues. At the session, the government unanimously passed the proposal of the 1996 budget.

The expenditure from the state budget will amount to 570 billion Slovene tolar. The overall contributions of companies are expected to be reduced by 0.5 percentage point. This reduction will be accomplished with the lowering of the contribution for the pensions and disability fund by 1 percentage point, while the contribution for health insurance is expected to increase by 0.5 percentage points.

Exporters will receive 5 billion tolar worth of subventions from the treasury of the Ministry for Economic Activity. The Ministry of Science and the Labor Ministry will also assist them with the same sum from their treasuries.

The budget surplus of 11 billion tolar will be intended to cover the losses of the pensions and science treasuries next year. A further 6 billion tolar will go for child benefits. The implementation of the law on the so-called universal child benefit will commence in the second half of 1996. [passage omitted]

Federal

Britain's Bonsor Hails Milosevic's 'Efforts'

*AU1010203895 Belgrade RTB Television Network
in Serbo-Croatian 1830 GMT 10 Oct 95*

[Statements by British Foreign Office Minister Nicholas Bonsor and FRY Foreign Minister Milan Milutinovic in Belgrade on 10 October; Bonsor speaks in English with superimposed Serbo-Croatian translation—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Bonsor] The meeting with the president was extremely constructive; I thanked him for his leading role in bringing peace to Bosnia-Herzegovina. I hope that the process will progress, and I believe that now that natural gas and electricity networks have been reconnected, the cease-fire will come into force very soon. Following this, it is very important that we move toward the conference and establish details for a lasting peace solution. My country will do everything within its power to help this process; the talks I had with your president were very constructive and they helped significantly. I have no doubt that we share similar thoughts regarding what needs to be done in order to achieve peace in Bosnia, and to achieve overall peace in the region of the former Yugoslavia. The international community is completely behind you. I would like to thank the minister for the warm reception, and once again to thank the president for the efforts he invested in finding a peaceful solution. I also want to wish him all the best in the future struggle for peace.

[Milutinovic] I have nothing in particular to add; I believe that everything Mr. Bonsor said is accurate and it reflects the true manner in which the talks were conducted. Mr. Bonsor's visit has taken place at the right time, on the eve of, we hope, a comprehensive cessation of hostilities throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina. It also comes on the eve of a big conference which is scheduled for the end of the month. Great Britain's role has been extremely positive throughout the peace process and we value this immensely. Mr. Bonsor's visit today confirms this.

[Unidentified correspondent] How will the progress of the peace process reflect on the suspension and lifting of sanctions for Yugoslavia?

[Bonsor] I hope that once the peace conference has been held, it will be a great step forward toward the lifting of the sanctions; of course, that is an international decision, and my government will certainly be happy to see the sanctions lifted as soon as conditions are met. This will improve Yugoslavia's position in the international community.

End to Sanctions: 'Unavoidable Element' of Peace

*LD1010171895 Belgrade TANJUG in English
1632 GMT 10 Oct 95*

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Bucharest, Oct. 10 (TANJUG)—Speaker of the Yugoslav Parliament's upper house Milos Radulovic said here Tuesday that Yugoslavia would continue making the greatest possible contribution to a peaceful resolution of the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The speaker of the Chamber of Republics said at a session of the Interparliamentary Union that the lifting of the U.N. sanctions against Yugoslavia was a vital and unavoidable element of the Bosnian peace process.

The Yugoslav delegation head reiterated that sanctions were counterproductive and their further implementation only suited forces which were against peace and political dialogue. The Yugoslav parliamentary official set out that the crisis in the former Yugoslavia was at a crossroads.

He expressed conviction that the international community was truly determined to restore peace in the region and would put pressure on the sides which did not abide by the latest ceasefire agreement.

Radulovic stressed that it was of the greatest importance now to secure respect for the principles agreed in Geneva and New York. He said Yugoslavia hoped the agreed ceasefire would be enforced and would mean an end to the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The Yugoslav delegate underscored that air strikes against Bosnian Serbs were not in line with hopes for peace. He said the strikes were a violation of the agreed principle of equal treatment of all warring sides and an encouragement to the advocates of war.

Yugoslavia joins the U.N. Security Council condemnation of the Croatian massacre against Serbs in Krajina and the plundering of their property, Radulovic stressed.

He set out that the problem of the position and rights of Serbs in Croatia was an important issue for the resolution of the crisis in the former Yugoslavia.

The ethnic cleansing carried out in Krajina led to an exodus of Serb civilians, whose rights must be protected by the international community, the Yugoslav parliamentary official said.

Italian Envoy: Sanctions To Be Lifted in Nov*LD1010165095 Belgrade TANJUG in English
1538 GMT 10 Oct 95*

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Oct. 10 (TANJUG)—Italian Charge d'Affaires in Belgrade Francesco Bascone said Tuesday that the signing of a Bosnia peace agreement and complete lifting of the sanctions against Yugoslavia were expected in November [sentence as received].

Being in the neighbourhood, Italy is much more interested in the settlement of the crisis in the former Yugoslavia than other European states, Bascone told a press conference in Belgrade.

He said that Italy had been Yugoslavia's second biggest Western European trade partner and that Italian businessmen were still very interested in this region.

Speaking about the 'Contact group' meeting in Rome last week, Bascone said that criteria had been established for direct international assistance after the signing of a peace agreement. Three plans were made to this end, he said.

The first plan refers to humanitarian aid for all refugees of different ethnic groups in all states that emerged in the territory of the former Yugoslavia.

The second plan refers to the assistance for building and restoring war-torn regions. According to Bascone, one of the conditions for this assistance would be the observation of minority and human rights.

The third plan refers to the rehabilitation and creation of conditions for economic development, normalization and modernization of economy, and creation of conditions for reconciliation.

This can be achieved if a regional approach is taken, Bascone said. We will have to help the regions in the construction of infrastructure, which can be done only if the countries in the territory of the former Yugoslavia cooperate, he added.

Red Cross Chief Describes Refugee Aid Program*LD0710191595 Belgrade TANJUG in English
1856 GMT 7 Oct 95*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Novi Sad, Oct. 7 (TANJUG)—Yugoslav Red Cross Secretary-General Rade Dubajic said Saturday that his organization had continuously been providing for about 400,000 refugees from war-affected territories of the former Yugoslavia.

"These include about 180,000 refugees who have been receiving humanitarian aid since 1991. However, the

newly arrived refugees from the Republic of Serb Krajina, of whom there are more than 200,000, are no doubt in the most difficult position," Dubajic told TANJUG.

He said Serbs expelled from the Republic of Serb Krajina, mostly old and ailing persons and children, were in the greatest need of aid.

The Yugoslav Red Cross's possibilities to provide aid have regrettably been significantly reduced due to the economic sanctions and the impact of the sanctions on the family budgets over the years, Dubajic told TANJUG.

Referring to the significant international humanitarian aid due to start arriving in mid-October, he said the U.N. sanctions committee's red tape required much time, was complicated and slow.

Dubajic made note of the fact that the Yugoslav Red Cross was sending significant aid to the Bosnian Serb republic Republika Srpska (RS).

The aid is mostly sent to the region of the city of Banja Luka in the northern part of the RS, where there are more than 120,000 refugees from Serb territories recently occupied by the Muslim-Croatian coalition.

Maize Harvest Expected To Increase 40 Percent*LD0910142095 Belgrade TANJUG in English
1313 GMT 9 Oct 95*

["Ecopool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Novi Sad, Oct. 9 (TANJUG)—Between 6.8 and seven million tons of maize will be harvested in Yugoslavia this year, 40 percent more than last year, director of the Novi Sad Agricultural Institute Milutin Cirovic told TANJUG on Monday.

Maize covers 1.4 million hectares of fields and its yield stands at 4.2 tons per hectare so far.

As the harvest season is still at its start, crops have been collected from merely about seven or eight percent of the fields, said Cirovic, adding that the average yield was expected to reach five tons per hectare by the end of the season.

Publication of New Economic Magazine Noted*LD0610175895 Belgrade TANJUG in English
1152 GMT 6 Oct 95*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Oct. 6 (TANJUG)—The Belgrade daily Politika said on Friday that together with Belgrade's Komercijalna Banka (Commercial Bank) it had published the first number of the economic magazine Poslovni Krug (Business Circle).

The attractively designed 120-page magazine for businessmen presents numerous economic information and commentaries about the possibilities of the Yugoslav economy.

In the editorial, Governor of the National Bank of Yugoslavia (Central Bank) Dragoslav Avramovic gives his model for overcoming Yugoslavia's current economic difficulties.

One of Yugoslavia's neighbours will be presented in detail in every issue. Greece was presented in the first.

Every issue will include a supplement about transactions in the world markets of money, shares and raw materials.

Serbia

Milosevic, British Minister on Peace Process

LD1010171495 Belgrade TANJUG in English
1615 GMT 10 Oct 95

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Oct 10 (TANJUG)—Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic and State Minister in the British Foreign Office Nicholas Bonsor assessed on Tuesday that the current peace process in Bosnia should be resolutely encouraged and that any obstruction, with a view to continuing the war, should be prevented energetically.

The talks between Milosevic and Bonsor, currently visiting Yugoslavia, focused on moving forward the peace process to the final stage, and on meeting necessary conditions for normalizing life in the war-ravaged areas, the Serbian president's office said.

At the present hour, it is of paramount importance to accept and confirm the opinion that peace in the former Yugoslav Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina would be secured by a normalization of life, and that the agreed principles, or political settlement, represented a turnaround from a warlike to a pacific way of looking at life and at relations between citizens and peoples.

At the talks was also present Yugoslav Foreign Minister Milan Milutinovic, the statement said.

Milosevic 'Leading Role' Noted

AU1010191195 Paris AFP in English
1755 GMT 10 Oct 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Oct 10 (AFP)—Sir Nicholas Bonsor, a junior minister at the British Foreign Office, said Tuesday he had thanked Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic for his "leading role" in seeking a Bosnian peace settlement.

Bonsor held an hour of talks with Milosevic on the latest developments in Bosnia. "The meeting with the president was extremely constructive," he said.

The junior minister said he hoped that a U.S.-brokered cease-fire would go into effect "very shortly" following the restoration of power supplies to the Bosnian capital Sarajevo. "Everything that my country can do to assist in that process, we clearly will," he added.

Milosevic has pushed his former proteges the Bosnian Serbs towards accepting an international peace plan for Bosnia, though he is widely credited with having launched the conflict in 1992 by arming and assisting the rebel Serbs with both men and material.

Third of Serbs Oppose 'Multiparty' Democracy

LD1010145895 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian
1006 GMT 10 Oct 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Belgrade, 10 Oct (SRNA)—Over one third (35.4 percent) of Serbia's citizens (excluding Kosovo) has a strong negative attitude towards the multiparty political system and believe that all parties should be abolished, according to an earlier opinion poll carried out by the Institute for Philosophy and Social theory from Belgrade. The results of this research have now been released.

Agency BETA reports that the aim of this research, conducted in October 1993 by Zagorka Golubovic, Mirjana Vasovic, and Bora Kuzmanovic, was to examine the influence of the radical sociopolitical changes in the area of the former Yugoslavia on the opinions, beliefs, and values of citizens.

The sample covered by the poll included 1,555 people, 22 percent from Vojvodina, 25 percent from Belgrade, and 53 percent from central Serbia.

As many as nearly 30 percent of interviewees from Belgrade and Vojvodina and 53 percent from central Serbia oppose parliamentary democracy.

The abolishment of multiparty democracy is supported mostly by citizens with little education—55.5 percent with primary education as opposed to 19 percent with high school and university degrees. [passage omitted] The highest percentage of those who oppose multiparty democracy is among unskilled workers—67 percent and members of the ruling Socialist Party of Serbia—46.5 percent]

Serb Spokesman Assesses Bosnia Peace Deal

MS0610132495 London ITV Television Network
in English 1800 GMT 6 Oct 95

[Interview with Marko Gasic, Serbian Information Center spokesman, by presenter Zeinab Badawi in the London studio; from the "Channel Four" newscast—live]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] [Badawi] General Mladic and Radovan Karadzic have in the past displayed no appetite for making peace, what guarantees are they giving this time for the cease-fire deal?

[Gasic] On the contrary, they have been asking for peace for the last two years and we would have had a peace months ago had the Americans—rather crucial players in this had chosen instead of bombing the Bosnian Serbs, to pressure the Bosnian Moslems into agreeing to a cease-fire. It's no coincidence that the Bosnian Moslems have agreed to a cease-fire at a time when they are losing territory rather than winning it through military conquest which they were doing a week ago. So there is a direct connection between their military conquest and their reluctance to accept a cease-fire.

[Badawi] If the Bosnian-Serbs are talking peace, why, as we heard in our report earlier on, are they, even as we speak retaking land around Kljuc?

[Gasic] The Bosnian-Serbs are taking back the territory which was conquered by the Bosnian Moslems in recent weeks after Nato conveniently bombed the Serbian defenses, and the Bosnian Moslems and Croats were able to walk through the Serbian lands and expel the Serbian civilians behind those front lines. It's entirely legitimate that Serbians would reclaim their Bosnian-Serbian Republic of Srpska from Moslem and Croat conquest.

[Badawi] Are they genuinely committed, General Mladic and Radovan Karadzic now, to making sure that today's cease-fire deal will stick, will they really adhere to the conditions?

[Gasic] Well, there is a big commitment on the part of the Bosnian Serbs for peace, because at the end of the day, they don't claim all of Bosnia for themselves, they claim a part of Bosnia. The problem has always been that the so-called Bosnian Government, in reality the Bosnian-Moslem Government, has actually claimed all of Bosnia which includes the Serbian lands of Bosnia for itself. The willingness of the Bosnian Serb leadership can't be denied in respect of peace. They really are for it, and they have been arguing for it for the last two years.

[Badawi] The United States has said as part of this deal, there will be sixty days to discuss a final settlement. Do you think sixty days is enough?

[Gasic] This is a problem, there is a timebomb in this cease-fire. It's not a permanent cease-fire. What the Bosnian Serbs have wanted has been a permanent cease-fire, we haven't got it yet. The problem is that if the Bosnian Moslems don't get what they want at the negotiating table by diktat, then they will try and impose a peace with their American alliance on the battlefield. And the question is—will the Americans support the peace option or the Bosnian-Moslem war option.

[Badawi] What are the stumbling blocks from the Bosnian-Serb point of view, what are the real things they would never give up?

[Gasic] The stumbling blocks are various.

[Badawi] The key ones?

[Gasic] The key plans are—the key problems for the Bosnian-Serbs are that the windpipe, the corridor of life for the Bosnian-Serbia's linking them to Serbia proper, and the tendency of peace plans like the one giving Goradze to the Moslems to divide the Bosnian-Serbian Republic of Srpska into several parts, these are the problems, these are the sticking points for the Bosnian-Serbs.

[Badawi] And just one very very brief question—two of the key signatories, General Mladic and Radovic Karadzic, the Bosnian-Serb leaders, both indicted on war crimes by the International Crimes Tribunal. Do you want to have immunity from prosecution for them?

[Gasic] Well, first of all, this whole trial is a charade. It's a political show trial financed by the Americans. To call it a kangaroo court is to insult the kangaroo, really. This—of course, the Bosnian-Serbs wouldn't expect to be prosecuted by such a charade of a trial, and certainly President Tudjman [Croat President], or rather General Tudjman should expect to be called to account for his crimes in the Krajina.

Trade Unions Assail 80-Percent Poverty Level

AU0910183695 Belgrade POLITIKA
in Serbo-Croatian 1 Oct 95 p 13

[Article by Radojka Nikolic: "Purchasing Power Ever Smaller"]

[FBIS Translated Text] From September bread and electricity have cost more, while from October the cost of public utilities and transportation will be increasing as well. Other costs have also been increasing, which caused 10.2-percent inflation in September, while this

year, compared with last year's average, inflation has already exceeded 100.8 percent.

To what extent is such a dynamic growth in prices and the cost of living endangering standards of living in our country?

Undoubtedly, the price increases are increasingly seriously threatening standards of living, because with the average salary increasing by 22 percent since last December, the cost of living has increased over the same period by 74 percent. Statistically, this September, compared with December last year, the living standards of the majority of people have fallen by half.

In all this, the problem does not only lie in the increasing price of food, but also in the costs of various services, public utilities, electricity, and other expenses. For instance, food prices have increased by 60 percent since last December, but at the same time rents have increased by 105 percent, and charges for various services by 90 percent. Are living standards threatening to plummet?

Rapid Impoverishment

In recent days there have been frequent warnings from the trade unions. Last week, at the meeting of the Presidency of the Yugoslav Trade Unions, Chairman Dragan Radulovic said that citizens had been cruelly divided into the extremely poor, who make up 90 percent of the population, and the new elite, small in number, which is chiefly engaged in the gray economy, smuggling, or criminal activities. The Montenegrin trade union has also at several recent meetings said that poverty is knocking at our door. According to its information, 90 percent of the population buy only basic food supplies, while 80 percent of citizens in that republic live in poverty.

The consumer basket, according to assessments in Montenegro, costs more than 1,000 dinars a month, which is just covered by two average monthly salaries of a doctor, or by three average monthly salaries of a school teacher.

Is the trade union naturally just warning of its membership's problems or are living standards being seriously endangered?

To judge from many indicators, the latter is the case. This is because in recent months over the last year there has not been a single price of goods or in the service sector that has not increased. Exceptions are found only with the prices of agricultural produce, many of which were still at last year's level this September, even in dinars. Last autumn, winter paprika cost two or three dinars per kilogram, potatoes cost 60 to 80 paras [a hundredth of a dinar] per kilogram, and cabbage

was being sold at between 70 paras and one dinar per kilogram. These are seasonal products that simply have to be sold, since farmers cannot make any other use of them since they are grown for the market anyway. For that reason, they are sold at the price that the buyer is ready to pay. Unfortunately, the market cannot protect living standards for ever and salvation through vegetables on market counters is possible only as long as the season lasts.

Household Appliances—Unthinkable

The weakening of people's purchasing power becomes even more apparent and measurable if expressed through the hard currency exchange rate on the black market. While, for instance, the average December salary (283 dinars) was worth 180 German marks [DM], according to the black market exchange rate, the average August salary of 348 dinars was worth hardly more than DM150. With such salaries, it is highly improbable that people can live easily, even if every household had several such salaries each month to live on. The costs of rent, electricity, and public utilities, after the latest increase, exceed on average half a salary, while DM400 is necessary each month just for groceries.

Because of all this, at trade union meetings last week remarks were heard that workers can no longer even think about buying household appliances, consumer durables, or furniture.

These remarks are well founded, because, in view of the average salary, who could even think about buying a refrigerator or an oven, which cost over 2,000 dinars, or furniture for a living room, which, after a well advertised price reduction costs 4,000 dinars (instead of the previous 5,500 dinars)? One cannot even think about such a standard of living, because the notion of standard is now reduced to mere survival and even this demands great sacrifices.

The way to a better standard of living, of course, requires increased production and more successful business. Whether this will come about and whether the long-announced measures of official economic policy will curb the inflation and make better living standards possible, remains uncertain, at least until the results are announced, which are expected within the next few days.

Zastava Workers Demand Paychecks in Belgrade*AU0610145795 Belgrade VECERNJE NOVOSTI
in Serbo-Croatian 6 Oct 95 p 8*

[Article by Z.K.: "They Are Demanding Regular Paychecks"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Some 250 workers of the Zastava Namenski Proizvodi [special purposes production] company from Kragujevac demonstrated yesterday in the Trade Union House demanding more regular paychecks, hot meals, and some of their vacation bonus to be paid with their August paychecks. They demanded that the dates of issue of all paychecks be specified and that if certain changes occur, the responsibility should be shouldered by the general manager.

According to Zoran Nedeljkovic, head of the striking committee, some 5,000 workers have been on strike for seven days, yet the general manager never once addressed them. He also said that not a single paycheck date had been met so far and that the workers were receiving 5, 10, and 15 percent of their salaries. Many of the workers held this against General Manager Vukasin Filipovic, which made it necessary for them to come to Belgrade and talk to him.

Answering workers accusations, Filipovic stressed that Zastava's salaries were the highest in the special purposes production branch, that everything they have earned would be paid out to them, and that fresh installments of the salaries were due within 10 days. The workers, however, demanded the paychecks immediately.

In an attempt to help find a solution to the problem, Branko Savic, deputy federal minister for economy, addressed the assembled workers and stressed that it was essential that they find a common language with their leadership. He suggested that all problems should be solved within the plant and that if no agreement is reached, the ministry would help.

Sombor Military Airport To House Civil Airport*AU1110123895 Belgrade POLITIKA
in Serbo-Croatian 10 Oct 95 p 15*

[Article by R.S.: "Airport Construction Has Begun"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Sombor, Oct.—The construction of a civilian airport has recently begun in Sombor. According to Nemanja Zivadinovic, director of the public enterprise "Sombor Airport Under Construction," the civilian airport is being built within the wider area of the military one. For this reason its construction will be much cheaper. It is expected that airplanes will begin taking off from this airport in July next year.

Print, Broadcast Media Developments Detailed**Reporters Demand Veto Right***AU2709153595 Ljubljana DELO in Slovene
26 Sep 95 p 24*

[Article by Slobodan Dukic: "NASA BORBA Reporters Announced Strike"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Belgrade 25 September—The journalists of the independent daily NASA BORBA announced that they would go on strike in the middle of this week if the new variant of the paper's statute, demanded by the paper's owner and publisher, Dusan Mijic, is not coordinated with the text prepared by the editorial board.

The editorial board demands that this document includes the right of veto for representatives of the editorial board in the managerial board on the appointment of the editor in chief. The reporters emphasize that they are demanding this veto in order to establish an independent editorial policy. With this the conflict between the editorial board and the owner, who is trying to push his own man as editor in chief on the editorial board, has finally escalated. It is rumored that the post would be taken by Branislav Milosevic, former Serbian culture minister. He would supposedly replace Gordana Logar, who, to protect the interests of the editorial board, had withdrawn her resignation. [passage omitted]

NASA BORBA Editors Quit*AU0410082595 Belgrade POLITIKA
in Serbo-Croatian 3 Oct 95 p 12*

[Report by BETA: "NASA BORBA Editorial Collegium Resigns"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Editorial Collegium of the Belgrade daily of NASA BORBA has tendered its collective resignation, the BETA agency learned today.

It was decided that the current collegium will edit and prepare today's NASA BORBA for the last time.

It is said in the text of the resignation that, at its session held on 1 October, the Collegium examined its position within the newspaper considering the fact that it had conditionally tendered its collective resignation on 13 October for reasons that it acquainted the editorial board with. The resignation was accepted at a session held on 14 September.

The main reason for the dispute is that the editorial board was denied the right to veto the appointment of the chief editor.

BETA has learned at the NASA BORBA Editorial Board that the newspaper's owner, Dusan Mijic, is trying to replace Chief Editor Gordana Logar with Branislav Milosevic in favor of whom only seven journalists out of 85 had voted at a secret ballot held last week.

As the paper's owner failed to start meeting the set conditions by the given date (30 September), the Collegium decided unanimously for the conditional resignations to become final on 2 October.

The text of the Collegium's collective resignation was sent to the paper's editor in chief, Gordana Logar, who did not attend the meeting, and the paper's owner, Dusan Mijic.

The decision on whether the NASA BORBA Editorial Board will stage a strike, as it announced last week, will depend on the outcome of the session of the Managing Board of the Fininvest firm, which owns NASA BORBA. The Managing Board will meet in Novi Sad this afternoon.

Editor in Chief Rejected

AU0610080795 Belgrade POLITIKA
in Serbo-Croatian 4 Oct 95 p 12

[Report by BETA: "Dusan Bogdanovic Acting Editor in Chief"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Novi Sad, 3 Oct—BETA has learned that the board of directors of the Novi Sad Fininvest company, which owns the daily NASA BORBA, today appointed Dusan Bogdanovic, hitherto head of the daily's Novi Sad office, acting editor in chief.

The NASA BORBA editorial board disagreed with this decision and today refused to vote on it.

The NASA BORBA editorial board yesterday tendered a collective resignation following a conflict with owner Dusan Mijic. The editorial board has announced that today's issue of the paper would be the last that it has put together.

The principal reason for the conflict between the NASA BORBA editorial board and Mijic is withholding the journalists' right to veto the election of editor in chief.

TV Stations Criticized

AU0410074995 Belgrade POLITIKA
in Serbo-Croatian 29 Sep 95 p 39

[Commentary by Branka Otasevic: "Prettily Made-Up Eyes"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Amid the general apathy of the domestic public that should be getting used to

the (futile?) loss of Serbian heads, land, houses, and illusions as a fait accompli, the media are failing to help as much as they could. Even Radio-Television Serbia [RTS], ever ready for propaganda turnabouts in its efforts to serve the current tactical goals of the one ruling party and the one ruling man (it is difficult to speak about a strategy as people here are thinking, working, and living one day at a time), did not use all its power to replace the concept of "defeat" with the concept of "peace" in the citizens' consciousness. Still, occasionally slipping by would be a few reports about the RS ["Serb Republic"—Serb entity in Bosnia-Herzegovina] army "advancing" before the enemy and about refugees from Jajce, Mrkonjic Grad, and Sanski Most getting killed. The refugees from Glamoc, [Bosansko] Grahovo, and Drvar, who had arrived in Banja Luka earlier on, are being mentioned ever less frequently, and those from August and from Knin, Benkovac, Dvor, and Glina already belong to the distant past.

Probably believing—just as the U.S. Administration, NATO officials, and foreign mediators are—that the sheer density of tragic events is speedily bringing us to peace, RTS programs hardly take notice of "secondary" results in approaching the great goal (objectively speaking, with time, the goal has become increasingly narrower and is now mostly reduced to the lifting of sanctions on the FRY).

It seems that the SPO's [Serbian Renewal Movement] Vuk Draskovic, who until recently fiercely advocated the demise of the RTS, is not going to storm the "Television Bastille"—he has simply set off to bring it down from the inside. True, he has still not entered the building at 10 Takovska Street, but his interview with Politika Television and extensive quotations from the SPO proclamation carried in the "Dnevnik" newscast look promising (for him).

At the beginning, Draskovic used to be the main media promoter of the entire opposition. His party, from which NTV Studio B, as well as Belgrade viewers, profited so much, "undermined" the announced "NTV package" and the much needed meeting of the parliamentary parties' representatives. The fact that the opportunity was missed for talks between the people's deputies regarding that people's fate and close future—and there is no such opportunity in the Assembly (because "there is no constitutional basis for convening such a meeting")—has at least weakened the position of NTV Studio B. This house whose programs had an answer to everything and managed to open the public's eyes even when all this was at its beginning now seem to be lethargic.

BK [Karic Brothers] Television, which promotes itself with the motto "the television with open eyes," is widening its obviously prettily made-up eyes carefully and gradually, albeit more slowly than the public needs (and probably unlike the station's owners and editors). If the selection and presentation of the news in the "Telefakt" program, behind the intriguing sentence of "This is what today looks like," do not deserve much criticism, the rest of the information offered at BK TV fails to fulfill its promises or meet expectations. Neither the "invited" commentators nor the house's own authors, as in the new programs of "Gea" and "Portret," manage to penetrate deeper below the surface of shaky Balkan political ground, which is so strongly shaking perhaps before settling down.

An escape from physical and mental tremors into a pink life is offered by TV Pink. As a rule, the greatest quantity of bad taste, banality, and kitsch offered by a privately owned station would be in the programs having the word "love" in their titles. "Normal" is the favorite word of Zoran Ramovic, presenter in the "Love Is But a Word" program, but it is not quite normal that so much babbling, prattling, and emptiness is found in a television channel of the so-called capital city. A similar tone can also be heard in a program where the word "fashion" is added to the word "love."

There have been some protests on the part of prominent people from the world of fashion on the occasion of Altman's film "Haute Couture." Is somebody here bothered by the fact that television links fashion to superficiality and emptiness and that it is becoming a cover for stupidity?

'Reshuffle' Expected at RTS

AU0510124695 Belgrade VECERNJE NOVOSTI
in Serbo-Croatian 4 Oct 95 p 19

[Article by M.K.: "Spring Cleaning"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Following the resignation of Radio Television Serbia [RTS] chief Milorad Vucelic, a large-scale reshuffle is expected in our biggest television station!

For the time being, it is only known that our renowned director, Jovan Ristic, has been appointed deputy general manager of RTS program policy. (Incidentally, some of the new television stations were competing to get Ristic).

The other names that are supposed to move either upwards or downwards or to leave RTS are, as yet, only "rumors." We have learned, however, that everything will depend on the new Board of Directors, which should be elected by the end of the month.

BORBA Editor in Chief Appointed

AU0510095695 Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian
4 Oct 95 p 1

[Unattributed report: "Zivorad Djordjevic Is Director and Editor in Chief of BORBA"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The federal government yesterday appointed Dr. Zivorad Djordjevic director and editor in chief of the BORBA Newspaper Publishing Enterprise. Prior to this appointment, Dr. Djordjevic had been acting editor in chief of BORBA.

The BORBA editorial board expresses its gratitude to Dragutin Brcin, previous director of the BORBA Newspaper Publishing Enterprise, for his work and great contribution so that our paper can continue the tradition of successful journalism in this region.

Croatian Serbs Launch Paper

LD1010231595 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service
in Serbo-Croatian 1256 GMT 10 Oct 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Belgrade, 10 Oct (TANJUG)—The first edition of SRPSKA KRAJINA, an independent newspaper of the exiled inhabitants of the Republic of Serb Krajina, came off the presses today.

The publisher is the private company ZM from Batajnica [near Belgrade], and copublishers are the RSK news agency, ISKRA, the Serbian cultural association, Zora, the documentation and information center, Veritas, and the Kninska Krajina club. [passage omitted]

Montenegro

Djukanovic's Suspension of Payments Assailed

LD1010201395 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service
in Serbo-Croatian 1736 GMT 10 Oct 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Podgorica, 10 Oct (TANJUG)—The People's Party of Montenegro is very upset about a statement by Prime Minister Milo Djukanovic in which he says Montenegro has suspended payments of customs duties and taxes into federal coffers because of the federal government's debts to the Montenegrin Pension and Disability Insurance Fund, it was said at a party news conference in Podgorica today.

Djukanovic's statement, according to the People's Party, proves that in Montenegro the Constitution has been subordinated to the "arbitrariness" of the republic's power brokers who restrict the authority of the federal state, and then complain that this same state does not function. [passage omitted]

Montenegro Stops Sending Federal Tax to Belgrade

AU0810205595 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network
in Slovene 1800 GMT 8 Oct 95

[FBIS Translated Text] A decree whereby Montenegrins will no longer forward funds accrued from import tariffs and the value-added tax to Belgrade became effective today. The government in Podgorica so decided because the federal authorities in Belgrade do not send it funds for pensions and disability insurance of the Montenegrins. The disagreements between Serbia and Montenegro, thus, have resulted in an open economic dispute. Matej Surc reports from Belgrade:

[Begin recording] The money that the Montenegrins accrue from import tariffs and value-added tax will, therefore, stay at home now. These funds will be used for the pensions of Montenegrin pensioners, who have been waiting for the money from the federal treasury in vain for several months.

The government in Podgorica merely informed Belgrade about it, while Montenegrin Prime Minister Djukanovic explained that the measure was absolutely necessary since Serbia would not even hear of a compromise to resolve this issue. The move of Podgorica is, therefore, merely a reply to the increasingly more open economic exploitation of Montenegro, whom Serbia treats as a subordinate partner.

President Bulatovic acknowledged the political subservience and, thus, placed the fate of his ecological statelet in Milosevic's hands. However, when it comes to money, even the friendships seemingly as firm as the one between Serbs and Montenegrins end.

The president of the Montenegrin Economic Chamber has recently warned: We will either be an equal partner in the federation or we will secede from it. Here he cited vivid proof of how Serbia is violating the agreements. According to the energy distribution plan, a little more than 6 percent of domestic oil derivatives fall on Montenegro. However, out of the already meager 6 percent Montenegro only receives 20 percent. For that reason the economic elite in Podgorica warned Belgrade that Montenegro did not intend to be a Serbian milking cow, however, and that it could turn into a second Slovenia, which means a choice between equality and disassociation.

Because of his sharp stance toward Belgrade, Montenegrin Prime Minister Djukanovic crossed swords with Mira Markovic, leader of the neocommunist movement and Serbian President Milosevic's wife, who is striving the hardest to turn Montenegro into one of the Yugoslav regions. [end recording]

Recent Price Increases Termed 'Devastating'

AU0910180295 Podgorica POBJEDA
in Serbo-Croatian 4 Oct 95 p 4

[Report by JS. S.: "Alarming Prices"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Podgorica, 3 Oct—Prices, a hot and current topic, are the permanent subject of discussions among workers and the trade unions. The latest increases have been devastating for the consumers, but also for the results of the country's economic recovery program; the prices of basic items and services have increased: bread, milk, meat, cooking oil, electricity, water, etc.

Loans for firewood and winter food reserves are the only salvation for citizens threatened by poverty, according to the Montenegrin trade union, which has stressed that the sharp and drastic fall in living standards has deeply disturbed all citizens.

A consumer basket containing 43 essential food items for an average four-member family today costs 1,361.20 dinars, 200 dinars more than a fortnight ago. This is a heavy blow to living standards and the best illustration of its downward spiral. Four average Montenegrin salaries are needed for this consumer basket and the monthly family budget must include 40 percent more money for electricity, personal hygiene items, utilities, telephone, clothing, shoes, etc.

Latest Data on Refugees To Be Determined

AU0810220995 Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian
4 Oct 95 p 20

[Article by B. Pejovic: "Forty-Three Thousand Refugees in Montenegro"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Podgorica—In Montenegro, before the latest wave, there were 40,188 registered refugees. To this number should be added 2,300 from Krajina and around 400 from Herzegovina, which means that at the moment there are nearly 43,000 refugees in Montenegro—as we were told by the Committee for Displaced Persons. Estimates say that there are several hundred more unregistered people, mostly those who fled the Serb Republic, who are accommodated privately.

From the beginning of the war on the territory of the former Yugoslavia, the fluctuation of a fleeing population has been large. Montenegro was often a "passing station," so that at one moment it had over 70,000 refugees, which amounts to 12 percent of the republic's entire population. In the Committee for Displaced Persons they claim that, in proportion to the number of the population, more people are

accommodated in Montenegro than in Serbia. The Committee is going to conduct a poll in the course of this and next month, to establish new, more complete data on the number, status, and material situation of the displaced persons.

The reason for the poll, they say, is to assess the number of refugees who left Montenegro without having registered. Others have decided to become permanent residents of Montenegro and their problem should be solved in a different way. Besides, a number of refugees have managed to permanently solve the issue of their employment and existence for themselves and their families in Montenegro so that they no longer depend on humanitarian aid. In the committee they point out that apart from a more accurate insight into the number and the situation of the refugees, this action has no other function.

Kosovo

Downplaying of U.S. Aid Labeled 'Harmful'

AU1010142595 Zurich BOTA SOT in Albanian
2 Oct 95 p 2

[Article by Enver Maloku: "Silence on the U.S. Senate Aid for Kosovo"]

[FBIS Translated Text] It has almost become the practice in Kosovo no longer to register and "materialize" foreign aid and good words and deeds for Kosovo.

Thus, the U.S. Senate's 21 September decision to grant at least \$6 million in aid to Kosovo passed almost unnoticed.

Behind this decision lies the personal commitment of Senator Bob Dole, leader of the Republican majority in the U.S. Congress.

There is almost no doubt that the decision will take effect soon, while the commitment of President Clinton's Administration to the Kosovo issue is well known.

The \$6 million aid to be granted to Kosovo as humanitarian aid is a continuation of the aid of almost the same value that was provided this year.

The sum may perhaps seem small, but it has a symbolic significance as it is distinct from the \$40 million destined for the former Yugoslavia.

On the other hand, \$6 million (approximately 9 million German marks) is not to be ignored because it is being ignored by Albanian newspapers and politicians.

This amount is nearly the same as the amount of aid collected last year within the framework of the great campaign for the Albanian school.

Otherwise, the amount is many times higher than the aid collected in last year's campaign to assist those needing help in Kosovo and which was initiated by the Sector for Solidarity of the Democratic League of Kosovo Presidency.

U.S. aid can be ranked as the highest aid granted to Kosovo.

That is why it seems absurd to ignore it, although it is understandable after the lengthy propaganda campaign by Albanian circles in both Albania and Kosovo against the international community's role in resolving the crisis in the former Yugoslavia and in resolving the Kosovo issue and the Albanian issue in general.

Because of the demonization of the West today very few report and respect the deeds, aid, assessments, and foreign commitments for Kosovo and Albanians, particularly by the United States and Germany, but also Switzerland.

This silence is strange and absolutely harmful.

It is known that Albanians have sought residence and work in these states, whereas the question of Kosovo cannot be favorably resolved without the assistance of the United States and Germany.

The articles and statements against the international community come mainly from those circles that have sung the praises of "brotherhood with Russia and China" and "brotherhood and unity with the peoples of Yugoslavia."

What is surprising, however, is that Albanians are again falling into the traps of this propaganda and the disguised strategies whose objective is to have Albania, Kosovo, and Albanians ruled by the East and Moscow and Belgrade.

For this reason, the \$6 million allocated by the U.S. Senate for Kosovo is important both in terms of the amount and as a gesture. Even the Serbian media could not remain silent on this. In its 30 September issue, the Serbian newspaper VECERNJE NOVOSTI published a report about this gesture, basing their objection mainly on the theses of "the Albanian circles."

Vojvodina

Ethnic Hungarians Protest 'Abusive Letters'

LD1010175895 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network
in Hungarian 1600 GMT 10 Oct 95

[FBIS Translated Text] This time [ethnic] Hungarians of Subotica [Szabadka] have received abusive letters in which unknown people demanded that they should leave Vojvodina.

For this reason, the Association of Vojvodina Hungarians has again asked Serbian President Milosevic and Yugoslav Prime Minister Kotic to receive representatives of the Hungarian community. They would like to report on attacks and threats against the minorities of Vojvodina.

Earlier the association had already asked for a meeting with Serbian and Yugoslav leaders. At that time, a few weeks ago, Hungarians of Sombor [Zombor] received letters from unknown people demanding their flight.

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